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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system the integration of national 
financial markets grew steadily, to reach unprecedented levels. At the same time, 
episodes of extreme financial instability became more frequent. The latter were often 
extremely contagious, in the sense that country-specific episodes had hugely 
disruptive effects on financial markets across the globe. The literature on Financial 
Contagion investigates the channels through which that instability is propagated. This 
thesis deals with the two most recurring questions in the literature:  
1) What are the channels of macroeconomic instability propagation?  
A theoretical model of instability propagation in presence of currency mismatches 
is presented. The model shows that when domestic agents’ liabilities are denominated 
in foreign currency, exchange rate volatility raises credit costs, with negative real 
effects. Currency mismatches therefore create a channel through which external 
disturbances causing exchange rate volatility affect negatively the domestic supply.  
Several reasons why currency mismatches might magnify the effect of foreign 
disturbances have been identified by the theoretical literature on the issue. The 
empirical relevance of the magnification hypothesis is tested by investigating whether 
the degree of domestic output’s sensitivity to foreign output fluctuations is higher in 
countries where currency mismatches are widespread than in countries able to borrow 
abroad in domestic currency. The analysis gives strong support to the hypothesis: 
currency mismatches magnify the real effects of foreign disturbances. The analysis 
also highlights the presence of asymmetry of propagation: negative shocks have 
proportionally stronger real effects than positive ones in currency-mismatches-prone 
countries. 
2) Is the financial shocks propagation mechanism altered by major events such as 
banking or currency crises? 
The intensity of propagation of the crises in the ‘90s led researchers to ask whether 
the linkages between countries grew stronger during these turbulent times or were 
instead as strong before. Various tests of the instability of the propagation mechanism 
have been proposed since. These can be divided in two families: correlation-based 
and extreme-event-based tests. I propose a new approach, based on the Quantile 
Regression technique. It is argued that this approach retains the appealing features of 
the two families of test while avoiding some of their limitations. The new approach is 
then applied to stock market returns, finding strong evidence of instability of the 
propagation mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Why study contagion  
 
During the two centuries passed since financial intermediation became a crucial 
sector of the economic organization of societies, financial instability has been a 
common experience. Whether one uses this term to describe a Balance of Payment 
crisis with a devaluation of the currency, a banking crisis in which a country 
experiences bankruptcy of financial institutions or a mix of these two events, these 
have pointed the economic history of modern world (Bordo et al. 2001, Allen-Gale 
2007, ch. 1, Reinhard and Rogoff 2009).  
Nonetheless, the frequency of these varied significantly among different époques. 
Banking panics leading to runs and eventually bankruptcies have plagued Europe and 
the United States throughout the nineteenth century. The creation of central banks 
was aimed directly to the containment of these panics, and it succeeded in doing this. 
In Europe, England’s Central Bank learned how to prevent nationwide banking crises 
and the last such episode took place in 1866. Panics affecting single banking 
institutions did not happen for over a century, until the demise of Northern Rock in 
2007. A central banks system with power and coordination comparable to nowadays 
standards was instead established later in the US, specifically after the trauma of the 
Great Depression. The introduction of central banks effectively curtailed the diffusion 
of economy-wide bank crises in Europe and the States. This historical experience 
influenced strongly the interpretation of these episodes. Especially after the Great 
Depression, banking crises were seen as a market failure, to be avoided at all costs 
(Kindleberger 1978, Diamond and Dybvig 1983). This frame of mind was dominant 
in 1948, when the Bretton Woods system was created. It is the unsurprising that   the 
latter entailed extensive regulation of the financial system. As a consequence, 
banking crises (of even a much smaller severity than the 19th century ones) virtually 
disappeared.  
From the beginning of the ‘70s it became clear that the elimination of banking 
crises came with a cost. This was in the form of slow development and deepening of 
credit markets due to excessive regulation, leading to scarcity and inefficiency of 
banks’ investment allocation and ultimately lower growth (King and Levine 1993). 
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Calls for deregulation became usual. Banking crises ceased to be seen as pure market 
failures, driven by the irrationality of depositors. Instead an alternative interpretation 
of crises as an integral part of the business cycle gained popularity (Gorton 1988). 
This approach highlighted the intrinsic weakness of the banking system during 
economic downturns. Holding illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, banks cannot 
satisfy the liquidity demand depositors show when they predict low assets’ returns. 
Depositors are therefore rational in their running, because they predict correctly that 
bank’s revenues will not be enough to pay all depositors’ claims. The factor causing 
banking crises is then aggregate risk on asset returns, not depositors’ irrationality. It 
follows that runs are rational and, as long as central banks intervention allows 
troubled banks to avoid a premature sell of their illiquid assets, optimal too. 
Government intervention is thus seen as necessary, but only to manage the failure of 
financial institutions in an orderly way. As these considerations gained popularity, the 
financial sector underwent a substantial deregulation in most of OECD countries, and 
banking crises reappeared.  
Currency crises had, on the other hand, a more constant distribution throughout 
the 19th and 20th centuries, quite irrespective to the dominant policy environment in 
that moment. Since the reappearance of banking crises in the late ‘70s, the latter have 
been often followed by Balance of Payment distress and eventually crises. This 
phenomenon attracted the attention of economists, as the recent development of “twin 
crises” models testifies (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999).  
Financial instability has then featured prominently in the economic history of the 
world in the last two centuries. Just as much as its frequency, its costs make it an 
important topic of research. Bordo et al. (2001) estimate the costs of financial crises 
as the difference between the cumulative drop in output during normal recessions 
(from the peak of the business cycle until the year when growth returns to its pre-
crisis level) and during recessions accompanied by financial crises. The estimated 
output losses are sizeable. Over a period of 120 years, the sample of twenty-one 
middle to high-income countries lost an average of 9% of GDP per crisis. Since the 
probability of a random country in the sample incurring in a crisis is 8% per year, 
rough calculations suggest that the countries in the sample lost 1 percentage point of 
annual growth due to financial crises. This is a huge number: a 1% higher growth 
increases incomes by a third in 25 years. Hoggarth et al (2002) focus on banking 
crises and find the latter to be even costlier, causing an average output loss of 15 to 
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20% annual GDP per crisis. Dobson and Hufbauer (2001) focus on emerging markets 
in the 1980s and 1990s and again find estimates higher than those of Bordo et al 
(2001). According to them, Latin American countries lost 2.2% of annual growth in 
the ‘80s decade while Asia lost 1.4% of annual growth in the ‘90s decade. Other 
studies estimate the output loss caused by a crisis per year of duration, rather than the 
cumulative costs. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) estimate that banking crises cost 
2.4% of GDP per year of duration. Goldstein et al. (2000) estimate currency crises to 
cost 3% per year of duration in low-inflation countries, and 6% in high inflation ones.   
These estimates are big by any standard, yet the social consequences of financial 
crises can be easily underestimated by looking at GDP statistics only. Chen and 
Ravallion (2001) estimate that, if the pre-1997-crisis pace of poverty reduction would 
have been sustained, the poverty incidence in East Asia would have been 4% lower in 
1998. This suggests that the crisis increased the number of poor in the region 
(excluding China) by 22 million people in one year. Lee (2004) provides social 
indicators for post-crisis Korea. Reported crimes, drug addicts and suicides grew by 
respectively 46.2, 15.8 and 49.1 percent in the 1996-1998 period. Frankenberg and 
Thomas (2004) use household data to assess the impact of the crisis on Indonesia. 
They demonstrate that in the first year of the crisis poverty rose by between 50 and 
100 percent, real wages declined by 40 percent and household per capita consumption 
declined by 15 percent. Financial instability has therefore a direct and disruptive 
effect on the lives of millions, which gives a reason for trying to understand what 
cause it, and how it spreads.  
In fact, the deregulation of financial sectors, the progress of information 
technology and the overall increased interdependence of real sectors in different 
economies around the world due to the rise in world trade generated an international 
financial market whose integration was unknown before. What is now called 
“globalisation” poses new issues in the financial crises theory. Up until the early ‘90s 
these events were treated as mainly national, for they were mostly caused by domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances. The ‘90s crises had instead a distinct international 
nature. Country-specific events such as the Mexico, Thailand and Russia devaluations 
and/or defaults in 1995, 1997 and 1998 generated an outstanding way of turbulence, 
felt all the way through financial markets thousand of miles away. Certainly the ‘90s 
were not the first time financial crises exerted their effects well beyond national 
boundaries, nonetheless the speed and the strength of their international transmission 
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seemed of a higher degree, and the links between originating and affected countries 
often looser. It is no coincidence that theories of financial instability propagation 
across borders saw the light in the mid ‘90s, and at the end of the decade were one of 
the most researched topics in economics. The result is a rich body of literature, which 
is reviewed in chapter 2.  
The propagation of financial instability across borders is a very complex, multi-
faceted phenomenon. It is for this reason that the literature studying it provides at 
least three definitions of “contagion” (see Dornbusch and Claessens 2000 and Kodres 
and Pritsker 1999 for a detailed treatment of the issue of contagion definitions). The 
first is “propagation of macroeconomic instability across borders”, the second is 
“propagation of macroeconomic instability unexplained by fundamentals across 
borders” and the last is “increased/strengthened propagation of macroeconomic 
instability across borders during crises”. Clearly, the first one is the broadest, it 
includes the other two: the fact that a macroeconomic shock originating in one 
country affects another one constitutes contagion, whether or not the propagation is 
explained by fundamentals, whether or not the correlation among macroeconomic 
indicators in the two countries increases. The other two definitions highlight instead 
two different aspects of the propagation mechanism: that the propagation can be 
detached by any macroeconomic linkage (bilateral trade, competition for trade with a 
3rd country, common lender to name the most recurring) and that it can become 
stronger during turbulent times. These two aspects are equally important in the study 
of shocks propagation, for they shed light on key aspects of international economics 
theory as well as on policy recommendations. For example, whether shocks propagate 
through macro channels or not helps explaining what are these channels, their relative 
importance and the importance of investors’ sentiment shifts in contagion episodes. 
This in turn has relevant policy implications as the presence of sentiment shifts 
uncorrelated with macroeconomic considerations might give a rationale for 
introducing capital controls for example. Whether shocks propagate more strongly 
during crises is also an issue with relevant theoretical and policy implications. It is a 
test of the relevance of crisis-contingent versus non-crisis-contingent contagion 
models, as well assessing the scope for portfolio diversification and the measurability 
of systemic risk (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the issue). Both definitions 
are helpful in shedding light on key aspect of international interdependence of 
financial markets. There is thus no reason to choose one over the other. It seems more 
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reasonable to call “contagion” without any further specification the propagation of 
macroeconomic shocks across borders, “unexplained-by-fundamentals contagion” the 
propagation of macroeconomic shocks across borders over and above that explained 
by macroeconomic fundamentals and “shift contagion” the increase in the strength of 
propagation of macroeconomic shocks across borders during turbulent times. This 
will be the terminology used throughout the thesis. 
 The two most recurring questions in the contagion literature are: 
1) what are the channels of contagion? and: 
2) is contagion mechanism altered by major events such as banking or currency 
crises? In other words, is there evidence of shift contagion? 
This thesis addresses both questions. 
 
 
1.2 What are the channels of contagion? 
 
Recent work has emphasized the prevalence of currency mismatches (i.e. the 
different currency composition of agents’ assets and liabilities) in the financial 
systems of emerging markets economies as a key source of financial instability in 
those countries (see the literature review in Chapter 2 and references therein). Models 
investigating currency mismatches and the propagation of external disturbances to the 
domestic economies have been put forward. Chapter 3 reviews briefly this literature 
and expands it by providing a theoretical model of financial instability propagation 
driven by the presence of currency mismatches and credit markets imperfections. The 
model shows that when domestic agents’ liabilities are denominated in foreign 
currency exchange rate volatility raises credit costs, with negative effects on 
production. Currency mismatches therefore create a channel of contagion: financial 
crises abroad generate uncertainty about the future exchange rate, this in turn 
increases the cost of credit for domestic firms, therefore reducing production. 
Crucially, the channel of contagion may link countries with no direct trade or 
financial linkages, thereby generating unexplained-by-fundamentals contagion. 
 
Where trade linkages are present, theoretical models suggested that currency 
mismatches might magnify the effects of trade shocks (see, among others, Cespedes 
et al. 2004). Trade has been identified as the major source of output co-movements 
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across countries from both the literature on optimal currency area and financial 
contagion. Currency mismatches’ magnification of trade shocks’ real effects could 
then explain the higher observed output volatility in emerging market economies. 
Notwithstanding this, a systematic study of the way currency mismatches affect the 
propagation of trade shocks is not present in the literature. Chapter 4 fills this gap by 
empirically investigating three related hypotheses: a) that currency mismatches 
magnify the real effects of negative trade shocks, b) that currency mismatches 
magnify trade-related output volatility (i.e. that they magnify the real effects of trade 
shocks of either sign) and c) that currency mismatches generate asymmetric trade 
shocks propagation (i.e. that negative trade shocks propagate more strongly than 
positive ones in presence of currency mismatches). 
 
 
1.3 Is the contagion mechanism altered by major events such as banking 
or currency crises? 
 
The speed, intensity and pervasiveness of the turbulence caused by the ‘90s crises 
led researchers to ask whether the linkages between countries grew stronger during 
these turbulent times or were instead already as strong before. Various tests of the 
instability of the propagation mechanism (i.e. of shift contagion) have been proposed 
since. A review of these tests, provided in chapter 5, shows that the latter can be 
divided in two families: correlation-based and extreme-event-based tests. A new 
approach, based on the Quantile Regression technique, is proposed in the same 
chapter. It is argued that this approach retains the appealing features of the two 
families of tests while avoiding some of their limitations. The new approach is then 
applied to stock market returns, finding strong evidence of shift contagion.  
The conclusions of the thesis are presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 - CURRENCY MISMATCHES AND CONTAGION: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical models of contagion 
 
2.1.1 Limitations of financial crisis models and the birth of contagion theory 
 
The financial crises of the ‘90s featured country-specific events triggering 
speculative attacks in several different countries across the globe. This event was a 
challenge for the theory of currency crises dominant at the time. The latter, so-called 
“first generation”, consisted of models linking the collapse of a peg with the 
inconsistency between monetary and fiscal policies pursued and a stable exchange 
rate (see Krugman 1979, Flood and Garber 1984). In these models the growth of 
domestic credit forces the central bank to offset it by using foreign reserves in order 
to maintain a fixed exchange rate. With finite reserves, this would lead to reserve 
exhaustion. Agents with perfect foresight will anticipate this and attack the currency 
when the amount of reserves is just enough to maintain the current exchange rate so 
that no arbitrage possibility is there. After the attack, reserves are exhausted and the 
exchange rate is let free to float.  
Since excessive domestic credit growth is causing the exhaustion of the central 
bank reserves, currency crises have a purely domestic reason in such a framework. A 
crisis elsewhere cannot cause a crisis domestically. This framework could not explain 
the time-proximity of speculative attacks characterizing the crisis episodes in the 
‘90s. To do so, it would have required budget deficits and/or expanding domestic 
credit in both the crisis and the affected country determining a similar path of central 
bank reserves exhaustion. Only in this way reserves would have fallen under the 
critical level triggering the attack in the same period of time.  
The experience of European currencies in the 1992-93 turmoil clearly challenged 
this theory: after the floating of the Finnish Marrka in September 1992, the Swedish 
and the Norwegian Krona came under intense speculative pressure that eventually led 
to the floating of the Swedish currency. This notwithstanding the relatively strong 
fiscal position of the two countries and their moderate credit growth up to then. 
Similarly, the devaluation of the Italian Lira triggered a wave of sales of the British 
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Pound and the French Franc, forcing the former out of the ERM band. Again, neither 
of the two countries showed evident signs of growing monetized government debt nor 
credit growth inconsistent with a peg. The same is true for Argentina after the 
Mexican devaluation in 1994, when after years of moderate credit growth and fiscal 
discipline a speculative attack on the peso was repelled only at the costs of extreme 
monetary tightening and a painful recession. 
 
2.1.2 Fundamental-based  contagion models 
 
By showing that devaluations tended to trigger speculative attacks in trade 
partners and that credit growth could hardly be the reason behind it, the experiences 
of European currencies and Argentina led to the development of the first formal 
models of contagion. These applied the logic of the first-generation crisis models to a 
multi-country setting. Crises were still seen as the moment of exhaustion of central 
banks reserves, excluding the possibility of a voluntary abandon of the peg, and 
reserves exhaustion was still seen as depending from the inconsistency of pursued 
macroeconomic policies and a stable exchange rate. However, foreign disturbances 
that speed up the exhaustion process were introduced. In this way, the framework was 
able to explain the time-proximity of speculative attacks.  
An example is Gerlach and Smets (1995), which is essentially a two-country 
version of the Flood-Garber model with one difference: the policy inconsistency 
leading to reserve exhaustion is arising from capital outflows generated by the current 
account deficit rather than by expanding domestic credit. To offset such outflows the 
central bank uses foreign reserves. The time proximity of speculative attacks is 
explained via the “competitive devaluation” argument: a devaluation in a trade-
competing country reduces domestic net exports therefore increasing the capital 
outflows and speeding up the process of reserves exhaustion. After a devaluation in a 
trade partner, rational investors will then attack the domestic currency sooner: the 
time of the attack is then interdependent in trade-competing countries. This model 
could better describe the European contagion episode, where the devaluations caused 
speculative pressures on trade partners showing current account deficits (see Gerlach 
and Smets op. cit.), and the Mexican one, where countries with relevant current 
account deficit and real exchange rate overvaluation were found to be the most 
affected (see Sachs et al. (1996)). It also provides a plausible explanation of the time 
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clustering of speculative attacks. Notice that, since the trade partner’s devaluation 
speeds up the reserves exhaustion process, the speculative attack is rational, based on 
the deteriorating fundamentals of the affected economy. Contagion is therefore 
rational and fundamental-based in this model. 
 
The Gerlach-Smets approach lost much of its appeal after the East Asian 1997 
regional meltdown. Countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea were hugely 
affected even if coming from years of fiscal, current account surpluses and moderate 
credit growth. A predictable path of reserves exhaustion was very hard to conceive, 
even accepting that the Thai devaluation could have caused a loss of competitiveness 
in neighbouring countries. In fact, inside and outside academia, the “Asian tigers” 
were hold as examples of a successful economic development and of safe emerging 
markets.  
Less than a year later, in August 1998, Russia defaulted on its debt and as a 
consequence of this too, the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund 
suffered immense losses and would have filed for bankruptcy if a consortium of 
American banks (following a warm invitation from the Fed) would not have agreed to 
bail it out. These two events together generated an outstanding wave of instability that 
eventually forced Brazil to abandon its peg. The fact that a shock coming from such a 
small financial market like Russia could spread so strongly to countries with no 
evident macroeconomic imbalances or trade/financial linkages with it was even 
harder than the Asian contagion to reconcile with the fundamental-based contagion 
theory. If the East Asian contagion put the latter into question, the Russian-Brazilian 
episode definitely shifted the consensus away from it. Policy inconsistencies and 
trade linkages alone could not explain the timing and the strength of speculative 
attacks triggered by the Thai devaluation and the Russian default. Meanwhile, various 
weaknesses in emerging financial markets, in the banking sector particularly, had 
been identified as key players in the propagation of the crises. It was then natural to 
introduce financial market imperfections in contagion models. Researchers’ 
explanations pointed in two main directions: multiple equilibria models and investor 
behaviour/financial sector weaknesses models. 
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2.1.2 Multiple Equilibria models 
 
The new line of thought abandoned the fundamental-based setting and saw the 
East Asian experience as a Multiple Equilibria story in which the Thai devaluation 
determined a jump towards the bad equilibrium in the neighbouring countries (see, 
for example, Masson 1998). This model starts from the Krugman-Flood-Garber crisis 
theory by assuming that a speculative attack takes place when the reserves are just 
enough to maintain the current level of the peg. Defining this critical level of reserves 
as R , we have that the probability of an attack and thus of a devaluation is ( )RR <Pr  
where R is the amount of international reserves available to the central bank. The 
latter are given by: tttt DSTBRR −+= −1 , respectively the reserves accumulated in 
the past plus the trade balance minus the cost of debt servicing. Perfect capital 
mobility and perfect foresight are assumed, so that uncovered interest parity holds. 
Agents will then request a domestic interest rate equal to the world risk-free rate plus 
a premium for the expected depreciation. This is where the multiple equilibria arise: 
the interest rate paid on the debt is a function of the expected depreciation. Therefore, 
the more expected is a devaluation, the higher the interest rate required by investors 
to hold domestic debt, and thus the higher the cost of debt servicing. This is turn 
makes a devaluation more likely, closing the circle and generating the possibility of 
multiple equilibria. The cost of debt servicing is indeed given by 
( )πδ+== *rDDrDSt , where D is the external debt accumulated, r and *r  the 
domestic and world interest rates respectively, π  the probability of a devaluation and 
δ  the exchange rate jump taking place in case of a devaluation. If agents consider a 
devaluation likely, they will request a high interest rate. Debt servicing will then be 
high, available reserves low and the probability of a devaluation high. If agents 
consider a devaluation unlikely, the opposite will be true and a devaluation will 
indeed be unlikely. There are multiple equilibria. 
The East Asian contagion is interpreted under this light: the Thai devaluation 
increased markedly the perceived probability of other regional currencies devaluating. 
Investors shied away from those currencies, therefore increasing the cost of debt 
servicing for those countries to unsustainable levels and causing a chain of 
devaluations.  
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This would imply that the overall macroeconomic situation in the affected 
countries (not Thailand) was not unavoidably inconsistent with a stable exchange 
rate. However, the Thai crash eroded investor confidence, triggering speculations on 
neighbouring countries. The macroeconomic situation was not totally consistent with 
a stable exchange rate either (otherwise the attacks could have been repelled and 
rational investors, knowing it, would have not attacked). Nevertheless, it would have 
been consistent, had the Thai market not collapsed and investors’ confidence faded in 
a typical self-fulfilling prophecy of doom. 
In light of this, a crisis is not solely caused by the inconsistency of fundamentals 
with a peg. The departure from the fundamental-based contagion approach consists in 
this. It is however important to notice that this view does not deny the role of 
fundamentals (i.e. the amount of reserves) in triggering a crisis: the model specifies a 
range of reserve levels within which there exists more than one equilibrium. Outside 
that range, a unique good or bad equilibrium is possible. Intuitively, if the reserve 
cushion RR −  is bigger than the additional cost of debt servicing caused by a 
devaluation even if the latter is sure (i.e. if 1=π ), then a speculative attack is always 
repelled by the central bank. Agents know this and thus don’t attack. The only 
equilibrium possible is the one with 0=π  and the peg is stable. The contrary is true 
if the reserve cushion is zero; the only possible equilibrium is an attack and the 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate. The level of reserves is then crucial in 
determining the possibility of multiple equilibria. A common critique to multiple 
equilibria models is that they absolve policy makers from any blame for the crises in 
their countries by denying the role of weak fundamentals in such episodes. In light of 
these considerations, the critique seems here misplaced. 
 
The crucial element in any multiple equilibria model of contagion is the self-
fulfilment of the devaluation prophecy. If investors get convinced a devaluation will 
take place, they pull out of the market, thereby making the peg unsustainable. This 
element is present in various other models. All generate the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, and they model contagion as a shift from the stable peg to the devaluation 
equilibrium caused by a crisis abroad. These models can be divided in two broad 
categories: 
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a) Macroeconomic feedback models 
 
Obstfeld (1994) provides an alternative take on the contagion as jump between 
multiple equilibria theory. In his setting increased expectations of devaluation raise 
the interest rate required by investor to hold domestic debt. To hold the peg, the 
central bank must keep higher interest rates, thus causing unemployment to rise. This 
tilts the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining the peg faced by the monetary authorities 
towards the red. Since the costs exceed the benefits, the peg is abandoned. The 
difference from Masson’s model is that in that model the turning of investor 
expectations towards the bad triggers the attack that exhausts all reserves. In Obstfeld 
model the peg is instead voluntarily abandoned by the monetary authorities because 
the costs of maintaining it exceed the benefits. Reserves are not necessarily 
exhausted. 
 
b) Liquidity shocks/Bank runs models 
 
These are models of multiple equilibria-based banking crises. As in Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), the decision of any agent depends on the expected decision of other 
agents. An adverse external shock acts as a sunspot and coordinates agents’ decision 
towards the bad equilibrium: each investor pulls out. 
Sachs (1994) applies this idea to international banking. There are n creditor 
banks with borrowers located in a foreign country. If any bank believes other banks 
will stop providing credit to borrowers, thus making them go bankrupt, all banks will 
stop lending, fulfilling the prophecy. A crisis elsewhere convinces banks that the 
other banks will cut credit lines. All banks cut the credit lines and precipitate the 
crisis.     
Chang and Velasco (1998) provide a model of twin (currency and banking) crisis 
in a multiple equilibria fashion. An adverse external shock leads to an interest rise. 
This in turn might trigger a run on banks. The central bank, in order to save the 
banking sector, is forced to intervene with a sterilised money intervention. Even if it 
succeeds, the intervention causes a loss of reserves and then the speeding up of the 
reserves exhaustion process. In the best case, a currency crises follows, in the worst 
case, the central bank’s intervention is not enough to save the banking sector and a 
twin crisis follows suit.  
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2.1.3 Investor behaviour – financial market weaknesses models 
 
Some authors proposed models in which the time-proximity of crises is explained 
by shifts in investors’ behaviour caused by a crisis somewhere but without the 
circular logic generating multiple equilibria. In this models the possible equilibrium is 
always one only. However, this equilibrium does depend on factors detached from the 
fundamentals of the country. Common feature of these models is the presence of a 
shock propagation channel that causes a crisis to have repercussions on assets whose 
expected returns are not affected by it. The underlying idea is that when a crisis hits 
market A, investors active in that market have incentives or obligations to alter their 
portfolio, regardless of whether the expected return on their other assets changed. The 
crisis therefore triggers trades of assets in market B. The trades are not caused by a 
change in market B’s assets’ absolute expected returns. It is the change in their 
expected returns relative to the other assets in the investors’ portfolio causing the 
trades. The price of assets whose returns are totally unrelated with the those of the 
assets hit by the crisis might therefore be affected as well. A country can thus be 
affected whatever its fundamentals, as long as domestic investors are active in the 
crisis market too.  
An example of such framework is Schinasi and Smith (1999), which shows how 
standard portfolio management rules such as the return-benchmark, the trade off and 
the value-at-risk approaches can generate correlation of assets holdings even when 
these have uncorrelated returns. Schinasi and Smith describe a simplified portfolio 
design problem in which an agent has to allocate his wealth between two risky assets. 
The agent can also borrow in order to finance investment. They show how, under all 
three portfolio-management rules, a capital loss generated by the drop of one asset’s 
price will cause a net purchase of both assets if the agent is not leveraged and a net 
sale if she is. Being the assets uncorrelated and being their conditional distribution 
unaltered by the price shock, the co-movement of assets’ holding is not justified by 
any correlation in the expected returns of the two, it is caused by the portfolio 
management rule only.  
Schinasi and Smith focus on the role of leverage: if the investor is leveraged, the 
capital loss will cause a sale of both assets. The reason is that the capital loss 
generated an over-borrowing for the investor. If indeed the ratio of debt to assets (i.e. 
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the leverage ratio) was optimal before the loss, it is excessive now, since the value of 
assets has fallen by the value of the debt did not. It is therefore optimal to reduce this 
latter in proportion of the capital loss, which can happen only by disinvesting. Thus, 
the degree of leverage amplifies the reduction of total investment generated by a 
capital loss. Relatively small drops in wealth can then generate big unrelated-to-
expected-returns sales of both assets and thus full-blown unrelated-to-expected-
returns contagion when hit investors are leveraged enough.  
 
The model is not able to predict how the sales will affect assets prices. The price 
fall causing the initial capital loss is indeed assumed to be the only price variation. 
The relationship between domestic and foreign asset prices is not defined. The model 
does nevertheless derive a relationship between the foreign asset price shock and the 
reduction in domestic asset demand. Whether this translates in correlated price 
movements is a question that can be formally answered by a full price-determination 
model only.  
This is provided by Calvo (1999), a model of contagion based on liquidity shocks 
and asymmetric information. Investors in country x (the crisis country) suffer capital 
losses due to the fall of x’s assets’ value. The reduced assets value puts them on 
margin calls or similar. As a consequence, they need liquidity, which they raise by 
selling assets in other (liquid) markets. They will transmit the shock to the country y, 
whose fundamentals have not been changed by the crisis. Therefore, there is a price 
movement unexplained by fundamentals.  
The liquidity shock works once and for all, so that the movement in y’s price 
should be quickly reversed. Moreover, other investors, knowing that y’s fundamentals 
are not changed, should be happy to buy y at the pre-shock price. In a world of 
perfectly informed investors, liquidity shocks should therefore have no effect on y’s 
price. If, on the other hand, both informed and uninformed investor are present in the 
market, Calvo shows that liquidity shocks generate unexplained-by-fundamentals and 
time-persistent price movements.  
The core structure of the model is borrowed from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). 
There are two type of investors, informed and uninformed. The former observe a 
signal of the future expected return of each asset s. On this basis they choose their 
optimal portfolio allocation. However, when suffering a capital loss, they are forced 
 21
to liquidate some of their assets, thus departing unwillingly form their optimal 
allocation.  
Uninformed investors observe informed investors’ trading decisions only. As a 
consequence, their are not able to distinguish whether informed investors’ trades are 
dictated by shifts in s or by liquidity shocks. In other words, uninformed investors can 
infer ( )sE  from the actions of other investors, but with some noise generated by the 
liquidity trading of informed investors. Liquidity shocks are at least partly interpreted 
as movement in s by uninformed investors and their trades move the asset prices in a 
way that is partly unrelated to expected returns. In this context contagion arises when 
a crisis in country x generates significant capital losses to investors which are forced 
to liquidate some assets in country y. These sales trigger a misguided lowering of the 
expected return in y’s assets by uninformed investors and therefore a sale in the y 
market. As a consequence, prices of y’s assets fall, even though their expected returns 
are unaffected by the events in x. Furthermore, the fall in y’s price reduces ( )sE , so 
that informed investor as well will lower the price they are willing to pay for y. The 
price movement caused by the uninformed investors is then not reversed. The 
liquidity shocks produce persistent, unexplained-by-fundamentals price movements. 
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) propose a model of contagion based on cross-market 
portfolio rebalancing that shares the main features of Calvo’s model, even if in a very 
different setting. The driving force behind contagion is, again, the presence of 
uninformed investors that are unable to interpret the informational content of the 
transactions they observe. The novelty in the Kodres-Pritsker setting is that informed 
investors can trade because a price change altered the composition of their portfolio 
and it is therefore optimal to alter the weights given to each asset in the portfolio. If 
the price of asset A changes, informed traders rebalance their portfolio by altering 
their positions on asset B. Differently from Calvo’s setting, liquidity needs do not 
play any role here. However, similarly to Calvo (1999), uninformed investors are 
unable to understand whether informed investors traded asset B because of voluntary 
portfolio rebalancing or the acquisition of private information on the asset value. 
They therefore alter their expected returns on B in ways partly unrelated to the asset’s 
fundamentals. Voluntary portfolio rebalancing introduces noise in the price formation 
process just as liquidity trading did in the Calvo model. 
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The key question is then why are uninformed investors there? Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000) give two possible explanations. First, performance-based managers’ 
wages in an incomplete information setting. If managers receive wages based on the 
difference between their fund performance and the market average performance, their 
optimal strategy is choosing the same portfolio as the market does. Following the 
herd, the manager does not risk anything. If he made the wrong decision, everybody 
did as well. If instead he did not follow the herd and the decision turned out to be 
wrong, his remuneration is reduced. Of course, if the expected pay back of not 
following the herd is high enough, following his own information might be the 
optimal strategy too. This possibility is ruled out with the assumption that the 
marginal cost of performing worse than the market is higher than the marginal benefit 
of doing better. The second explanation is the simultaneous presence of fixed costs of 
information, limits to short selling and what they call globalisation (the expansion of 
investment opportunities through the opening of new markets). The benefit of 
acquiring information is to know which assets have higher expected returns and lower 
variance. When investment opportunities increase due to globalisation, investors can 
diversify, thus reducing their portfolio variance. Therefore, the second benefit of 
acquiring information (lower variance) diminishes with globalisation. The other 
benefit (knowing which markets have higher expected returns) remains. However, 
limits to short selling limit the benefits one can reap knowing the highest-return 
assets. Calvo and Mendoza show that a critical number of markets above which the 
benefits of acquiring information are lower than the (fixed) costs can be reached, 
therefore making it rational to be uninformed investors. In other words, the possibility 
of diversification offered by the ever-increasing investment opportunities would 
reduce the rationale for acquiring costly information about the fundamentals.  
    
Even if it is optimal for agents to acquire costly information rather than stay 
uninformed, the associated costs will influence the working of the financial market 
and might generate contagion. This is the case in Romer-type intermediation models 
based on asymmetric information such as Agenor and Aizenmann (1998). Two agents 
are present in this model: banks that borrow abroad and lend to domestic firms. The 
latter can default, in which case banks can force the firm’s liquidation and recover 
part of the credit, undergoing some costs of state verification (Townsend 1979). 
These costs arise from the fact that the bank does not know the value of the firm’s 
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assets and therefore how much of its credit can be recovered. Firms have an obvious 
incentive to underreport their asset value, reason for which a verification of the firms’ 
book value is necessary. This verification is costly for the bank. It follows that the 
possibility of default introduces agency costs in the intermediation process. These 
agency costs are internalised by banks by raising the lending rate charged to firms.  
Deteriorating economic conditions increase agency costs because they reduce the 
firm’s net worth and increase the probability of the firm’s defaulting (a sort of 
Bernanke-Gertler effect, although the fall in firms’ net worth provokes an increase in 
credit costs rather than its rationing). The assumed deterioration in economic 
conditions is an increase in the volatility of the firm’s profits due to increased 
turbulence in international financial markets. This increases the probability of default, 
agency costs and thus the lending rate. Facing higher costs of credit, firms reduce 
production and employment. Notice that firms’ expected profits did not change. If 
that would be the case, the fact that firms reduce employment would not be 
particularly interesting and would not need any financial market imperfection to arise. 
It is the fact that only the variance of the expected profits’ increased that makes the 
model interesting. With costly-state-verification, turbulence itself has negative real 
effects.  
 
Some models of capital market imperfections other than agency costs derive 
similar conclusions. An example is given by Caballero and Krishnamuthy (1999). 
Here the imperfection is given by the scarcity of internationally accepted collateral in 
the domestic financial market. As a consequence of this, the supply of credit might be 
just enough to satisfy domestic firms’ credit demand. In such a situation, major 
shocks (such as financial crises abroad or terms-of-trade shocks) reduce the quality 
and/or the quantity of domestic collaterals, thus pushing the supply of credit under the 
demand level. Therefore, domestic firms are forced to costly liquidate illiquid assets, 
generating a fire sale. Assets prices drop and all firms’ profits are transferred to 
collateral holders. Shocks in foreign prices generating a fall in the domestic credit 
supply level underneath demand level provoke domestic prices collapse. This is the 
contagion channel highlighted. The authors then show why the obvious incentive to 
increase collateral holding given by the firms’ profit transfer to collateral-holders 
might be insufficient.  
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Caballero (2000a,b) presents extensive evidence showing how, due to weak links 
with the international market, Latin American financial markets (namely the ones of 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico) face constraints in the supply of credit. According to 
Caballero, this suggests that in Latin American credit markets major external shocks 
might push the supply level under the minimum demand level necessary to conclude 
the productive cycle, thus forcing firms to costly liquidate their illiquid assets as 
described by the model. This would explain the chronic instability of financial 
markets in that continent. 
 
Finally, Allen and Gale (1998) provides an application of a similar idea on the 
inter-bank lending markets. They focus on the structure of interbank lending markets, 
describing a situation in which linkages between banks are “incomplete”. If the 
interbank market is complete (i.e. each bank has liquid deposits in all other banks) 
any liquidity demand shock can be accommodated. The excess demand of credit in 
the market hit by the liquidity shock is satisfied by inter-bank lending and default is 
avoided. If instead banks are linked in an incomplete way (i.e. each bank has liquid 
deposit in a subset of banks only), banks hit by unexpected liquidity shocks might not 
be able to satisfy the withdrawals and default.  
Allen and Gale give this example: assume the interbank lending system is a loop, 
in which any bank borrows from the previous one only and lends to the following one 
only. When a liquidity shock hits one market, the excess demand in that market can 
be satisfied only if the previous bank (the one lending to the one hit by the shock) has 
an excess supply of liquidity. Otherwise, this latter won’t lend and the bank hit by the 
shock will have to default. Contagion is then modelled as a liquidity shock to a bank 
(a price shock generating a capital loss) that triggers the domino effect on the bank 
located downstream in another country.  
 
Reviewing the contagion models developed in the last fifteen years has hopefully 
shown the variety of explanations given to the phenomenon. Empirically assessing 
their relative importance is not easy. This is a recurring problem in the theory of 
contagion. For example, the fact that countries with relevant current account deficits 
were found to be the most affected by the Mexican crisis tells only that trade 
imbalances made these countries more vulnerable. Whether this happened because of 
the reserve exhaustion argument at the basis of the Gerlach-Smets approach or instead 
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because concerns about the current account deficit co-ordinated investors 
expectations toward a bad equilibrium in a multiple equilibria fashion  is very hard to 
assess. In general, trade is found to be a very important (if not the most important) 
channel of propagation of financial instability across emerging markets (see, to name 
just a few, Eichengreen et al. (1996), Glick and Rose (1998), De Gregorio and Valdez 
(1997), Forbes (2001)). However, this tells only that financial instability tends to 
spread towards trade partners. Whether this happens via a rational speculative attack à 
la Flood and Garber or by a jump between equilibria or other channels detached from 
fundamentals is hard to establish.  
For this reason, when trying to assess the relevance of competing contagion 
models, researchers tended to focus on the crisis-contingent vs. non-crisis-contingent 
dichotomy rather than on one particular theory against the other. Multiple equilibria 
models and in general models based on a shift in investor behaviour during crises 
imply a break in the shocks’ propagation mechanism. They are crisis-contingent 
models, as opposed to, for example, the Gerlach-Smets model. According to the 
latter, the propagation of shocks should indeed be stable during normal and crisis 
times, since trade shocks would cause the same path of reserves exhaustion in a trade 
partner irrespective of the turbulence in the markets. A necessary condition for crisis-
contingent models to be relevant is then the observation of a break in the propagation 
mechanism during crises. This can be assessed by comparing the degree of 
correlation among financial markets during normal and crisis times. The relevance of 
alternative contagion models has then been assessed testing the stability of such 
correlation. This empirical literature is reviewed in chapter 5. 
Empirically testing the relevance of theoretical models is certainly important. 
However, as noticed by Allen and Gale (2007), financial contagion is a complex 
phenomenon in which a multitude of factors are interplaying to generate the final 
outcome. In this light, looking for the theory of contagion does not seem a fruitful 
approach. Different models all highlight important channels of financial instability 
propagation. 
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2.2 Currency mismatches in emerging market economies 
 
This literature review showed how real world events shifted the consensus of 
economists towards a new view of financial contagion. This view includes a bigger 
role assigned to investor behaviour or financial market weaknesses in transmitting 
shocks across borders and a wider set of fundamentals, both macro- and 
microeconomic (banking sector health, the quality of market regulatory bodies, 
maturity composition of the debt to name a few) considered determinant for the 
resilience of domestic financial markets to external shocks.  
In this light, one feature of emerging markets received much attention in recent 
times: the currency composition of public and private debt. As stated by Eichengreen 
and Hausmann. (1999), “essentially all non-OECD countries have virtually no 
external debt denominated in their own currency”. They called this phenomenon the 
“Original Sin” of emerging markets, to suggest that these are unable to borrow abroad 
for reasons related to their past and beyond their control. According to them, 
emerging market economies (EMEs henceforth) cannot borrow abroad because of 
their history of inflation, devaluations and default. This view contrasts with the 
moral-hazard view according to which the virtual non-existence of local-currency 
denominated debt in EMEs derives from credible pegs and implicit bailout guarantees 
from central banks. These would let borrowers and lenders discharge currency risks 
onto the central bank and the taxpayer, thus promoting excessive unhedged foreign-
currency borrowing. The pervasiveness of foreign-currency-denominated debt would 
then be a voluntary choice of domestic borrowers, rather than an unavoidable risk for 
them. 
Whatever the reason behind it, foreign-currency-denominated debt is a global 
phenomenon. Hausmann and Panizza (2003) provide detailed measures of the 
currency composition of internationally traded bonded debt: 97% of the latter is 
issued in five currencies (USD, EUR, YEN, GBP, CHF). On the other hand, the 
countries printing the five currencies issue only 83% of it. The rest of the world issue 
the remaining 17%, but only 3% is denominated in local currencies. This has two 
important implications: first, EMEs are almost completely unable to issue debt in 
their own currency, second, the five major currencies issuers have the opportunity to 
hedge against currency risk by swapping their credit with debt emitted elsewhere in 
their own currency. Agents in EMEs are then exposing themselves to currency risks 
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by borrowing in foreign currencies while typically earning in local currencies. In 
other words, they present relevant “currency mismatches” in their balance sheets. 
This is made clear by the regional index of currency mismatches proposed by 
Eichengreen et al. (2003), the OSIN3 index1. This is defined as 1 minus the ratio of 
the value of securities issued in currency i over the value of securities issued in 
country i. By considering total debt issued in currency i (rather than debt issued in 
currency i by country i), the index takes into consideration the hedging opportunities 
offered by bonds issued abroad in the country’s own currency. The results for the 
years 1999-2001 show enormous differences between financial centres and EMEs: 
Latin America, Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe have an OSIN3 index of, 
respectively, 1.00, 0.94 and 0.84. The index for financial centres is instead 0.08. This 
means that the latter can hedge 92% of their debt by swapping with debt issued 
elsewhere in their own currency. On the other hand, Latin American countries cannot 
hedge any of their external debt, while the other EMEs are close to it. Also, another 
index (the OSIN1) shows that financial centres issue 42% of their debt in own 
currencies, while the same figure is around 1% for EMEs. 
Goldstein and Turner (2004) point out that the OSIN indexes are defective on 
four grounds. First, they consider the currency composition of liabilities only, not 
assets. Clearly, if a country has a trade surplus covering all its foreign-currency 
denominated debt, its exposure to currency risk is lower than if its trade balance is 
negative. This is also true regarding international reserves, an important issue 
considering the immense amount of reserves stashed by EMEs in recent years. 
Second, the OSIN indexes neglect the disaggregated side of currency mismatches. 
Who actually holds the foreign-currency-denominated debt within the economy? Are 
they exporting firms, earning in dollars, or local businesses invoicing in local 
currency? This has a crucial impact on exposure to currency risk, and it is neglected 
by looking at the aggregate side only. Third, domestic financial markets are now a 
relevant (in fact the biggest) source of credit in various EMEs and they tend to trade 
credit in local currency. Finally, the development of derivatives markets extended 
significantly the hedging opportunities available to agents in EMEs. Focusing on 
bonded debt only neglects that hedging opportunity.  
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion of the OSIN indexes see Chapter 4. 
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Goldstein and Turner develop a more sophisticated index of currency mismatches 
that takes on boards these considerations, the AECM. This and the OSIN indexes are 
described in greater detail in Chapter 4, the interested reader is redirected there. Using 
their more sophisticated index, Goldstein and Turner are able to distinguish more 
subtly among EMEs, and find that not all of them are completely unable to avoid 
currency risk. However, also according to the AECM index, most EMEs that 
experienced financial crises and/or contagion in the ‘90s (namely Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Turkey) appear to have substantial currency 
mismatches in the years leading to the crisis/contagion, and often afterwards as well. 
Whatever method of assessment is used, the inability to borrow in domestic 
currency appears then to be a prominent feature of financial markets in EMEs. 
Furthermore, currency mismatches provide the most convincing explanation of the 
recurrence of strongly contractionary devaluations in those countries. To show this, a 
brief review of the contractionary devaluation literature is here presented, with 
particular reference to aspects regarding EMEs. 
 
2.3 Currency mismatches and contractionary devaluations in Emerging 
Market Economies 
 
The fact that most of the devaluations taking place in EMEs in the last fifteen 
years were associated with sizeable drops in economic activity is hardly reconcilable 
with standard open economy macroeconomics, where devaluations are thought to 
increase aggregate demand via increased competitiveness, thus fostering rather than 
hindering economic activity. Some authors (notably Radelet and Sachs 1998) explain 
this conundrum by blaming the excessive reliance on monetary and fiscal tightening 
as stabilizing factors as the ultimate cause of such downturns. In this view, 
devaluations would not cause recessions, rather it would be the policy response to 
them. However, as pointed out by Frankel (2005), these policies might exacerbate the 
contractionary effects of a devaluation, but they hardly can be their origin. If 
devaluations have expansionary effects, then an optimal combination of exchange and 
interest rate interventions that allows achieving external balance without causing a 
recession should exist. Frankel’s argument is that with openness to trade, the 
expenditure-reducing effect of a rise in interest rates can be offset by a devaluation, 
which increases net demand for domestic goods. Thus, full employment can be 
always guaranteed moving the two rates in the same direction. On the other hand 
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capital mobility and trade openness imply that both exchange and interest rates 
improve the balance of payments, so that it is always possible to maintain the latter 
balanced trading off the two rates. Because exchange and interest rates are two 
independent instruments, any combination of them can be chosen. Therefore, there 
must be one combination giving current account balance and full employment. It is 
then unclear why EMEs government, having the tools to fix current account 
imbalances while avoiding politically damning recessions, would systematically fail 
to do so. Frankel concludes that a more appealing explanation is that devaluations 
have intrinsically contractionary effects in EMEs. In this case, current account 
imbalances can be levelled only through a fall in output. 
Frankel’s argument is nested in the traditional Mundell-Fleming approach to 
exchange rate determination. Investors’ sentiment shifts and other capital markets 
imperfections are not considered relevant in the dynamics of recent currency crashes. 
This is certainly a strong assumption when applying the approach to the EMEs crises 
of the ‘90s, since a large evidence of investor “flight to quality” and other shifts in 
investor behaviour have been documented in those events (among others: Ahluwalia 
2000, Basu 2002, Kumar and Persaud 2001, Favero and Giavazzi 2002, Kamin and 
Von Kleist (1999), Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Eichengreen et al. 2000). It seems 
that instead of restoring trust in the stability of the macroeconomic environment, 
devaluations unleashed fears of further troubles in financial markets, slides of the 
exchange rate and in general of poor economic performance, thus triggering huge 
capital outflows. In this view, the “natural” expansionary effects of devaluations 
would be dwarfed by the havoc in the domestic financial sector caused by the sharp 
credit crunch. This eventuality cannot be ruled out a priori. However, contractionary 
devaluations and sentiment shifts are not mutually exclusive. They could well interact 
with each other in a crisis episode. 
 
But why might devaluations be contractionary? Since the 1963 paper of Diaz-
Alejandro, a good amount of research has been dedicated to answer this question. To 
date, ten channels through which a devaluation might affect negatively output have 
been identified: 
1) Devaluations boost profits of producers operating in the tradable sector as a 
consequence of higher tradable-goods prices in domestic currency. In the 
meantime, if wages are sticky, real wages are falling. Therefore a 
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redistribution of income from wages to profits is taking place and, being the 
latter’s propensity to save higher, the aggregate demand shrinks (Diaz-
Alejandro 1963). With foreign ownership of capital, the negative effect will 
take place irrespective of agents’ marginal propensity to save. In this case the 
income redistributed towards profit will simply leak to the rest of the world 
(Barbone and Rivera-Batiz 1987). 
2) Countries usually devalue when they have a trade deficit, so when imports 
value in local currency is higher than exports value. A devaluation will 
initially increase this discrepancy as the value of imports increase. If the 
discrepancy was sizeable for start, then the elasticities of demand of import 
and export can be not high enough to fill the gap in the aggregate demand, 
even if the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied (Krugman and Taylor 1978).  
3) The rise in imported goods prices causes inflation and reduces real balances, 
pushing domestic expenditure down. In presence of non-tradable goods with 
sticky prices the excess supply is not immediately corrected (Williamson 
1991). 
4) When debt is predominantly denominated in foreign currency, a devaluation 
increases debt and debt service payments in local currency, worsening banks’ 
and firms’ balance sheets and draining resources that could be used in 
spending and production (Cooper 1971, Gylfason and Risager 1984, van 
Wijnbergen 1986). 
5) Speculative buying of durable goods. With high inflation and underdeveloped 
financial markets, the purchase of durable goods might be the only investment 
available to households. Expecting a devaluation and subsequent rise in 
inflation, households would anticipate the purchase of such goods. Aggregate 
demand would then increase before the devaluation, and then fall, since the 
rationale for the purchase is not there anymore (Dornbusch 1985).   
6) Ad valorem taxes on imports represent a relevant source of government 
revenues in EMEs. A devaluation increases the value and thus the tax levied 
on imported goods, thus representing a tax increase. If the government don’t 
spend the additional revenue, a fiscal contraction takes place and aggregate 
demand falls (Krugman and Taylor 1978). 
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All the above models highlighted potential negative effects of devaluations on the 
aggregate demand. Others have instead focused on the supply side of the story. 
Under this approach, some costs of production are in foreign currency (imported 
production inputs) or indexed to inflation (wages), so that a devaluation worsen 
firms’ profitability and thus reduces supply.  
7) imported production inputs: when a substantial part of raw materials, 
intermediate inputs and capital goods are imported the devaluation increases 
the cost of production per unit, thus reducing the firm’s profitability (Hanson 
1983, van Wijnbergen 1986) 
8) when wages are indexed to inflation, a devaluation causes them to rise via a 
rise in domestic prices. The effect is similar to that of point 7) (Hanson 1983, 
van Wijnbergen 1986) 
9) The reduction in real balances highlighted in point 3) might affect the supply 
side as well via rises in interest rates. In EMEs, firms are often relying on 
external finance for their working capital needs. With higher interest rates 
working capital becomes costlier, with a depressing effect on firm’s 
profitability. (Bruno 1979, van Wijnbergen 1986) 
 
As Frankel et al. (2005) point out, all the explanations apart from the balance 
sheet effect in point 4) share one feature: the contractionary effect involves a rise in 
domestic prices. If these channels are to explain the sharp drop in output that 
followed the 1990s devaluations, we should then observe a strong “pass-through” 
effect in EMEs. Yet, Frankel et al. (2005) provide evidence of the contrary. 
Estimating the pass-through of exchange rate movements to prices of eight narrowly 
defined retail imports to 76 countries, they find that the pass-through coefficient fell 
significantly along the 1990s. Such a fall was particularly strong in developing 
countries. So much so that, if those countries’ coefficient was 0.8 in 1990, it dropped 
to 0.29 in 2001, compared with 0.05 for high-income countries. According to these 
estimates, developing countries had at the end of the 1990s pass-through coefficients 
similar to those of high-income countries a decade earlier. Yet this fact did not protect 
those who experienced a devaluation from massive downturns in economic activity. 
On the other hand, substantial evidence showed that devaluations in high-income 
countries tend to be expansionary (see, among others, Ahmed et al. 2002). Why then 
rich countries that devalued during the ERM crisis in 1992 (Sweden, the UK, Italy) 
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did not suffer sharp recessions whereas the Mexico, Southeast Asian countries, 
Brazil, Russia and Argentina all did? As the Frankel et al. (2005) study rules out 
differences in the pass-through coefficients, the most plausible explanation is the 
Balance Sheet effect. Contrary to the “rich” devaluing countries of 1992, at the end of 
the decade EMEs had sizeable foreign currency denominated debt. In these countries 
the expansionary effect on exports might have been more than offset by the negative 
real effect brought by the worsening of banks’ and firms’ balance sheets experienced 
after the devaluation. Supporting this view, there is ample evidence that after a 
devaluation countries with high levels of liability dollarization experience sharper 
drops in output and slower recovery than those with debt mainly denominated in 
national currency (see Roca and Priale 1987, Nunnenkamp and Schweickert 1990, 
Cavallo et al. 2002, Guidotti et al 2004, Cespedes 2004).  
 
Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest therefore that currency 
mismatches are a key source of financial instability and recessions in EMEs. The 
relevance of this argument is witnessed by various researches’ statements. For 
example, Calvo and Reinhardt (2000) coin the term “fear of floating” to describe the 
fact that countries stating they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not. The 
main reason behind such fear is, according to them, the fact that “in EMEs 
devaluations (…) tend to be associated with recessions -not the kind of benign 
outcome stressed in standard textbooks. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact 
that in EMEs there is pervasive liability dollarization” (the italic is mine). Obstfeld et 
al. (2008) identify three forces behind the recent unprecedented accumulation of 
foreign reserves by central banks in EMEs. One of them is “a continuing desire to 
maintain a policy of fixed or tightly managed exchange rates (…) possibly to avert 
destabilizing balance sheet shocks when liabilities are dollarized”. Goldstein and 
Turner (2004) notice in their book’s preface “currency mismatches have been present 
in virtually every major financial crisis in emerging economies over the past decade” 
and “the countries that have experienced the largest currency mismatches have 
typically been the ones that have suffered the largest output losses during crises”. 
Finally, Furman and Stiglitz (1998) affirm “the ability of this variable (foreign-
currency denominated debt), by itself, to predict the crises of 1997 is remarkable”. 
Notwithstanding this, very few papers have been dedicated to the theoretical analysis 
of the role of currency mismatches in the propagation of external disturbances. The 
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next chapter briefly reviews this literature and expands it by investigating a 
previously neglected issue: the joint effect of variance shocks (i.e. increases in the 
exchange rate variance) and currency mismatches on the propagation of financial 
instability.  
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CHAPTER 3 – EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY AND CONTAGION 
IN PRESENCE OF CURRENCY MISMATCHES 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
The literature summarized in the previous chapter highlighted the pervasiveness 
of foreign currency denominated borrowing in EMEs. It was argued that this gives a 
plausible and evidence-backed explanation of the recurrence of contractionary 
devaluations in those economies. A number of studies have investigated the link 
between currency mismatches and macroeconomic instability in EMEs. Some authors 
developed DSGE models that extended the Bernanke-Gertler approach (in which 
domestic firms’ access to credit depends on their net worth) to a setting in which 
firms’ net worth depends on exchange rate levels since firms’ debt is denominated in 
foreign currency (see Cespedes et al. (2002), Devereuax et al. (2003), Gertler et al. 
(2002)). These studies show how currency mismatches generate a financial 
accelerator: negative shocks to the trade balance cause depreciation, this in turn 
reduces firms’ net worth therefore increasing their costs of funding. The effect of 
foreign disturbances on firms’ output is in this way magnified by the presence of 
currency mismatches. The focus is on the magnification of level shocks (i.e. shocks to 
the level of net exports). This work investigates instead the real effects of volatility 
shocks (i.e. increases in the macroeconomic volatility impinging on the economy, e.g. 
increases in the volatility of net exports) on countries with substantial currency 
mismatches. These shocks are a recurring feature of financial crises, during which 
EMEs’ volatility of exports, production, inflation, and financial variables such as 
stocks, bonds prices and exchange rates prices all tend to increase markedly. Just to 
give an idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon, in the months following the major 
crises of the 1990s the exchange rate variance of EMEs increased by 15% to 30% in 
the EMEs present in our sample (discussed below). Notwithstanding this, to my 
knowledge no formal analysis of the real effects of exchange rate volatility hikes in 
presence of currency mismatches have been carried out. 
Variance shocks are investigated developing a model of financial intermediation 
with domestic banks and producers where the latter borrow in foreign currency but 
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earn revenues in domestic currency. The currency risk renders firms’ profit (and 
therefore their ability to repay the debt) dependent on the exchange rate. When the 
exchange rate depreciates enough to wipe out all profits, firms default and the bank 
can recover the full value of the credit only incurring in a costly enforcement process. 
Banks will then internalise the expected enforcement costs by charging a risk 
premium on the rate at which they borrow. It is shown that the risk premium is a 
positive function of the exchange rate volatility. Higher volatility increases the 
probability of both extreme appreciations and depreciations. However, while higher 
probability of extreme appreciations do not increase banks’ expected revenues (for 
any level of exchange rate below that allowing firms to repay the full debt firms’ 
repayment to banks will not increase), higher probability of extreme depreciations 
reduces banks’ revenues as firms will be unable to repay the debt more often. Ceteris 
paribus, higher exchange rate volatility translates therefore in bigger risk premia. 
Default is costly for firms too, since they are sold piecemeal to find the additional 
resources needed to repay the debt, thereby loosing some of their value. Numerical 
computations show that, by raising default costs for both banks and firms, exchange 
rate volatility causes a drop in both the demand and the supply of loans and pushes 
production and employment down.  
In such a setting, shocks causing an increase in the exchange rate variance (e.g. an 
increase in the variance of foreign output) depress the aggregate supply and 
employment. Financial contagion events can be explained by these supply-side 
shocks: when a crisis renders the future performance of a trade partner less 
predictable its output volatility increases. This translates into higher volatility of the 
domestic trade balance and exchange rate. This in turn depresses domestic 
production. The framework thus provides a model of contagion driven by currency 
mismatches and volatility shocks. 
The model extends the literature on currency mismatches in two ways: first by 
showing that the negative effects of currency mismatches during financial turmoil 
may go beyond the much studied balance sheet effects. These consist of a 
deterioration of the balance sheet due to a level shock (exchange rate depreciation). A 
necessary condition for the negative real effects to materialize is the presence of 
foreign currency denominated debt. Without it, exchange rate fluctuations do not 
affect the balance sheet and thus the net worth of agents. The model presented below 
shows instead that a variance shock could negatively affect also firms with no foreign 
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currency denominated debt if these are dependent on foreign currency denominated 
credit. This will indeed become more expensive as a result of increased variance, 
reducing firms’ margin. Shifting the attention on variance shocks, the analysis shows 
that, even if they do not affect the balance sheet of a firm, variance shocks can affect 
supply negatively.   
The second contribution is related to the issue of contagion. The analysis shows 
that currency mismatches may generate a channel of contagion among countries with 
no direct trade or financial linkages. It is enough that a financial turmoil abroad 
increases uncertainty about the domestic economy’s exchange rate developments for 
domestic output and employment to be negatively affected.  
 
 
3.2 The bank loans market 
 
3.2.1 The Agenor-Aizenmann model 
 
The bank loans market is modelled introducing currency mismatches in the 
theoretical framework developed by Agenor and Aizenmann (1998) (AA henceforth), 
a model that was sketched in the literature review. In the AA model there is 
uncertainty regarding the future productivity of firms. The latter borrow from banks 
to cover their labour costs and once the production is completed they can either repay 
the debt or default. In this second case banks can seize a part of the firm’s output as 
compensation, after paying a fixed amount for legal expenses and contract 
enforcement costs. The costs arise from the fact that firms have an obvious incentive 
to underreport the value of their output in order to reduce the amount seized by banks. 
These can however observe the true value of the firm’s output, but only through a 
costly legal process. Firms’ are heterogeneous (i.e. they have different productivity 
levels). However their productivity has a common component, influencing all firms’ 
productivity. When this common component is low, average firms’ productivity is 
low and the output that banks can seize from defaulting firms is lower than the 
amount owed by the latter for many firms. For all these firms, it is profitable to 
default. When instead productivity is high it is convenient for fewer firms to default. 
Thus, the probability of default (and the expected losses for banks) is negatively 
correlated with expected productivity. Banks internalise this by charging higher 
interest rates when expected productivity is low. Notice the similarity with the 
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Bernanke-Gertler financial accelerator argument: here too economic downturns 
(drops in productivity) are amplified by the increase in agency costs. In fact, both 
models depart from the neo-classical Modigliani-Miller theory of investment by 
introducing Costly State Verification agency costs (Townsend (1979)).  
The volatility of aggregate shocks impinging on the economy (in the form of 
productivity shocks) plays an important role in this chapter. The asymmetric effect of 
extreme events on banks’ expected profits described in the introduction of this model 
are present here too. An increase in the probability of extreme hikes in productivity 
levels do not increase banks’ expected revenues while that of extreme drops increase 
banks’ expected verification costs. These react charging a higher risk premium, 
widening the spread between deposit and lending interest rate. Firms face a higher 
cost of funding and as a consequence reduce production. Volatility has thus a 
negative effect on the supply side of the economy.  
The AA setting gives a useful framework to analyse the issue of volatility in the 
financial intermediation process. I use it to investigate the effect of exchange rate 
rather than productivity fluctuations. To do so, the model presented here departs from 
the AA structure in two aspects. First, there is no uncertainty regarding firms’ 
productivity, which is instead constant, equal for all firms and known to all agents. 
Secondly, banks’ loans to firms are denominated in foreign currency. The domestic 
currency will be the “peso” and the foreign the “dollar”. Since firms borrow in dollars 
and earn in pesos, exchange rate movements affect their profits. In such a setting a 
rise in exchange rate volatility causes a drop in firms’ employment since it increases 
their costs of funding and expected losses related to the event of defaulting. To see 
this, let us look at the model in detail. 
 
3.2.2 The Agenor-Aizenmann model revisited 
 
There are two agents operating in this economy: producers (firms) and 
commercial banks. The latter borrow in dollars on the world markets and lend in 
dollars to firms. In period 0 firms must borrow from banks in order to cover their 
labour costs and start production; in period 1 production is completed, the output is 
sold and the debt repaid or defaulted. We therefore have the following time-line: 
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All firms are identical, and the representative producer faces a production 
function of the type: 
 
bny =          (3.1) 
 
y and n are, respectively, the output and employment levels of the representative 
producer; b is the share of labour in production and it is assumed smaller than one, 
implying diminishing marginal labour productivity. Capital is assumed fixed and 
normalized to one. Before starting the production, firms need to borrow from banks in 
order to pay employees a fixed peso wage w. It is assumed that banks lend to firms in 
dollars only. Firms borrow in dollars at the contractual interest rate r. They do so 
when the exchange rate is 0s  and must repay in the next period when the exchange 
rate is 1s . The exchange rate is expressed as the cost of one dollar in pesos, so that its 
increase represents a depreciation of the peso.  
The representative firm’s costs of funding to be repaid in time 1 (called F 
henceforth) are equivalent to the peso value of its debt. This in turn is the wage bill 
times one plus the lending rate adjusted for the exchange rate movement: 
 
( )
0
11
s
srwnF +=         (3.2) 
 
The firm can default its obligations, but in this case the bank is able to force the 
liquidation of its assets to recover its credit. I assume that loans are fully 
collateralised and thus banks can always recover the full value of their loans. Since 
firms are borrowing to cover their labour cost only, it is reasonable to assume that the 
value of the firm’s total assets is always enough to cover the full amount lent. 
0 1 
- Production levels set 
- Loans contracted 
- Wages paid 
- Production completed 
- Output sold 
- Loans repaid or defaulted 
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Knowing that the bank is always able to recover its full credit, the firm has no 
incentive to default and will do so only if it cannot do otherwise. The default 
represents the end of the firm, as all its assets are liquidated in order to repay its 
obligations. The liquidation process is assumed costly for the owners. The firm is 
dismembered and its assets are sold piecemeal, thus losing part of their value. In other 
words, there is a difference between the going concern and the liquidation value of 
the firm, and this difference is the cost of default borne by the owners. For this 
reason, although firms repay the full amount owed to banks whether they default or 
not, they will try to avoid it if possible. 
I therefore use an “ability to pay” approach in which firms always pay if they 
have resources enough to do so. This contrasts with the “willingness to pay” approach 
followed in AA in which firms default if the part of their revenues recoverable by 
banks (assumed less than 100%) is smaller than the value of their debt. In that 
approach firms’ default decisions are based on the present costs and benefits of 
defaulting only. In the next period, a firm that defaulted has the same access to credit 
than one that did not. This is an uncomfortable assumption. The “ability to pay” 
approach is preferable because it better captures the fact that, after defaulting, a firm 
at the very least cannot borrow easily and thus it tries to avoid it in any possible way.  
Firms will repay unless their revenues are not enough to repay the debt. The 
default condition in pesos is then essentially a negative profits condition: 
 
( )
0
11
s
srwnnb +<        (3.3) 
 
The term on the left hand side is the firm’s total revenues (i.e. the units of good 
produced times the good’s price, which is assumed fixed and normalized to one). The 
fact that revenues are in pesos while costs are in dollar is what generates currency risk 
and renders firm’s profit dependent on 1s . This is the only stochastic element in (3.3), 
so that expectations on the probability of default and thus on banks’ expected profits 
are based on expectations on the future exchange rate. Banks’ and firms’ profits are 
then both dependent on 1s . 
Setting (3.3) as equivalence gives *1s , the exchange rate at which firms’ revenues 
are just enough to repay the debt: 
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For any exchange rate level higher than *1s , the firm will have to default. Agents 
are able to predict the exchange rate in the next period with an error e, so that:  
 
ess e +=1         (3.5) 
 
where es  is the exchange rate that agents in t=0 predict will prevail in t=1.  
Substituting (3.5) for 1s  in (3.4) and rearranging we obtain the highest forecast error 
*e  still allowing the firm to repay its debt, given the expected rate es :  
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*        (3.6) 
 
Given the expected exchange rate, *e  is the maximum error that leaves the firm 
able to repay its debt. Above it, it will have to default its debt, starting the liquidation 
process.  
 
The bank is always able to fully recover its credit. However, the liquidation 
procedure implies some costs c. The latter can be thought of as legal expenses. These 
are assumed to be proportional to the amount lent, since it is thought that overseeing 
the liquidation process of a big firm is more expensive that the one of a family 
business, for example. Since wn represents the peso value of the amount lent by the 
bank, cwn is the proportion of amount lent that must be spent in order to recover the 
credit, in case of default. Also, taking into consideration the fact that professionals 
tend to be paid in foreign currency in EMEs, it is assumed that the recovering costs 
are indexed to the dollar. In other words, recovery costs are assumed to vary in line 
with the exchange rate. The recovery costs A expressed in pesos are thus cwn  times 
the depreciation between periods 0 and 1: 
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The bank’s expected return from a loan is the expected value of the credit minus 
the expected recovering costs: 
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where ( )dPr  represents the probability of the firm defaulting. For each peso lent 
(i.e. dividing (3.8) by wn
s
se 



0
), the bank expected returns are thus: 
 
( ) ( )dcr Pr1 −+         (3.9) 
 
Banks must borrow at the interest rate Br  in the international money markets. 
Free entry makes the banking sector perfectly competitive, so that banks make zero 
profits. Therefore, we must have that expected costs and return for each peso lent are 
equal: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )dcrrB Pr11 −+=+       (3.10) 
 
Or: 
 
( )dcrr B Pr=−         (3.11) 
 
Eq. (3.11) states that the spread between borrowing and lending rate is set by the 
bank so as to cover the expected costs of recovering defaulted loans. Given the 
international borrowing rate, the lending rate is then determined by the probability of 
default. The latter is the probability of the exchange rate forecast error being higher 
than *e , forcing firms to default. We thus have that: 
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( ) ( ) ( )** 1PrPr eeed Φ−=>≡         (3.12) 
 
where ( )eΦ  is the cumulative distribution function of e. Substituting it in (3.11) 
we get: 
 
( )( )*1 ecrr B Φ−=−        (3.13) 
 
Finally, substituting (3.6) into the latter we get: 
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Eq. (3.14) contains all the pairs ),( rn  ensuring that the bank’s expected profits 
are zero. In other words, it gives the interest rate the bank will charge in order to lend 
any amount of money to the firms. It is therefore the funds supply function, 
henceforth called S. The latter states that banks supply funds at the borrowing rate Br  
plus a premium to cover their expected enforcement costs in case of default.  
 
Turning to the demand of funds, this is determined by the firm’s production 
decisions. These in turn are taken so as to maximize the firm’s expected value, which 
is given by the expected value of the firms’ fixed capital plus profits. There is no 
investment nor capital depreciation in this economy, so that the only element 
affecting the value of the fixed capital is a default event. As seen above, if the firm 
defaults and it is therefore forced into liquidation, the total value of the fixed capital 
sold piecemeal will fall by a certain amount, assumed equal to x. We thus have that 
the expected value of the firm is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )xdEQvE Pr−+= π       (3.15) 
 
 Q represents the total value of the fixed capital in period 0, ( )πE  expected 
profits and ( )xdPr  the expected costs of default.  
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Expected profits are given by revenues minus expected costs. Recall that prices   
are normalized to 1, so that revenues U are equal to the value of  output: 
 
bb npnU ==         (3.16) 
 
Expected costs of funding are given by the expected repayment to banks, which 
is the amount borrowed times the interest rate and the expected depreciation:  
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Recall that firms always repay their debt, whether they default or not. For this 
reason, ( )dPr  does not appear in the costs of funding expression.  
Putting together the last three expressions we obtain the firm’s expected value: 
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The value-maximizing level of employment is given by the first order condition: 
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where ( )ef  is the probability distribution function of e. (3.19) is essentially a 
profit maximization condition with the addition of the marginal effect of the marginal 
worker on the probability (and thus costs) of default. The latter is identified by the 
last term in (3.19). This is obtained by differentiating the last term in (3.18) w.r.t  n  
and noticing that: 
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I define the last term in (3.19) the “marginal costs of default” and, as we will see 
later, these costs play a key role in the determination of the equilibrium levels of n 
and r. 
Eq. (3.19), together with the concavity of the expected value function, gives the 
value-maximizing level of employment. It therefore gives the amount firms will 
borrow at any lending rate level. It represents the funds’ demand function, henceforth 
called D.  
 
The equilibrium in loans market is described in the following with numerical 
computations of the two equations of the supply and demand for funds. The 
computations are then used to do some comparative statics in order to get insight on 
the effects of exchange rate depreciations and volatility on the equilibrium levels of 
employment and interest rate. 
 
 
3.3  Numerical Computations 
 
3.3.1  Model parametrization 
 
This section presents the calibration of the model, which is summarized in Table 
3.1. Most of the parameters values are taken from previous literature, the others are 
obtained from financial data as described in the following.  
Consistent with the DSGE literature on the topic (see for example Cespedes et al. 
2004 and Elekdag and Tchakarov 2007), the labour intensity of domestic goods 
represented by the parameter b is set equal to 0.65.  
The exchange rate in time 0 is normalized to 1. To investigate the effect of 
expected depreciations on the equilibrium, the expected time 1 exchange rate es  is set 
to different levels. The assumed maturity of the loans is a key issue to establish what 
levels of exchange rate depreciation (i.e. what levels of es ) to use in the 
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computations. If the firm’s debt is due to repayment in one month, the one-month 
exchange rate movement is what affects the debt value and thus es  should be the 
exchange rate one month ahead. If the loan matures in a year, the relevant es  is 
instead the exchange rate in a year time. If we want to use the average depreciation 
after a crisis as the level of es  in the computations, we need to decide the time-span 
over which the average depreciation is computed. The Survey of Terms of Business 
Lending provides information concerning the terms of commercial and industrial 
loans made to U.S. non-financial businesses by commercial banks. According to it, 
the average maturity of a loan with purpose “general corporate purposes/working 
capital” is of 9.6 months. Data for emerging markets are very scarce, but a recent 
study on Bolivia found the average maturity to be 11 months (Ioannidu et al. 2008). 
We then set the average maturity of working capital loans at 11 months. Accordingly, 
es  must be the expected exchange rate in eleven months time. Then we estimate the 
average 11-months exchange rate movement following a major crisis event in a 
sample of 40 EMEs in the period January 1995 – December 20052. The inter-quantile 
range of the exchange rate movement is +0.098 to +0.2. In other words, the exchange 
rate depreciated between 9.7 and 20 percent in the 11 months following a major crisis 
in the 50% of cases at the centre of the distribution (or alternatively, in the lowest 
25% of cases the exchange rate depreciated less than 9.8% or appreciated and in the 
highest 25% of cases it depreciated by more than 20%). We run two computations 
with es  equal to 1.1 and 1.2, therefore representing a 10% and 20% expected 
depreciation. We interpret these as the boundaries of the average exchange rate 
pressure felt by an EME after a crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The major crisis events are: the East Asian (start point Jul-97), the Russian-Brazilian (Aug-98), the 
Turkish-Argentinean (Feb-01), considered one only event as the proximity of the two makes it 
impossible to distinguish them. 
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Table 3.1 
Computations parameters values 
parameter description value source 
b Share of Labour in production 0.65 
DGSE literature 
(Cespedes et al 2004, …)  
p 
 
Price levels 1.00 normalized to 1 
0s  
 
Exchange rate in 0 1.00 normalized to 1 
es  
 
Exchange rate in 1 various  
w 
annual / productive cycle 
workers' wage 0.60 
wn/y=0.65, labour's share in 
production 
c enforcement costs as % of loan 0.18 Djankov et al. (2004) 
Br  international interest rate 0.04 
average 6-months LIBOR  
Jan1995-Dec2005 
σ  
Exchange rate forecast error st. 
dev. 0.22 
Sample average exchange rate  
volatility, Jan1995-Dec2005 
B 
Bankruptcy costs as % of firm’s 
value 0.192 Thorburn (2000)  
T Price-to-Sales ratio 3.61 
Computed from Damodaran’s 
database (var. years) 
 
Assuming a perfectly competitive labour market, labour’s share in the revenues 
should be roughly equal to the labour’s share in production. Wages levels are thus set 
so that the wage bill over total revenues (i.e. labour’s revenues share) is equal to the 
labour productivity share (i.e. b). In other words, w are set so that b
n
wn
b = , giving a 
value of w=0.60. 
Djankov et al. (2004) provide data on the estimated cost of debt enforcement 
proceedings as a percentage of the value of the debt for the claimant in 88 countries. 
Costs include court/bankruptcy authority costs, attorney fees, bankruptcy 
administrations fees, accountant fees and other associated costs. The average for 
EMEs (lower- and middle-income countries in the World Bank classification used in 
the study) is 18% of the loan. Accordingly, the value of c is set to 0.18.  
The international borrowing rate is computed as the average six-months LIBOR 
rate (i.e. the average LIBOR for a six month deposit in US Dollars on the last 
business day of the previous month) in the period January 1995 – December 2005, 
which gives a value of 4%.  
The exchange rate volatility is calculated as the average eleven-months volatility 
of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US Dollar. The figure is obtained with a three-
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stages procedure: first the eleven-months volatility for each country’s exchange rate 
is computed as the variance of an eleven-observations rolling sample of monthly 
exchange rate levels and the country-specific average is calculated. Then each 
country-specific average standard error is transformed into percentage change from 
the mean exchange rate in order to make standard errors comparable across countries. 
Finally the transformed standard errors for all 40 countries are summed up and the 
simple average taken. The procedure gives an exchange rate standard error of 0.22. 
The forecast error e is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0. The figure 
above implies therefore that agents are able to forecast the exchange rate in 11 
months time with less than 22% error on both sides roughly two-thirds of the times. 
To analyse the effect of variance shocks on the equilibrium, the latter is also 
computed for 253.0=σ  and 286.0=σ  (i.e. for a 14% and 30% standard error 
increase). These values represent the average increase in the exchange rate variance 
after main crisis episodes, computed in the same way as the average depreciation. 
Specifically, we consider the values at the borders of the interquantile range of 
increases in exchange rate variance in the eleven months after a crisis (i.e. 253.0=σ  
and 286.0=σ  are the 25th and 75th percentile of the variance increases after a crisis).  
When the firm defaults on its debt, the bank can force its liquidation and recover 
the full amount lent. The liquidation causes a monetary loss to the firm, equal to x. To 
calibrate this parameter, estimates of the cost of bankruptcy/liquidation for the firm’s 
owners are needed. These have been estimated for listed companied by a number of 
researchers. The most quoted study (Altman 1984) estimates bankruptcy-related costs 
to be around 16.7% of US firms’ value in the year before bankruptcy. More recently, 
Thorburn (2000) finds an estimate of 19.2% for Swedish and Russian companies. 
Bankruptcy costs as a percentage of the firm’s value are thus set equal to 0.192. To 
estimate the representative firm’s value, I use data on the Price-to-Sales ratio. This is 
the ratio of the market capitalization of a firm over its revenues in the past 12 months. 
Knowing the value of revenues U and the Price-to-Sales ratio T one can compute the 
representative firm’s value as: TUv *= . Average revenues U  are obtained by 
computing the equilibrium with all parameters (expected depreciation included) at 
their average value and computing bnU = , where n  is the equilibrium employment 
level for all parameters equal to their mean. The Price-to-Sales ratio is instead based 
on the dataset of Damodaran of the Stern business school (see 
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www.damodaranonline.com). This provides the ratio of roughly 8000 firms listed in 
emerging stock markets in the 2002-2007 period, with an average Price-to-Sales ratio 
of 3.61. Assuming that listed firms’ are representative of all firms in EMEs so that the 
former’ and the latter’ bankruptcy costs and PSR are similar we can compute the costs 
of default x as follows: 
 
)*(** TUBvBx ==  
   521.0)61.3*(*192.0 65.0 == n   
 
 
3.3.2  Numerical Computations  
 
With the above parameters values and no expected depreciation (i.e. setting 
1=es ), the computed demand and supply for funds are as depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.2 shows the enlarged detail of the equilibrium, from which one can see that 
the latter is given by r=0.04 and n=1.04.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 
Equilibrium in the loans market 
with no expected depreciation 
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The most interesting part of the analysis is the supply curve. Recall that banks 
charge a premium proportional to the probability of default over the borrowing rate. 
S 
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The probability of default is in turn a positive function of the amount lent: because of 
diminishing marginal productivity of labour, an additional worker (i.e. one more 
wage to pay and thus a bigger amount borrowed) increases firms’ revenues by less 
than it increases its debt. Profits per worker fall and the depreciation necessary to 
wipe out all profits and force the firm to default is lowered. It follows that an 
additional worker increases )Pr(d  and lowers banks’ expected profits.  
 
Figure 3.2 
Detail of the equilibrium 
with no expected depreciation 
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This can be seen differentiating the supply equation (3.14) with respect to 
employment:  
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The derivative is negative for any value of n and r. Another representation of the 
phenomenon is provided by Figure 3.3, plotting the probability of default as a 
function of n and r. We can see that, given r, an increase in n pushes ( )dPr  up. 
Low values of n are thus associated with low probability of default and low 
lending rate as banks charge a negligible premium: the supply is roughly flat at the 
borrowing rate. Given a borrowing rate of 4%, 0)Pr( ≈d  for all values of n below 1 
and as a consequence the supply is flat at r=0.04 (see Figure 3.2).  
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As n increases, it raises the probability of default above zero and thus reduces 
banks’ expected profits. These react charging a higher premium and the lending rate r 
rises.  
 
Notice however that the interest rate has two contrasting effects on the supply, as 
can be seen differentiating the latter w.r.t. r:  
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On one hand, an increase in r raises the amount due to the bank per dollar lent, 
on the other it increases the probability of default since it raises the firm’s debt. The 
first effect (identified by 1 in 3.22) increases banks’ expected repayments while the 
second (last term in 3.22) decreases it; the final effect on expected repayment and 
thus on banks’ profits is then theoretically ambiguous. For the values used in the 
computations we have however that (3.22) is positive: a marginal increase in r raises 
banks’ expected profits. It follows that banks offset the fall in expected profits due to 
the increase in n by increasing r: the supply is positively sloped. 
 
It is interesting to analyse why, starting from low levels of n and increasing, the 
supply gets steeper first and then gradually flattens until it is flat again at r=0.29. The 
key behind this is ( )*ef , which can be interpreted as the joint marginal effect of n 
and r on the probability of default and thus on banks’ profits. We have already seen 
that the probability of default is zero for low enough levels of n and r. For these 
values, since the forecast error e is normally distributed, ( )*ef  is also zero: a 
marginal increase in n does not increase the probability of default nor reduces banks’ 
expected profits (see 3.21, giving 0=nS  for ( ) 0* =ef ). ( )*ef  equal to zero also 
implies that an increase in r translates one to one in higher expected profits for banks 
(i.e 1=rS  for ( ) 0* =ef , see 3.22). This is because higher rates cause no increase in 
( )dPr  and thus increase banks’ expected revenues one to one. For low enough levels 
of n and r we thus have that the supply slope 0
1
0
==−
r
n
S
S
: the supply is flat.  
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Given r, as the amount lent increases so does the probability of default and 
( )*ef . Eventually, nS  will turn negative while rS  will become smaller than one: the 
supply will turn positive. At this point ( ) 0* >ef  and an increase in n will have to be 
offset by an increase in r in order for the bank to break even.  
With an upward sloping supply curve, as n increases, so does the level of r 
guaranteeing banks’ breakeven. This in turn pushes ( )*ef  up, further reducing both 
nS  and rS  and thus steepening the supply curve. This has a clear interpretation: in a 
world with Gaussian forecast errors, as default becomes more and more likely, the 
same increase in n will cause a bigger increase in banks’ costs and the same increase 
in r will have a smaller effect on banks’ profits. This process continues until 
( ) 5.0Pr =d . At this point *e  is at the mean of the error distribution and ( )*ef  is at its 
maximum: the marginal effect of n on banks’ costs is maximum and the marginal 
effect of r on banks’ profit minimum. Any further increase in n and r will now 
decrease ( )*ef  and thus the opposite process takes place: the supply flattens. Once 
( ) 1Pr =d , an increase in n and r will not have any effect on banks’ profits: the supply 
returns flat. This happens at the interest rate level 29.025.004.0 =+=+= crr B , 
which is indeed the supply equation (3.14) with ( ) 1Pr =d .   
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Figure 3.3 
The Probability of default 
as a function of N and R 
no expected depreciation 
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Turning to the demand, its key derivatives are: 
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The first terms of the two equations’ left-hand side represent standard effects of 
employment and the interest rate on the firm’s marginal revenues and costs. The 
terms in parenthesis represent the effects of n and r on the marginal costs of default. 
Depending on the level of ( )*ef  or, in other words, depending on the level of n and r, 
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the terms in parenthesis can be positive or negative. However, the computations show 
that ( ) 0Pr ≈d  along the whole range of values of n and r consistent with firms’ profit 
maximization, so that ( ) ( ) ( ) 0*** ≈
∂
∂
≈
∂
∂
≈
r
ef
n
efef . The effect of employment and 
interest rate levels on the marginal costs of default is close to zero. The terms in 
parenthesis are then negligible and we are left with a standard downward sloping 
demand for funds. Falling labour productivity implies that marginal revenues fall as 
employment expands: the term ( ) 21 −− bnbb  in (3.23) is negative since b<1. Higher 
interest rates increase marginal costs: w
s
se
0
−  is negative. The standard negative rD  
and nD  generate a standard downward sloping demand for funds, as shown in figures 
3.1 and 3.2.  
 
Comparative Statics I: level shocks 
 
We want to investigate the effect of increases in the level and variance of the 
exchange rate on the equilibrium levels of employment and interest rate. Let us focus 
on level shocks first. To see the effect of a 10% and 20% expected depreciation the 
equilibrium is computed for 1.1=es  (Figure 3.4) and 2.1=es  (Figure 3.5). The 
dotted lines represent post-shock demand and supply while the solid lines reproduce 
the pre-shock ones.  
Expected depreciations increase firms’ expected costs of funding and thus the 
probability of default. Looking at (3.6) we can indeed see that an increase in es  
reduces *e . The reason is simple: since a higher depreciation is expected, a lower 
forecast error is now enough to wipe out firm’s profits and force them to default. As a 
consequence, the default risk premium charged by banks rises. The difference 
between the dotted and solid supply curves D’ and D represents that increase. 
Regarding the demand, the increase in es  has a double negative impact: it increases 
both the firm’s marginal costs of funding and the marginal costs of default (see the 
first order condition (3.19), second and third term respectively). The economic sense 
of the first effect is the following: borrowing in dollars, a higher depreciation 
translates into higher expected marginal costs of  funding. The second negative 
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impact is caused by the marginal costs of default increase highlighted above: an 
increase in es  means higher ( )*ef  so that an additional worker increases ( )dPr  by 
more. Expected depreciations therefore increase the negative effects of the marginal 
workers on the firm’s value. As a consequence, the demand falls for any value of r as 
firms find it optimal to reduce the scale of operations: the demand shifts to D’. 
Expected depreciations reduce banks’ expected profits and increase firms’ 
marginal costs: both the supply and demand for funds shrink, bringing down the level 
of production. The 10% (20%) expected depreciation reduces the equilibrium level of 
employment to 0.81 (0.64) while the interest rate remains unchanged (see Figures 3.4 
and 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.4 
Equilibrium in the loans market 
with 10% expected depreciation 
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
0.080
0.100
0.120
0.140
0.160
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40
n
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S’ 
S 
D’ D 
 55
Figure 3.5 
Equilibrium in the loans market 
with 20% expected depreciation 
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Comparative Statics II: volatility shocks 
 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the equilibrium shifts for a 14% and 30% increase in the 
pre-shock levels of the exchange rate variance σ . Again, the dotted lines represent 
the post-shock demand and supply while the solid lines pre-shock schedules. The 
computations for variance shocks give results similar to those for expected 
depreciations: both the demand and supply shrink and the equilibrium employment 
levels fall.  
This can be explained as follows: ceteris paribus, an increase in the exchange rate 
variance σ  increases the probability of default. This is because extremely positive 
values of the forecast error e (i.e. extreme unexpected depreciations) become more 
likely. Firms will therefore be forced to default more often as their debt value will 
exceed their revenues3. Thus, an increase in the error variance pushes ( )dPr  up and 
raises the risk premium charged by banks just as depreciations did. The premium 
widening is identified by the wedge between the dotted and the solid supply curves S’ 
and S.  
                                                 
3 Of course, extreme unexpected appreciations also become more likely. However, for values of the 
actual exchange rate lower than expected (i.e. for any negative value of e) the firms must be already 
able to repay its debt. The equilibrium probability of default is indeed smaller than 50%, reason for 
which *e must be positive. Any negative value of e is thus associated with full debt repayment. Thus, 
the variance increase leaves banks’ expected profit unaffected.  
S 
S’ 
D D’
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The variance shock also increases firms’ marginal costs of default (the last term in 
(3.19)), thereby reducing the funds demand. This is because an increase in variance 
shifts probability mass from the mean towards the tails of the error distribution and 
pushes ( )*ef  up. Recall indeed that the pre-shock level of ( )dPr  is close to zero and 
*e  is at the upper tail of the distribution. As σ  increases, the tail of the normally 
distributed error becomes fatter. Therefore, with higher volatility an additional worker 
increases the probability of default by more: the marginal costs of defaults are higher.  
We can see this formally by differentiating the expression for the normal 
probability density function (with mean zero and standard deviation σ ) with respect 
to σ  and evaluating the resulting expression in *e :  
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The parenthesis on the right hand side of (3.25) can be positive or negative, 
depending on the level of *e . An increase in variance can therefore increase or 
decrease ( )*ef , depending on the value of *e . For values of *e  close to zero4 (i.e. 
close to its mean), the effect of a variance increase on ( )*ef  is negative, for “big” 
values (i.e. on the tails of e’s distribution) the effect is positive. This is intuitive, an 
increase in variance shifts probability mass from the mean towards the tails of the 
Gaussian bell. Central points (i.e. small absolute values of e) will lose probability 
density as they become less likely and tail points (i.e. big absolute values of e) will 
gain density as they become more likely.  
In our computations the pre-shock levels of ( )dPr  are close to zero, *e  is at the 
positive tail of the distribution, (3.25) is positive and an increase in the error variance 
pushes ( )*ef  up. Therefore, the variance shock causes the marginal worker to 
increase the probability of default by more: labour becomes costlier and as a 
consequence the demand shifts in. Variance shocks act just as level ones: they 
increase marginal costs for firms and reduce banks’ expected profits: the funds’ 
                                                 
4 More precisely for any value of *e smaller than 2 standard deviations in absolute terms, a 
variance increase reduces ( )*ef . 
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demand falls, the supply shifts up and the equilibrium employment levels fall. Pure 
risk has then a negative effect on firms’ output.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 
Equilibrium in the loans market 
with 14% increase in volatility 
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Figure 3.7 
Equilibrium in the loans market 
with 30% increase in volatility 
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Level and variance shocks negatively affect both the supply and the demand for 
funds. They do so for two different reasons: because they increase the level of the 
probability of default (with negative effect on the supply) and the rate at which the 
probability of default increases for an additional worker (with negative effect on the 
demand).  
Introducing default costs for both banks and firms, expected depreciations and 
variance increases do not necessarily cause a widening in the borrowing-lending 
spread. This is a key difference between this and the Agenor-Aizenmann model. In 
that framework higher probability of default is associated with lower costs of funding 
for firms since in case of default the debt is only partially recovered by banks. 
Therefore, default is detrimental only for banks. In such a setting an exogenous shock 
increasing the probability of default reduces banks’ profits and firms’ marginal costs. 
It thus translates into lower supply and higher demand for funds. The result is higher 
interest rates, higher ( )dPr  and a wider borrowing-lending spread. Differently, in our 
framework default is detrimental for both banks and firms so that an exogenous shock 
pushing ( )dPr  up causes a contraction of both demand and supply, with strong 
negative effects on employment and uncertain effects on the interest rate. The 
computations show that the interest is indeed unaffected by shocks to the level of the 
exchange rate and only slightly by variance shocks (see Table 3.2). Most of the 
adjustment weights on employment levels, which fall dramatically. This in turn keeps 
the equilibrium probability of default low. The computations describe then a realistic 
picture in which firms and banks find it optimal to keep the probability of default 
close to zero (see Table 3.2, last column). In normal times, EMEs bank non-
performing loans are indeed typically in the range of 0-3% of the total (see BIS 
2009), suggesting that the probability of a loan being defaulted should be in a similar 
range. This is consistent with our computations where the computed equilibrium 
( )dPr  levels are between 0 and 1%. 
The fact that firms and banks adjust to expected changes in the exchange rate 
level and variance to keep the equilibrium ( )dPr  low also highlights the key 
distinction between expected and unexpected exchange rate movements. When these 
are expected, they are less disruptive on the productive sector as both banks and firms 
adjust and avoid default. It is instead unexpected shocks that cause default and thus 
 59
the liquidation of firms. Inserting such a framework in a dynamic setting in which the 
number of existing firms is negatively affected by default, one may show that 
expected exchange rate movements have only temporary effect on the country’s 
potential output as firms avoid default by reducing their operation in time while 
unexpected shocks reduce persistently potential output by forcing firms into 
liquidation thus reducing the capital stock of the country. Such a model is however 
beyond the scope of this work. 
 
The models sketched at the beginning of this chapter identified balance sheet 
effects caused by currency mismatches as a key driver behind financial instability in 
EMEs. Analysing the effects of level shocks (exchange rate depreciations) on the 
financial intermediation process between banks and firms and through this on 
production they showed that in a Bernanke-Gertler world with currency mismatches a 
depreciation worsen firms’ net worth, thus impairing their ability to borrow. The 
analysis presented in this chapter shifts the attention on variance shocks. Leaving the 
exchange rate level unchanged, these do not affect the balance sheet of a firm but they 
increase firms’ costs of funding through the channel highlighted above. It follows that 
financial turbulence (in the form of exchange rate variance) has negative effects on 
firms’ production even in absence of foreign currency-denominated debt. This 
suggests that, although the size and the currency composition of agents’ stock of debt 
is an important factor determining the vulnerability of a country to external shocks, 
the currency composition of capital flows might be another, more neglected one. 
Thus, the negative effects of currency mismatches might go beyond the much studied 
balance sheet effects. 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Simulated Equilibria 
n r es  σ  )Pr(d  
1.05 0.04 1 0.22 0.007 
0.81 0.04 1.1 0.22 0.005 
0.64 0.04 1.2 0.22 0.002 
0.99 0.042 1 0.253 0.008 
0.92 0.045 1 0.286 0.011 
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3.3 Volatility shocks and financial contagion 
 
 
Variance shocks can also help explain the contagiousness of financial crises 
among EMEs. In a setting such as the one described by our analysis, shocks causing 
an increase in the volatility of the exchange rate translate into higher costs for both 
banks and firms, thus depressing aggregate supply. There are a number of ways under 
which a financial crisis abroad can generate an increase in domestic exchange rate 
volatility, thus creating a channel of contagion working through the supply side of the 
economy. If a country has trade or financial linkages with a country running into 
financial troubles, the uncertainty regarding the crisis country’s future output will 
translate into higher uncertainty about the domestic country trade balance and/or 
capital account: the crisis will then cause exchange rate volatility and the supply 
shock identified by the model. However, the same linkages between crisis and 
domestic country generate contagion under standard level shocks: the crisis country 
falls into recession, its imports plummet or its collapsing banking sector cuts funding 
to the domestic country. As a consequence, domestic output falls. These standard 
demand-side contagion channels, where drops in domestic production are caused by a 
sudden stop of capital inflows and worsening trade balance, have been extensively 
documented. What is interesting of our analysis is that variance shocks can generate 
contagion among countries with no direct trade or financial linkages. In presence of 
currency mismatches, if a crisis abroad increases uncertainty about the domestic trade 
balance and exchange rate, it will represent a negative supply shock. This may 
happen because a crisis abroad increases uncertainty about the future output of the 
domestic country’s trade partners. Trade has however not to be necessarily the 
channel of contagion. Major events such as debt restructuring/defaults or banking 
crises in an EME tend to cause flight-to-quality phenomena in which risk aversion 
jumps and capitals desert any asset perceived to be risky. If this happens, EMEs 
bonds, stock and currency markets are the first to suffer. By raising the possibility of 
flight-to-quality phenomena, a crisis in an EME increases the volatility of other 
EMEs’ exchange rates, regardless of the trade/financial linkages between the crisis 
country and the others. This alone is enough to depress production in our model. This 
can then generate unexplained-by-fundamentals contagion, a phenomenon widely 
documented in the major crisis episodes of the ‘90s. Currency mismatches are critical. 
If firms could borrow in domestic currency, increases in exchange rate volatility 
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would not affect their expected profits and output. Financial instability would in this 
case propagate only to countries sharing direct linkages with the crisis country. 
 
The main features of our model, liability dollarization and weak regulatory 
systems (implying high enforcement costs) are widespread in EMEs. The model can 
then provide a useful framework for interpreting the recurrence of sharp recessions 
and depreciations experienced during turbulent times by emerging markets without 
clear linkages with the crisis country. The key is the increased uncertainty about the 
domestic country’s prospects caused by the crisis. This reminds one of the events 
occurred in Brazil during the Russian-LCTM crisis in 1998. The latter caused a 
marked increase in the volatility of Latin America financial markets. Notwithstanding 
the non-existence of direct trade or financial linkages between Brazil and Russia, the 
former suffered a sharp widening of the deposit-lending spread, was forced to 
abandon its dollar peg and the economy went into a painful recession. These events 
are consistent with our theory. Brazil had indeed a sizable part of public and private 
sector debt denominated in foreign currency and was highly dependent on foreign-
currency denominated funding (see Baig and Goldfajn 2000). It also ranked very low 
in measures of business regulations and their enforcement such as the Doing Business 
index complied by the World Bank (129th out of 183, the lowest of all major Latin 
American economies). Indeed, Baig and Goldfajn gave a similar interpretation of the 
Brazilian episode, based on investors’ sentiment shifts. They pointed out that foreign 
investors’ withdrawal from Brazilian financial markets immediately after the Russian 
default played a crucial role in precipitating the crisis, suggesting that foreign 
investors panicked after the Russian crisis and speculated against the Real, even if the 
Brazilian economy did not show evident signs of macroeconomic disequilibrium. The 
authors therefore suggest that investors flew to more secure assets without a careful 
assessment of the situation, following a self-fulfilling prophecy of doom for Brazil.  
According to them, foreign investors’ flight to quality increased markedly the 
interest rate domestic financial institutions had to pay to raise capital abroad, while 
increased perceived exchange rate volatility (in the form of a reduced credibility of 
the existing crawling peg) increased the borrowing-lending spread charged by 
domestic financial institutions. These factors together caused a surge in the firms’ 
costs of funding and a drop in economic activity.  Our analysis is consistent with Bajg 
and Goldfain’s interpretation: both highlight imperfections in the financial markets 
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that created interdependence between Brazil and Russia beyond that explained by 
macroeconomic fundamentals and point to the key role played by increased exchange 
rate variance. 
 
Beyond the Brazilian case, the very different performances of Eastern European 
EMEs in the 2008-9 global financial crisis suggest that currency mismatches are still 
a key factor determining the likelihood and severity of contagion. Slovakia adopted 
the Euro, the Czech Republic strongly reduced its currency mismatches in the years 
before the crisis. On the other hand, Romania and Hungary borrowed heavily in 
Euros betting on future accession and convergence to the Euro Zone. This has been 
quoted as a key factor explaining the stronger contraction felt by the latter countries 
(IMF 2010). Investigating the link between currency mismatches and macroeconomic 
volatility seems still a worth exercise. 
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CHAPTER 4 - CURRENCY MISMATCHES AND THE 
PROPAGATION OF TRADE SHOCKS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Developing countries tend to be more volatile than industrial countries in the 
sense that they have a more unstable rate of GDP growth. Eichengreen et al. (1999) 
show that in the 1980-1999 period the standard deviation of developing countries’ 
annual GDP growth has been more than double than that of industrial countries: 5.8 
percent instead of 2.7. As the authors show, a relevant part of the difference is 
explained by the presence of currency mismatches in developing countries. 
Regressing output volatility on a series of controls and a measure of currency 
mismatches, they estimate that the latter are significantly associated with relatively 
high levels of output volatility and account for a third of the difference in output 
volatility between developed and developing countries. 
They give a three-folded explanation of such phenomenon: first, the presence of 
currency mismatches limits the scope and effectiveness of countercyclical monetary 
policies because of the negative effects of expansionary policies on the exchange rate 
and thus on domestic agents’ balance sheets. This point is also made by many others 
(see for example, Aghion et al. (2000), Calvo and Reinhardt (1999) and Obstfeld et 
al. (2005)) who highlight the catch-22 situation EMEs’ central banks are in when 
negative shocks hit: if they allow a depreciation they hurt agents’ balance sheets, if 
the rise interest rate to defend the currency they hurt agents’ ability to repay their 
debts. The latter tend indeed to be short-term for the same reasons causing currency 
mismatches (i.e. domestic financial markets underdevelopment). Second, foreign-
currency liabilities reduce central banks’ control over the amount of liquidity in 
domestic financial markets, thus reducing their ability to avert liquidity crises in their 
role as lenders of last resort. Third, dollar-denominated debts and real exchange rate 
interact to create uncertainty over the cost of dollar debt service, thus lowering credit 
ratings and making capital flows more volatile. 
 
The above arguments suggest that the effects of foreign shocks on the domestic 
output should be magnified by the presence of currency mismatches. A major (if not 
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the principal) source of foreign shocks is trade. Research on the optimal currency area 
found a strong positive link between trade intensity and business cycle 
synchronization (see, among others, Frankel and Rose 1996, Baxter and Kouparitsas 
2004, Gruben et al. 2002, Imbs 2004, Calderon et al. 2007, Inklaar et al 2008). This 
result is robust to a vast array of estimation techniques, definition of the relevant 
variables and choice of countries included in the sample. There is then strong 
evidence that trade shocks affect domestic output significantly.  
If the above considerations are correct, trade shocks should therefore cause 
stronger output fluctuations in currency-mismatches-prone countries because they hit 
an environment of more volatile capital flows and constrained and less effective 
monetary policy. This is the conclusion of DSGE models on the issue (see, for 
example, Cespedes et al. (2004)) where liability dollarization is found to magnify the 
effect of foreign disturbances on domestic output. The analysis carried out in the 
previous chapter also suggests that currency mismatches magnify the strength of trade 
shocks. Chapter 3 showed that, trade shocks cause exchange rate fluctuations 
impacting on firms’ costs of funding and thus on their production levels. In this 
setting trade shocks affect output levels in two ways: through the standard effect on 
the foreign component of aggregate demand and through the effect on firms’ costs of 
funding that affects the aggregate supply. The second effect is there only in presence 
of currency mismatches. However, the framework developed in chapter 3 describes 
only the functioning of the loans market. To formally assess the real effects of trade 
shocks with and without currency mismatches, one would need to insert it into a 
general equilibrium framework where prices, interest and exchange rates and output 
are simultaneously determined. The model identifies however a propagation channel 
of trade-related output fluctuations generated by currency mismatches, additional to 
the standard AD channel, thereby suggesting a magnification effect of currency 
mismatches. 
  
In the presence of currency mismatches, trade shocks might then have stronger 
repercussions on firms’ production decisions, cause higher capital volatility and be 
less counter-balanceable by monetary policy. Altogether, this suggests that the output 
of currency-mismatches-prone countries should be more sensitive to trade shocks 
than that of countries where currency mismatches are negligible. This hypothesis is 
tested in the following.  
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Estimating the effect of currency mismatches on the sensitivity to foreign output 
fluctuations, of either sign, is a way of assessing the empirical relevance of the above 
discussion. However, of particular interest is the sensitivity to negative trade shocks 
(i.e. drops in the economic activity of trade partners). As Goldstein and Turner (2004) 
notice in their book’s preface “currency mismatches have been present in virtually 
every major financial crisis in emerging economies over the past decade” and “the 
countries that have experienced the largest currency mismatches have typically been 
the ones that have suffered the largest output losses during crises”. This view is 
supported by ample evidence. It is widely recognized that short-term foreign-currency 
denominated debt was a key factor in the East Asian episode (see Table 2.1 in 
Goldstein-Turner 2004). Furman and Stiglitz (1998) affirm “the ability of this 
variable (foreign-currency denominated debt), by itself, to predict the crises of 1997 
is remarkable”. The same is true for foreign-currency indexed tesobonos in the 
Mexican 1994 crisis, as documented by Calvo and Goldstein (1996). Finally, the 
large literature on the leading indicators of currency and banking crises generalized 
this result for emerging market economies in the last three decades: the ratio of short-
term external (mainly denominated in foreign currency) debt to international reserves 
and the ratio of bank and corporate external debt to exports are among the most 
powerful predictors of a crisis (Sachs et al. (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999), 
Berg and Patillo (1998)). Therefore, ample evidence suggests a key role played by 
currency mismatches in crisis episodes. Some of these episodes, notably the 
Argentinean difficulties in 1995, the Korean, Malaysian and Indonesian troubles in 
1997 had a clear contagious nature, in the sense that the crises in those countries were 
imported from the original crisis country rather than caused by domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances. It is then important to assess the role of currency 
mismatches in the propagation of crises, in particular after the observations on trade-
related shocks put forward above. Notwithstanding this, to my knowledge a 
systematic study of the effect of currency mismatches on the propagation of negative 
trade shocks is not present in the literature. This chapter fills this gap by investigating 
whether negative trade shocks are felt more strongly in countries where agents are 
exposed to currency mismatches.  
The chapter also tests for asymmetries in the propagation of trade shocks (i.e. 
whether negative trade shocks affect the domestic output proportionally more than 
positive shocks) in both countries with and without a substantial degree of currency 
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mismatches. These asymmetries can arise if for example asymmetric reactions to 
productivity shocks such as the ones described by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) are 
present. In their renowned paper the authors show that the real effects of productivity 
shocks can be asymmetric: negative ones can reduce firms’ net worth below a 
threshold, making borrowing unprofitable and thus having a negative effect on 
investment while positive ones might not alter the profitability of borrowing and thus 
the level of investment. In such a setting, negative productivity shocks have stronger 
absolute real effects than positive ones. If trade shocks translate into productivity 
shocks (because exporting firms reduce their capacity utilization following negative 
trade shocks and increase it following positive ones) these might have an asymmetric 
effect on domestic output, with negative shocks being felt more strongly than positive 
ones.  
Trade shocks might then propagate asymmetrically, regardless of the presence of 
currency mismatches. On top of this, the latter may introduce an additional element 
generating asymmetric shock propagation. If firms are exposed to currency 
mismatches, their net worth is dependent on the exchange rate. The logic behind the 
Bernanke-Gertler effect can then apply to a context of liability dollarization as well: 
negative trade shocks cause depreciations that might push firms’ net worth below the 
critical level and thus cause a rationing of credit, while positive shocks might not 
have that effect. Therefore, we might have that currency mismatches generate 
asymmetries if these are not there, or magnify them if instead they are there already. 
Asymmetries in trade shocks’ propagation could then arise in both countries with and 
without pervasive currency mismatches: the following analysis investigates both 
hypotheses. 
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4.2 Testing the link between currency mismatches and trade-related 
contagion 
 
4.2.1 The tests  
 
Aim of the chapter is thus to test: 
 
a) whether the output of currency-mismatches-prone countries is more 
sensitive to negative trade shocks than the output of currency-mismatches-
free countries (negative hypothesis henceforth)  
b) whether the output of currency-mismatches-prone countries is more 
sensitive to trade shocks of either sign than the output of currency-
mismatches-free countries (higher sensitivity hypothesis henceforth) 
c) whether negative trade shocks propagate more strongly than positive trade 
shocks of the same size, in both countries with and without a substantial 
degree of currency mismatches (asymmetry hypothesis henceforth) 
 
Note that point b) implies point a) and is a more general test of the magnification 
effect of currency mismatches on trade-related output volatility. Point c) is a test of 
asymmetric shock propagation. It asks whether there is such asymmetry, and whether 
is confined to currency-mismatches countries or instead is a general phenomenon. All 
tests can be carried out with a single model estimation, as shown now. 
Before carrying on it is worth recalling the definition of contagion used: 
“propagation of macroeconomic instability”. Focusing on output, contagion is 
synonymous with output shocks propagation and output interdependence. In this 
light, the first two hypotheses investigate the role of currency mismatches in 
magnifying contagion while the third focuses on its role in generating asymmetric 
contagion. The acceptance of the hypotheses would only prove that currency 
mismatches increase output interdependence and/or render it asymmetric. It would 
not prove that currency mismatches generate shift- or unexplained-by-fundamentals 
contagion.  
 
There are four possible trade shock regimes: positive shock to a currency-
mismatches-free country (financial centre or FC henceforth), positive shock to a 
currency-mismatches-prone country (Original Sin country or OS henceforth, for 
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reasons explained below), negative shock to an FC, and finally negative shock to an 
OS. 
Estimating a regression such as (4.1) below, we can estimate the effect of each of 
the four shock regimes on the output of country i: 
 
itiititititiitititit XOSNegCNegCOSPosCCy γββββα +++++=Δ ***** 3210   (4.1) 
 
where: 
ityΔ  is the percentage change in country i's output in period t  
itC  is the contagion proxy, the sum of the percentage changes in foreign 
countries’ output in period t. These changes are weighted for the relevance of any 
country j as a trade partner of country i.  
itPos  is a dummy variable assuming value 1 when 0≥itC  and zero otherwise 
itNeg  is a dummy variable assuming value 1 when 0<itC  and zero otherwise 
iOS  is the “Original Sin” dummy variable, assuming value 0 if country i is a 
financial centre, able to borrow abroad in domestic currency and 1 otherwise. The 
definition of Original Sin and Financial Centre countries is based on Eichengreen et 
al (1999). The issue is discussed at length below. See Appendix A for an explanation 
of the dummies specification chosen. 
itX  is a set of control variables.  
 
The estimated effect of each of the four types of trade shock on the domestic 
output is given by the linear combinations listed in Table 4.1: 
 
Table 4.1 
The four regimes 
Regime 
Estimated 
effect 
positive shock to FC 0β  
positive shock to OS 10 ββ +  
negative shock to FC 20 ββ +  
negative shock to OS  320 βββ ++
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Testing the hypotheses above amounts therefore to test the statistical significance 
of the differences between the linear combinations in Table 4.1. Subtracting the last 
row of the table from the second last we see that the difference between the estimated 
real effect of a negative shock in an OS and in an FC is given by 3β . This parameter 
therefore identifies the reaction of OS countries to negative shocks over and above 
the reaction of FCs. If negative shocks affect the former more than the latter, 3β  must 
be positive. Therefore, testing the negative hypothesis is equivalent to test the 
hypothesis 03 >β .  
Similarly, subtracting the second row from the first we find that the difference 
between the estimated real effect of a positive shock in an OS and in an FC is given 
by 1β . This parameter identifies the reaction of OS countries to positive shocks over 
and above the reaction of FCs. If positive shocks affect the former more than the 
latter, 1β  must be positive. Therefore, if OS countries are more sensitive than FCs to 
trade shocks of either sign, we should have both 1β  and 3β  positive. The higher 
sensitivity hypothesis is then a test of the joint hypothesis 01 >β  and 03 >β .  
Subtracting the first row from the third we get the difference between the 
estimated reaction of FCs’ output to negative and positive shocks. If the former are 
felt more strongly than the latter we must have that 02 >β . This parameter thus 
identifies the asymmetry in the propagation of trade shocks to FCs and the hypothesis 
02 >β  is the one tested to investigate the Asymmetry to FC hypothesis. The 
estimated asymmetry of propagation in OS countries is instead found subtracting the 
second row from the last. This gives 132 βββ −+  so that testing the Asymmetry to OS 
hypothesis is equivalent to test 321 βββ +< . 
Table 4.2 sums up and describes the hypotheses tested. 
 
Table 4.2 
The four tests 
Hypothesis Description Test 
Negative negative shocks more affecting in OS countries 03 >β  
Higher sensitivity shocks of either sign more affecting in OS countries 01 >β  and 03 >β
Asymmetry in FC negative shocks more affecting than positive ones in FC countries 02 >β  
Asymmetry in OS negative shocks more affecting than positive ones in OS countries  321 βββ +<  
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4.2.2  Data 
 
The following analysis exploits data from three main sources: the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and the Directorate of Trade Statistics (DOTS) complied by 
the IMF and the World Development Indicators (WDI) compiled by the World Bank. 
All three databases have been accessed via the ESDS system based at the University 
of Manchester. 
All data used in the analysis apart from those on exports are taken by the IFS 
database. This provides national-level data on a wide range of economic aggregates 
from interest rates to exchange rate vis-à-vis major currencies, price and production 
indexes, government spending and national accounts, international transactions and 
money, banking and financial sector indicators. Monthly and quarterly data are 
available. Both monthly and quarterly data present advantages and disadvantages. 
Monthly data are preferable for two reasons: a) given the speed at which 
macroeconomic fluctuations are transmitted across borders, quarterly and annually 
data would probably lose some of the dynamics by averaging out higher frequency 
oscillations and b) higher frequency gives more observations in the same time span. 
Since complete data for all variables needed started to be compiled only recently, this 
has a relevant effect on the degrees of freedom available to the estimation process. On 
the other side, it might take more than a month for the effects of output fluctuations in 
trade partners on the domestic economy to fully manifest themselves. Importing firms 
located in the trade partner will see their orders or sales change, they will revise their 
own orders to domestic firms that will in turn reset their production levels 
accordingly. The process is likely to take more than a month, so that the monthly 
analysis may not be able to identify the correlation. One can control for this using 
lags in the monthly analysis or instead carrying it out with quarterly data. I tried both 
and the former gave very unstable and unreliable results, both in terms of statistical 
and economic significance. For this reason, I chose to include in this chapter only the 
results from the quarterly analysis.  
Data on exports disaggregated for country of destination is taken from the DOTS 
database, while data on exports’ share of GDP is provided by the WDI database. The 
latter are provided at yearly frequency and they are transformed in quarterly data by 
assigning the same value to all quarters of the same year.  
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The data covers 23 countries from January 1995 to December 2005, giving 44 
quarterly observations for each country, for a total of 1012 observations. Due to the 
inclusion of lagged variables, the number of observations used in the estimation is 
however smaller: 897. Exports data from the 1993-94 period are used in calculating 
the weighting, as it will be explained below. The countries included in the sample are: 
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.  
Summary statistics are given in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
4.2.3  The estimated model 
 
The estimated model is equation 4.1 with six control variables and one lagged 
dependent variables (LDV henceforth) for reasons that will be explained below: 
 
+++++=Δ iititititiitititit OSNegCNegCOSPosCCy ***** 3210 ββββα  
        titttitit uyoiliusei +Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+ −103210 δγγγγ   
 (4.2) 
 
where the four control variables are: 
itiΔ : the change in country i's discount rate from the end of quarter t-1 to the end 
of quarter t. 
iteΔ : the percentage change in country i's average exchange rate vis-à-vis the US 
dollar in quarter t. 
tiusΔ : the change in the Federal Reserve’s discount rate from the end of quarter 
t-1 to the end of quarter t. 
toilΔ : the percentage change in the average crude oil price during quarter t.  
and finally, 1−Δ ity  is a lagged dependent variable, the percentage change in 
country i's output in quarter t-1. See Appendix A for an explanation of the dummies 
specification chosen. 
  
As a proxy for the output level I use the quarterly Index of Industrial Production 
(IIP). This is preferred to GDP because it is more widely available at a quarter 
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frequency, especially for developing countries. This clearly comes at the cost of 
neglecting fluctuations in non-industrial production. On the other side, the advantages 
of higher frequency data (more observations and the identification of short-term 
fluctuations lost in the annual average) outweigh such costs. The base of the index 
number varies across countries, but this is not a problem since the IIP appears in the 
estimated equation as percentage change over the previous quarter. I firstly used both 
seasonally adjusted IIP series as well as non-adjusted. This provided a larger sample 
of countries (37). However, the quality of the estimation, both in terms of the 
coefficients signs and asymptotic variances, increased notably when restricting the 
sample to seasonally adjusted series only. This makes sense, since the intrinsic 
autocorrelation in the non-adjusted series is clear at first sight (e.g. production in July 
and January drops markedly in all northern-hemisphere countries). This creates a 
spurious correlation between fluctuations across countries. The results presented here 
are for the 23-countries adjusted-IIP sample only. 
 
The Contagion index 
 
The key variable is the contagion index C. This is intended to measure the 
intensity of the trade shocks by summing up the quarterly percentage changes of 
foreign countries’ IIP. How intense a shock for the domestic economy is a trade 
partner’s output fluctuation depends on two main factors. One is the openness to trade 
of the domestic country. If most of the AD is represented by absorption, foreign 
output fluctuations will be felt much less than if exports represent most of the AD. 
The other factor is the importance of the country where the shock originated as an 
importer of domestic goods: an economic boom in a major importer of domestic 
goods will have a stronger impact on the domestic AD than a boom in a country with 
which the domestic one has no trade linkages. Therefore, the intensity of a trade 
shock depends on both the openness to trade of the domestic economy and the 
relevance of the originating country as a trade partner. To take these two factors into 
consideration the foreign output fluctuations summed up in the contagion proxy C are 
weighted for the share of domestic exports to each country over total domestic 
exports 
t
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t
t
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TOTEX
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1
1
12 ,..., and the sum is then multiplied by the exports’ share of 
 73
GDP, 
t
t
GDP
TOTEX
1
1 . These two measures are intended to capture respectively the 
openness to trade of the domestic country and the relative importance of each foreign 
country as a trade partner. Notice that, since total exports appear both in the 
denominator of the measures of bilateral trade intensity and in the numerator of the 
exports’ share of GDP, total exports cancel out so that the weights are actually the 
share of bilateral trade over GDP 
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12 ,..., . This measure of trade intensity is 
preferred to bilateral over total trade because it takes into consideration both the 
closeness of the trade linkage and the importance of trade on the overall economy, 
while bilateral over total trade only the first. This point is made, for example, by 
Calderòn et al (2006). 
A three-countries example might clarify matters. The Contagion proxy for 
country 1 in quarter t  is: 
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is the (1x2) weighting vector composed by the value of exports from country 1 to 
countries 2 and 3 in quarter t over tGDP1 , country 1’s GDP in t, all in US dollars 
millions.  
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1  is the (2x1) vector of percentage IIP changes in countries 2 and 3.  
The Contagion index for country 1 is then: 
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It is the sum of the fluctuations in the IIP of country 2 weighted for country 1’s 
exports to country 2 and the fluctuations in the IIP of country 3 weighted for country 
1’s exports to country 3, all divided by country 1’s GDP. 
The contagion proxy for country 2 and 3 are respectively: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]tttt
t
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The fact that output fluctuations in country j influence the exports from country i 
to country j may generate a misleading correlation between cΔ  and the weights M. If 
for example a recession hits country 2, this will cause exports from 1 to 2 to fall. So 
both ty2Δ  and tEX 12  will fall simultaneously. The latter is the weight assigned to 
ty2Δ . Therefore, whenever ty2Δ  is negative, the weight assigned to it falls. 
Conversely, whenever ty2Δ  is positive the weight assigned to it increases, since an 
increase in country 2’s production pushes exports from 1 to 2 (i.e. tEX 12 ) up. The 
way is calculated, the contagion index would then assign more weight to positive 
trade shocks than to negative ones. 
An example might help. Suppose we are in the three-country world just described 
and in quarter t country 1 exports 50% of its total exports to country 2 and 50% to 
country 3. The two weights assigned to the IIP fluctuations of countries 2 and 3 will 
then be equal. Now suppose that in quarter t+1 a crisis hits country 2 and as a 
consequence exports from 1 to 2 drop to zero in one quarter. Now country 1 exports 
100% of its exports to country 3 and zero to country 1. As a consequence, the weight 
assigned to the fluctuations of country 2’s output in quarter t+1 is zero. The drop in 
country 2’s output will thus not show up in the contagion index of country 1, which 
will not vary since country 3’s output did not vary. However, the drop had a 
significant impact on country 1’s aggregate demand, since 50% of its exports have 
been wiped out by it.  
The pro-ciclycality (with the trade partner’s cycle) of the weights would then lead 
to systematic under-weighting of negative trade shocks and over-weighting of 
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positive ones in the contagion index C. For this reason, instead of the simple share of 
trade to j on GDP, the last three years average of that magnitude is used as a weight. 
In other words, the weights used are the three-year average exports of country i to 
country j, proxying the long-term average share of country i’s aggregate demand 
represented by exports to country j.  Short-term output fluctuations should then not 
affect the weight assigned to them. The weights used for 1995 are then the average 
exports’ shares in the 1993-1995 period, so that the contagion index for country 1 is: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]tttt
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where the tPDG 1 , tXE 12  and tXE 13  are the three-year average up to quarter t of, 
respectively, tGDP1 , tEX 12  and tEX 13 . 
 
The dummy variables and their interactions with the Contagion index 
 
The contagion index is interacted with the three dummy variables Pos, Neg and 
OS in order to capture the different real effects of positive and negative trade shocks, 
in both OS and FC countries. Neg assumes value 1 when the contagion index is 
negative and 0 otherwise. Pos assumes value 1 when the contagion index is positive 
or zero and 0 otherwise and OS assumes value 1 when the country is categorized as 
an “Original Sin” country and 0 when it is categorized as a financial centre (FC). As 
shown above, the interaction C*Neg captures any effect of negative trade shocks to 
FCs additional to the effect of positive shocks captured by C itself while the 
interactions C*Pos*OS and C*Neg*OS capture the effect of, respectively, positive 
and negative trade shocks on OS countries’ output over and above the effect of such 
shocks on FCs’ output5. Appendix A justifies the dummies specification showing 
how this is equivalent to a standard three dummies specification as suggested by 
Wooldridge (2002). 
The distinction between OS countries and FC is based on the work of 
Eichengreen et al (1999), where the authors analyse the problem of currency 
                                                 
5 Note that the sum of the interactions C*Pos*OS and C*Neg*OS gives C*OS. The latter is however 
not included in the equation so that there is no perfect multicollinearity and the two interactions can be 
included in the estimated model. 
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mismatches in emerging markets and develop some measures of it. They coined the 
term “Original Sin” to suggest that emerging markets are unable to borrow abroad for 
reasons related to their past and beyond their control. The currency mismatches 
measures proposed by the authors are presented in the following.  
The first measure is one minus the ratio of the stock of securities issued by 
country i in its own currency to the total stock issued by country i: 
 
i
i
i totB
B
OSIN −= 11         (4.5) 
 
A country able to raise money abroad in its own currency will issue most of its 
bonded debt in domestic currency and thus have an OSIN1 index close to zero. The 
closer the index to 1, the stronger the currency mismatches. As the authors recognize, 
this measure has two drawbacks: first it neglects any form of debt other than bonded 
debt and, second, it neglects the opportunities for hedging currency exposure through 
derivatives such as swaps. In order to tackle the second problem, they develop 
another measure: 
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The first element in parenthesis, 
i
DCi
totB
B
−1 , is one minus the ratio of the stock of 
securities issued everywhere in currency i to the stock of securities issued by country 
i. The idea behind this indicator is that if a country other than i issues securities in 
currency i it gives country i an opportunity to hedge its currency exposure via the 
swap market. Therefore the relevant measure is the stock of securities issued in 
currency i rather than issued by country i. Since there can be more debt issued in 
domestic currency than debt issued domestically, the ratio can be over 1 and the 
element turns negative. In order to avoid this, the OSIN3 is constrained to be weakly 
positive. 
In order to tackle the other drawback of OSIN1 (i.e. the neglect of non-bonded 
debt) another measure is defined as the ratio of securities and cross-border loans 
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issued in country i in the five major currencies to the total stock of securities and 
cross-border loans issued in country i: 
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This gives country i's proportion of internationally traded bonds and cross-border 
bank loans denominated in the five major currencies (USD, EUR, YEN, GBP, CHF). 
The closer the index to 1, the stronger the currency mismatches. The reason why 
cross-border loans denominated in the five major currencies only are taken into 
consideration is simple: data are available for those currencies only. Notice that 
INDEXA is implicitly assuming that all debt non denominated in those five currencies 
is in domestic currency. INDEXA therefore overstates the domestic currency-
denominated debt and understates the degree of currency mismatch. It might be a 
good approximation for countries able to issue a non-negligible part of their debt in 
domestic currency. However, if this is the case, then is should be reflected in OSIN3 
because domestic or foreign agents are then able to issue debt in domestic currency. 
Otherwise, the index provides information about the likelihood of a bank loan being 
denominated in a foreign currency other than one of the five major. For this reason 
the last index proposed by Eichengreen et al. is: 
 
{ }3;max2 OSININDEXAOSIN =       (4.8) 
 
Table 4.5 gives the average OSIN indexes for the countries in the sample across 
two periods: pre- and post-ECU introduction. As expected, countries issuing major 
currencies present the lowest indexes. This “major-currency effect” is noticeable in 
the Euro area, where all countries experience a major reduction is their currency 
mismatches after the introduction of the ECU in January 1999. Original Sin seems 
affecting all EMEs equally: all countries but major-currencies-issuers present higher 
indexes than the latter’s, and close to 1. Various EMEs show indexes values equal to 
1, meaning that they are completely unable to access international credit in domestic 
currency.  
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The OSIN indexes and in general the Original Sin approach has been recently 
criticized by Goldstein and Turner (2004). Their critiques can be summarized in three 
points: 
 
a) The Original Sin approach neglects the asset side of the story. Consider 
two countries with identical shares of foreign currency-denominated debt. 
One has a twice as high ratio of exports to GDP than the other. Clearly, 
they do not have the same exposure to currency risk. Yet, the OSIN 
indexes will miss this difference. The same reasoning applies to reserve 
holdings and foreign currency-denominated assets in general. These are 
neglected by the OSIN indexes. 
 
b) By taking into consideration the currency denomination of internationally 
traded bonds and banking flows only, the Original Sin approach neglects 
the role of domestic bonds markets and banking sectors as sources of 
credit. Newly available data quoted by the authors shows that local bond 
markets in EMEs (see Burger and Warnock 2002, quoted in Goldstein and 
Turner, 2004) amount to between 30 and 60% of GDP. Although still far 
from OECD levels (being around 100%), local bond markets are now the 
single largest source of domestic and international funding to EMEs. 
Crucially, the currency composition of such bonds is similar to that in 
OECD countries. For example, in emerging Asian economies, the share 
of locally traded, domestic-currency-denominated bonds is 88% of the 
locally traded total, higher than that in the UK (74%) and identical to that 
in the Euro Area (see Burger and Warnock 2002). Similarly, the domestic 
banking sector represents a sizeable part of funding in the EMEs and it is 
mainly domestic-currency-denominated. By considering only 
international bonds and banking flows, the OSIN indexes are therefore 
likely to overestimate the degree of currency risk to which EMEs are 
exposed. They are also likely to miss important differences in the degree 
of currency mismatches across EMEs. International bonds markets are 
indeed dominated by the five major currencies. Focusing on these only, 
all EMEs appear similarly exposed to currency mismatches. However, 
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there are important differences in the size and depth of their local bonds 
and credit markets in general.  
 
c) The Original Sin indexes, as any aggregate measures of currency 
mismatches, ignore the fundamental question of who within the economy 
actually bears the currency risk. If, for example, all foreign currency 
liabilities are held by exporting firms who earn in dollars the currency 
risk will be very different than if all those liabilities are in the hands of 
companies earning in domestic currency.  
 
Goldstein and Turner propose an index of Aggregate Effective Currency 
Mismatch (AECM) that takes on board these considerations:  
 
FCD
X
NFCAAECM *=         (4.9) 
 
where NFCA stands for Net Foreign Currency Assets and is the sum of the net 
foreign currency assets of monetary authorities, domestic deposit banks, non-banks 
(held with BIS-reporting banks) and international foreign currency-denominated 
bonds outstanding. Using NFCA instead of the sum of liabilities controls for both the 
liabilities and assets sides of the currency mismatch problem. With the same aim, the 
country’s exports of goods and services X are included. Finally, the ratio is multiplied 
for FCD, the share of total debt denominated in foreign currency. The latter is 
computed as the ratio of banks’ and non-banks’ (cross-border) liabilities to BIS-
reporting banks, domestic credit to the private sector and domestic and international 
outstanding bonds that is denominated in foreign currencies. Notice that both the 
international (cross-border) and domestic markets for bonds and loans are included in 
this index, therefore reflecting the considerations put forward in point b). A country is 
a net debtor in foreign currency if NFCA is negative. Thus, the more negative the 
index the stronger the currency mismatch.  
The authors highlight that the index is computed assuming that all domestic bank 
and bonded credit is in domestic currency. However, recently available data show that 
this is not the case and that the share of foreign-currency-denominated domestic 
credit is not negligible (see Reinhardt, Rogoff and Savastano 2003). The FCD 
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measure in the AECM index would then underestimate the foreign currency share of 
debt. To avoid this problem, the authors incorporate the data from Reinhardt, Rogoff 
and Savastano (2003) in the index AECM2, using the estimated share of foreign 
currency-denominated loans and bonds traded in emerging domestic markets. 
Table 4.6 provides the AECM and AECM2 indexes alongside the OSIN ones. 
Unfortunately, Goldstein and Turner provide data for emerging markets only, so that 
a comparison in possible for these countries only. Nonetheless, we can see that by 
taking into consideration foreign currency asset holdings and the domestic financial 
markets, the AECM indexes distinguish more than the OSIN ones among EMEs. For 
example, all countries for which the AECMs are available show an OSIN1 index of 1 
(apart from Poland, showing 0.97). On the other side we can see that big differences 
are detected by the AECMs. Israel and Poland, for example, had a net asset position in 
foreign currency for the whole period covered. According to OSIN1 they are not 
different from, say, Turkey, Mexico or Brazil, all of which had instead huge net 
liabilities and experienced sharp devaluations and recessions in the period considered. 
OSIN2 and OSIN3 fares slightly better, but still are missing important differences 
across EMEs. It is this consideration that makes Goldstein and Turner question the 
validity of the OSIN indexes and in general of the Original Sin hypothesis, which 
states that currency mismatches are an unavoidable feature, blighting all emerging 
markets equally.  
 
The AECM indexes certainly fix some of the shortcomings of the OSIN ones, 
however, they have limitations themselves: first, they focus on net rather than gross 
positions, notwithstanding that balance sheet effects depend on gross positions rather 
than net ones. OSIN indexes are instead based on gross magnitudes (liabilities). 
Second, on a more practical level, the AECM indexes are available for a small number 
of EMEs only, so that a comparative study between financial centres and emerging 
markets as this one cannot be based on those indexes. For these reasons I define the 
OS dummies on the basis of the OSIN rather than the AECM indexes. 
Among the OSIN indexes, OSIN2 is the one with the broadest coverage and for 
this reason it is the chosen one. However, it has an obvious limitation: it considers 
loans denominated in the five major currencies as foreign currency loans. The index 
is then meaningless for those countries issuing the five major currencies. These issue 
debt in their own currency and still have high OSIN2 indexes, as one can see 
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comparing OSIN2 and OSIN3 in table 4.6: Germany, Japan, the UK and the US all 
have OSIN3 equal to zero, proving their ability to raise all the (bonded) credit they 
need in domestic currencies, yet their OSIN2 are high because the loans denominated 
in their own currencies are considered foreign-currency loans by this index. In order 
to avoid this, the three major currencies issuers included in the sample (Germany and 
the Euro Area after 1999, Japan and the UK) are considered financial centres by 
definition. 
The dummy variable OS is then assuming value 1 when the country is considered 
an OS country (i.e. heavily relying of foreign funding) and 0 otherwise. To render this 
definition operational, one has to decide a threshold above which a country is 
considered an OS one. In order to limit the arbitrariety of such choice, various 
dummies with different thresholds are defined and the estimation results are 
compared. Table 4.7 describes which countries and when are considered OS countries 
in each of the dummies’ specification used. Very little changes between different 
specifications. Only 3 (2) countries “become” OS countries when the threshold is 
lowered from 80% to 60% in the 1993-1998 (1999-2005) period. A further lowering 
of the threshold would not change much since, apart from the major currency issuers, 
all countries but two are already considered OS countries by the 60% threshold 
dummy OS2.  
Since the OSIN indexes are continuous variables, one could include them in the 
regression analysis without converting them to dummies. However, I prefer not to do 
so for two reasons. Firstly, the indexes are likely to have substantial measurement 
error. Secondly they show very little variation. As already noticed, most OSs have 
indexes equal to 1 across the whole period considered while most financial centres 
present values in the 0.4-0.5 range. The conversion to dummies is then eliminating 
the measurement error problem at the cost of very little variance lost.  
 
The control variables 
 
The domestic interest rate is included to control for monetary policy interventions. 
Since monetary policy is used also for counterbalancing the real effects of foreign 
shocks such as trade shocks, not controlling for it might generate a negative 
correlation between the contagion index and the error, therefore creating a negative 
bias in the betas. The end of period discount rate applied by the country’s central 
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bank has been used for all countries apart from Mexico, Poland and the United 
Kingdom. For these, only the money market rate (the overnight interbank rate for 
Poland and the UK, the bankers’ acceptances for Mexico) was available. An 
important issue in this discussion is the advent of the ECU first and the Euro 
subsequently. Various countries in the sample fixed their exchange rate to the ECU at 
its introduction in January 1999 and then adopted the Euro in the following years. For 
these countries, I have considered the domestic discount rate before the Euro 
accession and the European Central Bank’s discount rate thereafter. Only the money 
market rate was available for France and Nederland until their accession to the Euro. 
For this reason, I have used their money market rates until their accession, and the 
ECB discount rate thereafter.  
 In order to control for the real effects of monetary authorities’ intervention in the 
forex markets I include the period average exchange rate, defined as the cost of one 
dollar in domestic currency, so that an increase in the exchange rate represents a 
depreciation of the domestic currency. The justification for this is similar to that for 
the interest rates inclusion. If the monetary authorities react to trade shocks with forex 
interventions in order to smooth the fluctuations in domestic output, omitting 
exchange rate fluctuations could cause endogeneity. Again, for Euro Area countries, I 
consider their domestic rate until the accession to the Euro.  
Notice that no control for the fiscal policy is included. I chose to do so because in 
the sample period (1995-2005) the use of fiscal policy as a short-term stabilization 
tool was not common. By including it, I would have introduced a potentially 
endogenous variable with scarce influence on the dependent variable. Losing degrees 
of freedom to instrument and estimate a scarcely relevant correlation seems not 
worthwhile. Of course, interest and exchange rates are also policy variables and 
endogenous. These are however included (and instrumented) because they are widely 
used as short-term stabilization tools.  
Common shocks such as an increase in the price of oil are likely to affect both the 
target country and its trade partners. If neglected, this would then lead to overestimate 
the effect of trade and ultimately would give an inconsistent estimate of the betas. For 
this reason the quarterly change in the world average price of crude oil is included. 
The quarterly change of the Federal Reserve end-of-period base rate is also included 
as a proxy for the price of credit.  
 83
As explained in Appendix A, the two dummies Neg and OS and their interaction 
are included to control for the effects of trade shocks’ sign and the presence of 
currency mismatches on the intercept. These controls do not tell anything about the 
changes in strength of trade shocks propagation caused by the sign of the shock and 
the currency mismatch degree (i.e. about the so-called slopes effects) so that they are 
not the focus of this study. However, leaving the two dummies and their interaction in 
the error could generate endogeneity of the other interactions. 
Finally, one lagged dependent variable is included for reasons explained in the 
next section. 
 
 
4.3 Methodology and Econometric Issues 
 
4.3.1 Simultaneity bias and instrumentation 
 
If output fluctuations are interdependent (i.e. if the true β ’s are positive), C 
determines yΔ  as well as the reverse. Movements in u affect other countries’ 
fluctuations and therefore C. It follows that the error term is not independent from the 
latter. If the true β ’s are positive, OLS regressions will then give upward biased and 
inconsistent estimators, and the bias will be directly proportional to the 
interdependence of output fluctuations. This simultaneity bias might affect iusΔ  as 
well. Imagine that a productivity shock common to various countries arises. This 
could be, for example, the discovery and diffusion of a new technology. This 
phenomenon would not be picked up by the variables included in the model and thus 
would be picked up by the error term. If the output fluctuations generated by the 
productivity shock are sizeable in various countries and affect US output, the Federal 
Reserve is likely to intervene to offset such fluctuations. The US discount rate would 
then be correlated with the errors as well. This could happen in a quarter, so that the 
problem can theoretically arise. Finally, monetary authorities intervention suggests 
that the exchange and interest rates are at least partly determined simultaneously with 
output fluctuations. iΔ  and eΔ  may thus be endogenous as well.  
The econometric procedure needs to take into consideration the likely 
endogeneity present in the model. As usual, the tool used to overcome these problems 
is the instrumentation of potentially endogenous variables. This poses another 
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question: what instruments are likely to be relevant and valid? Relevance (i.e. the 
partial correlation of excluded instruments with the instrumented variables) can be 
achieved in this model exploiting the strong autocorrelation exhibited by C, iusΔ , iΔ  
and eΔ . The relevance of the lags as instruments is tested via Bound’s partial-
Rsquared, which will be provided and discussed in the results section below.  
 
4.3.2 Autocorrelated errors and instrumentation 
 
Having established the relevance of the instruments used, it is as important to 
understand their validity (i.e. their orthogonality with u): endogenous instruments 
would again give inconsistent estimates. If the error is autocorrelated, then the lags of 
endogenous variables used to instrument them could be endogenous themselves. To 
see this, first notice that: 
 
( ) 0cov 11 ≠Δ −− itit yu        (4.10) 
 
by definition. If the output fluctuations are interdependent so that 0>β  then 
(4.10) implies:  
 
( ) 0cov 11 ≠−− itit Cu .        (4.11) 
 
If the error is autocorrelated, from (4.11) follows that: 
 
( ) 0cov 1 ≠−ititCu         (4.12) 
 
i.e.: the first lag of C is endogenous and is not a valid instrument. In presence of 
autocorrelated errors, extra caution must be then used in choosing the lags to use as 
instruments. Let us be more specific and assume that the error exhibits 
autocorrelation of degree one (henceforth AR(1)), so that we can write: 
 
ititit uu ερ += −1           (4.13) 
 
with itε  white noise. Substituting (4.13) in (4.12) we get: 
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 ( ) ( )111 covcov −−− = itititit CuCu ρ        (4.14) 
 
Eq. (4.14) says that 1−itC  may not be used as instrument for itC  since the former is 
correlated with the error itself. However, the size of the problem depends on the 
strength of the AR process. The stronger the latter (i.e. the closer ρ  to one in absolute 
terms) the stronger the correlation between the lagged variable and the errors. If 
1.0=ρ , the endogeneity of C might be negligible, not so with 9.0=ρ . In this 
second case 1−itC  is certainly not a valid instrument. It is then natural to try older lags, 
such as for example 2−itC . The latter’s correlation with the errors is given by: 
 
( ) ( )2222 covcov −−− = itititit CuCu ρ         (4.15) 
 
With 9.0=ρ  we have that ( ) ( )222 81.0covcov −−− = itititit CuCu . The correlation 
might still be too strong and older lags must be used. Differently, with 1.0=ρ  we 
have that ( ) ( )222 01.0covcov −−− = itititit CuCu , in which case one can reasonably 
consider 2−itC  a valid instrument. 
This simple example shows that when instrumenting with lags, care must be given 
to the presence of AR and that, even with autocorrelated errors, lags can be valid 
instruments for the potentially endogenous variables as long as the AR process is not 
too strong. Clearly, the longer the lag used, the weaker its correlation with the 
autocorrelated error. However, longer lags are likely to be less correlated with the 
instrumented variable as well. There is therefore a trade off between relevance and 
validity of the instruments. The strategy I followed is thus to try limiting the AR in the 
error by defining a model that is as close as possible to dynamic completeness and 
then use as instruments the shortest lags that give a reasonable chance of exogeneity. 
With quarterly data, the are various reasons to suspect the errors of eq. (4.2) to be 
autocorrelated. First, cycles of expansion and contraction of economic activity last 
typically more than a quarter, so that y is likely to follow longer-than-quarterly 
cycles. Breaking those cycles into quarterly observations causes the past observations 
to be correlated with the present one: yΔ  might be autocorrelated. If some of this 
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correlation is not explained by the included regressors, then the error in (4.2) will be 
autocorrelated. Formally: 
 
If ( ) ( )1,|| −ΔΔ≠Δ ttt yXyLXyL  and ( ) 0cov 1 ≠ΔΔ −tt yy , then ( ) 0cov 1 ≠−ttuu
 (4.16) 
 
Where ( )XyL t |Δ  is the linear projection of tyΔ  onto X, the set of regressors 
included in (4.2) except the lagged dependent variable. Since we know that 
( ) 0cov 1 ≠ΔΔ −tt yy , the chain of causation (4.16) is true if a part of the cycle 
characterizing tyΔ  is not explained by X. This is not hard to imagine. If, for example, 
productivity shocks hitting the domestic economy increase the growth rate of 
industrial production for more than a quarter, this would generate autocorrelation in 
tyΔ  that is not be picked up by the regressors. The error would then be 
autocorrelated.  
However, preliminary estimations of (4.2) without the lagged dependent variable 
(with longer-than-two lags of instrumented variables as instruments) showed no 
substantial AR in the error. A standard AR test such as the one suggested by 
Wooldridge (2002, p.177) did not reject the null of no autocorrelation (not shown). It 
seems that autocorrelation is not an issue. However, since we cannot confirm a null 
hypothesis, we want to minimize the type II error by “maximising” its P-value. If 
(4.16) is the only source of autocorrelation in u, then the inclusion of lags of the 
dependent variable in the model should eliminate it. Therefore, I include one lagged 
dependent variable to see whether this increases the P-value of the null of no-AR. 
This is the case: the introduction of one lagged dependent variable (LDV henceforth) 
in the model raises the test’s P-value from 0.3215 to 0.8929, high enough to 
comfortably believe in the absence of AR in the model. The introduction of one LDV 
seems then enough to eliminate any evidence of autocorrelation. For this reason I 
include one only LDV in the estimated model. 
 
4.3.3 GMM 
 
In presence of heteroskedasticity, a GMM estimator with optimal weighting 
matrix is the efficient estimator. As pointed out by Baum et al. (2007) the efficiency 
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gains from the traditional 2SLS estimator derive from the use of the optimal 
weighting matrix, the overidentifying restrictions of the model and the relaxation of 
the i.i.d. assumption. Since heteroskedasticity is present in this panel dataset (shown 
below), the two-step GMM estimation with clusterized errors is implemented. 
 
4.3.4 Panel Time-Series issues 1: the dimension of choice 
 
In standard panel datasets the number of periods/observations per panel T is so 
small that it does not allow for an estimation of panel-by-panel regressions. 
Developed in micro-econometrics field, those panel datasets exploited the time 
dimension mainly to control for the heterogeneous intercepts. However, when T is big 
enough to allow a panel-by-panel estimation, the researcher has the choice of 
considering the dataset as a set of N time-series or of T cross-sections. This choice has 
deep implications for estimation, since, for example, in a Fixed Effect estimation the 
intercepts would identify time-invariant country-specific effects in the first case and 
time-specific country-invariant effects in the second case. The choice of dimension is 
based on the purpose of the investigation.  
In our case, both interpretations would be informative. Considering our dataset a 
set of 132 cross-sections with 23 observations each and estimating a panel data model 
would focus the analysis on the heterogeneity of coefficients across time. It might 
well be that trade shocks have different repercussions on domestic production in 
periods of sustained world growth like the mid-to-late nineties than in moments of 
recession like the present one. Considering our dataset a set of 132 cross-sections 
with 23 observations and applying an estimator controlling for heterogeneous 
coefficients such as, for example, the Swamy estimator would then be able to treat 
and estimate such heterogeneity. However, estimation techniques for heterogeneous 
slopes panel data models such as the Swamy or Random Coefficient estimators do not 
allow for instrumentation, which is unavoidable in our setting. This avenue is then not 
viable and we cannot control for heterogeneous slopes. 
Moreover, the fact that we are dealing with countries provides a rationale to treat 
the dataset as a set of 23 time-series. In fact, a country-effect is very likely to be 
there: simply some countries grew more than others for idiosyncratic reasons. The 
most common way of controlling for such heterogeneity is an FE or FD model 
applied to the 23 cross-sections. Applying those models to the 132 cross-sections 
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would instead control for a country-invariant time-effect making all countries grow 
more or less in a certain period. This country-invariant unobservable should however 
be controlled for by the common shock proxies. The first interpretation gives then a 
higher guarantee of consistency than the second one.  
FE/FD models are however useful if the country effect is correlated with the 
regressors. Otherwise, a Random Effect model or other estimators taking into 
consideration the heteroskedastic structure of the errors are the efficient estimators. In 
our case, the country effect is likely to be scarcely correlated with the regressors, so 
that FE/FD might be superfluous. The idiosyncratic (unexplained) growth of a 
country might affect other countries’ growth via trade, in which case the country-
effect would be correlated with the contagion index. However, since the contagion 
index is a weighted average of 23 countries’ output fluctuations, the correlation 
between the latter and the country effects is likely to be low. Apart for the biggest 
importers in the sample (Germany, Japan, the UK), it is hard to imagine that the 
idiosyncratic growth of a country could affect strongly the output levels of a 
diversified set of countries such as the ones in the sample (e.g. Brazil, Canada, Korea, 
Mexico, Turkey..). Since most countries in the sample are likely to affect with their 
import demand the economic activity of their main trade partners only, the contagion 
index is likely to be scarcely correlated with the country unobservable effects. Also, 
there is no reason to expect a strong correlation between the country effect and the 
other regressors. This hypothesis is confirmed by a standard FE test: the country 
effects are present but do not seem to be correlated at any relevant degree with the 
regressors. An FE/FD specification is thus unnecessary here: a pooled regression with 
relevant and valid instruments guarantees consistency while the GMM estimation 
clustered by country guarantees efficiency. This is therefore the chosen estimation 
technique. The dimension of choice is thus irrelevant to our analysis. 
 
 
4.3.5  Panel Time-Series issues 2: T-asymptotics vs. N-asymptotics 
 
This section explains why estimating eq. (4.2) with a FE of FD model might 
cause problems that the pooled estimation avoids. Since the last section showed that 
the rationale for an FE/FD estimation is likely not to be there, this section can be 
skipped unless interested. 
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Eq. (4.2) is an autoregressive model containing a LDV. As shown by Nickell 
(1981), the demeaning of variables in the FE estimator gives inconsistent estimators 
in presence of LDV. To see this (the following discussion is taken from Bond 2002) 
assume we want to estimate a structural equation with country-effects such as: 
 
ititit uyy ++= −1βα  with itiit vu +=η       (4.17) 
 
The FE-transformed lagged dependent variable is: 
 
( )1,11 ......1
1
−−
++++
−
− Tiitiit yyyT
y       (4.18) 
 
and the transformed error is: 
 
( )Tiitiit vvvTv ,2 ......1
1
++++
−
−      (4.19) 
 
The component 
1−
−
T
yit  in (4.18) is correlated with itv  in (4.19) and 1
1
−
−
−
T
vit  in 
(4.19) is correlated with 1−ity  in (4.18). Nickell (1981) showed that these two 
correlations are both negative and dominate positive correlations between the other 
components in the two parenthesis, so that the correlation between the transformed 
LDV and error term can be shown to be negative. This correlation does not vanish as 
the number of panels in the sample increases, so that the FE estimator is not 
consistent for N going to infinity.  
However, it does vanish for T going to infinite, since the contribution of 
1−
−
T
yit  
and 
1
1
−
−
−
T
vit  to their respective averages becomes negligible. The FE estimator can 
then be shown to be N-inconsistent but T-consistent for dynamic autoregressive 
processes. This highlights the difference between T- and N-asymptotic theory and 
provides an important result: using an FE estimator we would be taking country-
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averages with 132 observations each, and thus it seems we could consider the Nickell 
bias negligible and the FE a consistent estimator for (4.2).  
This is however not the case, since in our setting matters are complicated by the 
instrumentation. We cannot use the lags of the transformed variables as instruments. 
To see this, assume we are estimating:  
 
ititit uxy ++= βα  with itiit vu +=η      (4.20) 
 
and that ( ) 0cov ≠itit vx : x is endogenous. Notice that no LDV is included. This is 
for simplicity only: since the presence of an LDV is irrelevant in this problem I put it 
aside in this example. Assume we want to use an FE-estimator and instrument x with 
its own lags. In practice we would be running a 2SLS procedure on: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )vvxxyy ititit −+−+=− βα  
 
In such a setting xxit −−1  cannot be used as an instrument for xxit − . In fact 
( ) 0cov ≠itit vx  implies ( ) 0cov ≠vx  and thus any lag of the transformed (demeaned) 
variable will be endogenous. Therefore, the transformed variable cannot be 
instrumented with its own lags. We would have to use the non-demeaned lagged 
variable 1−itx  or find other instruments. Both these options are not viable, the first 
because the correlation of 1−itx  with ( )xxit −  is so low that the model is not 
identified, the second because other relevant instruments could not be found. 
Therefore, we could not estimate (4.2) with a FE estimator. 
Estimating eq. (4.2) with an FD model would generate other potential problems 
because of the presence of an LDV. To see this, assume we estimate (4.17) with an 
FD technique. In practice, we would be regressing: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1211 −−−− −+−+=− itititititit uuyyyy βα      (4.21) 
 
The LDV becomes endogenous by construction, reason for which it would have to 
be instrumented. This brings us back to the issue of what instruments to use. As for 
the instrumentation of C, we would need to use lags older than the autocorrelated lags 
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of the error. In other words, if the error is AR(1) the newest lag we can use as 
instrument is 3−ity . If the error is AR(2) we can use 4−ity  and so on. This would force 
us to use longer lags, with the likely loss of relevance we discussed above.  
Since both the FE and FD specification are likely to raise the problems discussed 
above and the benefit of using them are scarce (because scarce is the correlation 
between the country effects and the regressors), I preferred to apply the GMM 
technique on the pooled dataset.  
 
4.3.6  Panel Time-Series issues 3: stationarity 
 
One last issue arising from the time-series nature of the dataset is stationarity. For 
the analysis to be reliable, we need to ensure the stationarity of the series. However, 
since the variables enter the model as percentage changes, this should not be a 
problem. It is unlikely that, for example, industrial production grows at an ever-faster 
rate. This is indeed confirmed by Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, which reject the 
unit-root null without any doubt for each variable (not shown). 
 
 
4.4  Results and interpretation  
 
Table 4.8 shows the results obtained from the estimation of the equation (4.2), 
here reproduced for ease of reference: 
 
+++++=Δ iititititiitititit OSNegCNegCOSPosCCy ***** 3210 ββββα  
titiitiitttitit uyOSNegOSNegoiliusei +Δ++++Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+ −106543210 * δγγγγγγγ
  
(4.22) 
 
The estimation technique is the two-step GMM procedure described above and 
implemented by the ivreg2 Stata routine. From a first look at the results (Table 4.8) 
one can notice the effects of the instrumentation on the key variable C and its 
interactions. As expected, the instrumentation reduces the size of the estimated 
coefficient associated with C. In the OLS specifications this is roughly twice as big 
than in the GMM ones. This suggests the existence of a positive simultaneity bias. 
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Since the positive effect of a trade shock (from C to yΔ ) feeds back into the 
originating country (from yΔ  to C), the OLS estimates of C are biased upward.  
Different specifications of the OS dummy do not alter the results: the three GMM 
models’ results are very similar. This is not surprising since the countries were 
categorized in similar ways by the different dummies.   
In all three specifications all variables but the oil price change have signs in line 
with theoretical expectations (the positive effect of oil price on production could 
anyway be explained by the presence of oil-exporting countries such as Canada, 
Mexico and Norway in the sample). The expected sign on the exchange rate is 
ambiguous, since it is positive for FCs but might be negative for OSs due to the 
presence of currency mismatches and other factors highlighted by the literature on 
contractionary devaluations. The US base rate is found to be contractionary, while the 
domestic rate vaguely expansionary. The latter’s coefficient is however not 
significantly different from zero. Domestic policy variables seem to have a much 
smaller (if any) effect on output than the Fed’s base rate: the latter’s coefficient is at 
roughly eight times bigger than the domestic rates’ one, twice as big than the 
exchange rate’s one and extremely more significant in all three specifications. 
 
Turning to the key variables, C and its interactions, all four present positive and 
extremely significant coefficients (in all tables the interaction CpOS represents 
OSPosC ** , Cm represents NegC *  and CmOS represents OSNegC ** ). Output 
fluctuations are thus found to propagate among trade partners. In line with the 
literature on trade intensity and business cycle synchronization, trade is confirmed to 
be a relevant channel of shock propagation, both between financial centres and 
emerging markets. Clearly, the fact that trade partners’ output is correlated does not 
necessarily imply that this is because of trade. However, the sensitivity analysis 
below will show that this is instead the case. 
Estimating one coefficient for each regime (see Table 4.1), we are able to 
investigate whether the propagation mechanism is stronger when the shocks are 
negative, and whether the presence of currency mismatches plays a part in it. Table 
4.9 provides estimates for the strength of propagation of trade shocks in the four 
regimes for the three OS dummies specifications. The first column gives the model’s 
reference number. The second and third columns describe respectively the regime and 
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the linear combination of coefficients associated with it. The other columns give the 
estimated coefficient, P-value and 95% confidence interval associated with the linear 
combination.  
The first two rows of each model give the estimated response to a unit increase in 
the contagion index in FCs and OSs, respectively. In all three specifications OS 
countries are found to be markedly more reactive. A unit increase in the contagion 
index pushes OS countries’ output up by roughly 2.1% while the same increase 
pushes FCs’ output up by only 0.8%, on average and ceteris paribus. A unit increase 
in the contagion index represents a 1% increase in the output of all countries in the 
sample. Therefore, a 1% increase in the output of all countries will cause an average 
0.8% increase in the domestic output of FCs and an average 2.1% increase in the 
domestic output of OSs, ceteris paribus. Countries where currency mismatches are 
widespread are thus more than twice as sensitive to positive trade shocks. Notice that 
the confidence intervals of the two combinations do not overlap in the first and third 
specifications and do only slightly in the second. The different sensitivity is then 
likely to be statistically significant, as the tests carried out below will confirm. 
The same is true for negative trade shocks: these as well affect OS countries much 
more than FCs. A unit decrease in the contagion index pushes the output of the 
former down by roughly 5%, compared to roughly 2.1% for the latter. Therefore, a 
1% decrease in the output of all countries will cause an average 2.1% decrease in the 
domestic output of FCs and an average 5% decrease in the domestic output of OSs, 
ceteris paribus. Again, the confidence intervals are overlapping only slightly in the 
second specification, suggesting that the difference is statistically very significant. 
Since shocks of both signs are found to affect OS countries more than FCs, the former 
appear to be more sensitive to trade shocks. The negative and higher sensitivity 
hypotheses seem confirmed. It is also interesting to notice that negative shocks appear 
to propagate more strongly than positive ones in both FCs and OSs. The asymmetry 
hypothesis seems therefore confirmed in relationship to both type of countries.  
 
The analysis so far seem to prove all tests we wanted to perform. Trade shocks 
propagate in a very different manner depending on the degree of currency mismatches 
and their sign. However, to give statistical significance to such claims we need to 
perform the tests described in Table 4.2. The results of such tests for the three OS 
dummies specifications are provided in Table 4.10. The second and third columns 
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provide the name of the hypothesis tested and the null associated with it. The third 
and fourth columns give the statistic and associated P-value for each hypothesis.  
The results give extremely strong support to the hypotheses tested. The first, third 
and fourth tests all give P-values close to zero. Evidence gives doubtless support to 
the negativity, higher sensitivity and asymmetry in OS hypotheses. OS countries are 
more sensitive than FCs to trade shocks, be these positive or negative. Furthermore, 
negative shocks are felt in OSs more than positive ones. There is also support to the 
asymmetry in FCs hypothesis, although slightly less than for the other three, its P-
value hovering around 7% in the first two models. Notice however that in the model 
with the dummy OS2, the null of symmetry of shocks propagation in FCs is rejected 
at 0.9% significance level.  
The tests confirm without doubts the impression raised by the estimated responses 
to trade shocks: OS countries are markedly more sensitive than FCs to trade shocks of 
either sign. Also, negative shocks affect OS countries more than positive shocks. 
These two elements interact, so that the real effect of a negative shock to an OS (5%) 
is more than four times stronger than the real effect of a positive shock to a FC 
(0.8%). These are big differences to any standard. Asymmetry of shock propagation 
is found in FCs as well, although the evidence on this point is not as clear-cut.  
Currency Mismatches magnify the real effects of trade shocks. It is then 
interesting to investigate whether they exacerbate the asymmetry of propagation as 
well. In other words, it is interesting to test whether the asymmetry is stronger in OS 
countries than in FCs. This can be tested by noticing that the estimated asymmetry 
(i.e. the difference between the estimated response to negative and positive shocks) is 
given by 132 βββ −+   in OSs and by 2β  in FCs. Subtracting the latter from the 
former one obtains 13 ββ − . This is then a measure of the difference in the degree of 
asymmetry of shocks propagation in OS and FC countries. A positive number would 
imply that currency mismatches widen the gap between the propagation strength of 
negative and positive trade shocks, rendering the former more powerful than the 
latter. The hypothesis 013 =− ββ  is tested for all three models. The statistics for the 
three models, distributed as a Chi-squared with 1 d.o.f., are respectively 10.97, 8.09 
and 16.50 with associated P-values of 0.0009, 0.00044 and 0.0000. According to the 
data, the asymmetry is then doubtlessly stronger in OS countries. Therefore, not only 
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currency mismatches render a country more vulnerable to trade shocks, but they also 
increase the strength of negative shocks with respect to positive ones.  
 
Substantial differences in the way shocks propagate to OSs and FCs have been 
found. I’ve interpreted this as a proof that currency mismatches magnify the real 
effects of trade shocks. However, for this to be true, the degree of currency 
mismatches must be the only element affecting one country’s sensitivity to trade 
shocks being different between OS and FC countries. If instead some other factor 
increasing one country’s sensitivity to trade shocks is systematically higher in OSs, 
we might overestimate the importance of currency mismatches. In this case, the OS 
dummies would pick up the effect of that other factor along with that of currency 
mismatches. It is thus important to ask what factors determine the sensitivity of a 
country’s output to external output fluctuations and whether these factors might be 
systematically higher in OS countries. The literature on business cycle 
synchronization offers answers to the first question. It highlights three main factors 
determining the sensitivity of a country’s output to a trade partner’s output 
fluctuations: bilateral trade intensity, distance and the degree of similarity of the 
industrial structure of the two countries. Distance is found to be negatively correlated 
with the synchronization of the business cycles, while the other two are found to be 
positively correlated. If any of these factors is not controlled for in the estimated 
equation and are positively correlated with the degree of currency mismatches we 
could have a bias in the estimated betas. This is however hard to conceive: bilateral 
trade intensity is controlled for by the weights assigned to the contagion index, while 
it is unclear why the other two factors should be related to the degree of currency 
mismatches. Take distance. To have an upward bias in the coefficient, OS countries 
should have their trade partners closer than FCs do. If anything, the opposite is more 
likely: apart from Japan and the US, all FCs in the sample (Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom) 
are European countries. These have other European countries as their major trade 
partners. Therefore, the distance between them and their major trade partner is 
generally lower than that of the OS countries in the sample (Brazil, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Norway,  Slovak Republic, Turkey), 
whose major trade partners are typically neighbouring countries and major economies 
such as the US, Japan, or Germany. Regarding the similarity of the industrial 
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structure, there is no reason why this should be higher among OSs than among FCs. It 
follows that, if anything, given the proximity of FCs to each other a downward rather 
than upward bias in the estimated coefficients of the C interactions could be there. 
The analysis is then genuinely identifying the crucial role of currency mismatches in 
the propagation of trade-related shocks. 
 
In order to see how reliable these results are, one has to assess the quality of the 
instrumentation used. Table 4.11 shows the relevant statistics from the first stage 
regressions. Each column corresponds to a different OS dummy specification. For 
each instrumented variable the table provides the F-statistic and its P-value, as well as 
the Partial R-Squared of the excluded instruments. 
The partial R-squared is high for all instrumented variables, in particular for the 
key variables C and its interactions. Their partial R-squared are between 23% and 
40% in all three specifications, more than satisfactory. Unsurprisingly, the F-test 
statistics of all instrumented variables are extremely high, enough to reject the null of 
no partial correlation between instruments and instrumented variables at the 0.1% 
significance level. Again, the key variables C and its interactions show the highest 
statistics. We can therefore say confidently that the instruments are relevant and the 
model is identified. This is indeed consistent with the strong significance found for 
almost each coefficient of the instrumented variables in the second stages.  
The instruments are also valid, as shown by the Hansen J-statistics appearing in 
the bottom rows of the table. The test’s P-value is around 17-20% for the first two 
specifications and higher for the third where it reaches 33%. Since we cannot confirm 
a null hypothesis of exogeneity but only hope not to reject it, we would like to get a 
higher the P-value. 33% is however large enough to believe reasonably in the 
exogeneity of the instruments.  
 
Finally, it is worthwhile recalling that with homoskedasticity the GMM estimator 
is consistent but not efficient, the efficient one being the standard 2SLS estimator 
instead. If errors are homoskedastic, the precision of the estimation could then be 
improved applying 2SLS rather than GMM. For this reason, I test the null of 
homoskedasticity for all three specification with the Pagan-Hall test that allows for 
instrumentation. This returns 43.645, 44.713 and 43.075 for the three models 
respectively. Being distributed as a Chi-squared with 21 d.o.f., the three statistics are 
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associated with P-values of 0.0026, 0.0019 and 0.0031 respectively. The null of 
homoskedasticity can then be rejected with confidence, proving that GMM is the 
correct estimator for this application. Of course, the efficiency of the GMM estimator 
is conditional on the optimality of the weighting matrix used. The latter is the inverse 
of an heteroskedastic var-cov matrix with clustered variance, the clusters being the 
countries in the sample. Intra-cluster autocorrelation is however allowed, so that the 
variance structure assumed is quite general. 
 
 
4.5  Sensitivity analysis 
 
The findings of analysis are interesting, since they isolate a key role played by 
currency mismatches in the propagation of output fluctuations. It is then worthwhile 
to check the robustness of such results to different specifications and assumptions 
underlying the estimated model. I will do so modifying the base-line model in the 
following ways: 
 
a) Different test for the higher sensitivity of OS countries. If the latter are more 
sensitive to trade shocks irrespective of their sign, then the interaction of C and 
the OS2 dummy (named COS2) should identify that higher sensitivity. CpOS2, 
Cm and CmOS2 are then substituted by COS2 in order to see if the higher 
sensitivity hypothesis is confirmed even when distinction between negative and 
positive shocks is put aside. The first column of Table 4.12 gives the regression 
results for this model. 
b) Different autocorrelation (AR) in the error term. While autocorrelation tests 
cannot reject the null of no-AR, this is not a definitive proof of its absence. In 
presence of AR, instruments would be endogenous themselves, therefore 
invalidating the analysis. For this reason I re-estimate the model assuming 
autocorrelation of first and second degree in the error term. In other words, I 
use one- and two-periods older lags to instrument the variables suspected to be 
endogenous. The models corresponding to these specifications are S2 and S3 in 
Table 4.12. 
c) Different de-trending method. In the trade intensity and business cycle 
synchronization literature various de-trending methods are used, the two most 
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common being the use of first-differenced log-output and output deviations 
from a linear trend as dependent variables. The first method was implemented 
in the base-line estimations. I use the second in the model S4. First, each 
country’s output levels are regressed on a linear trend, then the errors from such 
regressions are regressed on the same right-hand-side variables of the base-line 
model (apart from the LDV obviously, which is the lagged deviation from the 
linear trend). The estimated model is then identical to 4.22) apart from the 
dependent variable and the LDV, which are now the deviation from the 
estimated linear trend. 
d) Different measure of trade intensity. Again, this is suggested by the literature 
just quoted. Instead of bilateral trade as a percentage of GDP, bilateral trade as 
a percentage of total trade is used. I used the former for the reasons explained in 
section 4.2.3, but I now check that the choice of either measure of trade 
intensity does not affect the results. These are presented in the column S5. 
e) Unweighted contagion proxy. If output co-movements are generated by 
common shocks rather than trade-shocks propagation, the analysis above would 
not prove the non-linearity of trade-related shocks propagation. Common 
shocks are assumed to be controlled for by, among others, the oil price variable. 
This is however found positively signed and significant, casting doubts on its 
ability to effectively pick up the effects of common shocks. In order to see 
whether the contagion proxy and its interactions isolate the effect of trade 
shocks or instead pick up common shocks affecting the output of more 
countries, I re-estimate the model with unweighted contagion proxy and 
interactions. In other words, the output fluctuations of all countries in the 
sample are summed up in the C assigning them the same importance. If trade 
linkages are the transmission channel, output fluctuations of countries with no 
trade linkages with the target one should not affect the latter’s output. The 
unweighted contagion proxy and its interactions should then lose significance 
and have coefficients close to zero. This hypothesis is tested in model S6. 
f) The domestic monetary and exchange rate policy proxies (di and de) are found 
to be scarcely insignificant in the output fluctuations at a quarterly frequency. 
This can be either because they actually are not affecting output, or more likely 
because their instrumentation is weak enough to produce excessively large 
variances in their coefficients. Considering them exogenous and therefore not 
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instrument them can improve the quality of the estimation without affecting its 
consistency if di and de are only slightly correlated with output fluctuations in 
the present quarter. In other words, if di and de in t are set on the basis of past 
rather than the present quarter’s economic performance ( 1−tdy  and older), then  
they are exogenous and we could then save the degrees of freedom used to 
instrument them. Model S7 implement this line of thought by re-estimating the 
base-line model considering di and de exogenous. 
g) As shown in Appendix A (footnote 2), the dummies’ specification assumes no 
effect of the dummies on the intercept. In other words, the fact that a trade 
shock is negative is assumed to have no effect per se on the domestic output. 
Similarly, being an OS country is assumed to have no effect per se. These 
assumptions are justifiable on a number of grounds: first, it is hard to conceive 
why the fact that a trade shock is negative should magnify of the shock’s 
strength (the slope effect) and reduce domestic output irrespective of the 
shock’s size. Second, it’s unclear why OS countries as a whole should have 
grown more or less than FCs, being the former a group of diverse countries 
such as Austria, Brazil, Canada, Korea and Poland to name a few. Finally, we 
are interested in detecting an eventual magnification of the propagation 
strength, which is identified by the slopes effects. However, if the intercept 
effects are significative and omitted, they may cause endogeneity, since they are 
correlated with the slope dummies by definition. For this reason, it is important 
to test the significance of the intercept effects. This is pursued in the model S8, 
which introduces the dummies Neg, OS and their interaction to see whether they 
are significant and whether their introduction alters the results on the 
hypotheses tested. For identification reasons (the number of clusters used in the 
robust errors must be bigger than the number of instruments), one has to drop 
one variable to include the three new ones. Since the interest rate has been 
found non-significant in all baseline estimations, I drop that one. 
 
Since the different specifications of the OS dummies give almost identical 
results, I will apply the modifications just described on the model with the third OS 
dummy (i.e. OS2 as opposed to OS and OS1) only. This specification is chosen 
because it gives the strongest results in terms coefficients’ size and significance. 
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Furthermore, it shows the highest statistics in the tests for the relevance and validity 
of the instruments. The results of the regressions and the four hypotheses’ tests are 
provided by Table 4.12 and 4.13 respectively. 
Table 4.12 provides the estimates for the eight specifications just described. The 
key parameters, C and its interactions are substantially stable, apart from C. The 
latter’s coefficient is negative in various specifications. Notice however that in most 
of these cases the coefficient is not significant, only slightly in S4. The OS dummies 
interactions are instead positive and extremely significant in most specifications. I 
particular CmOS, the interaction identifying the magnifying effects of negative 
shocks by currency mismatches is big and extremely significant in all specifications. 
The higher sensitivity of OS countries to all shocks and in particular negative ones 
seems robust to a vast array of specifications. Different specification of the OS 
dummy, de-trending method, trade weights, assumption about the exogeneity of 
policy variables and about intercept effects do not alter the main finding of the 
analysis: that OS countries seems to react more strongly than FCs to trade shocks. 
This will be proven by the tests’ results below. 
This seems not to be the case for the asymmetry hypothesis, at least when it 
comes to FCs. Cm, the interaction identifying asymmetries in FCs, is indeed 
insignificant in all specifications, while the asymmetry in OS receives some support, 
as the tests results presented below will show. The evidence of asymmetry seemed 
weaker than that of higher sensitivity in the main analysis already.  
The importance of trade as a propagation mechanism is confirmed by the model 
estimated with the unweighted contagion index (S5). We can see that the estimated 
coefficients for C and its interactions decrease markedly and loose significance 
completely (as noted above, the coefficient on C turns even negative). Notice that this 
does not happen because of an increase in the coefficients’ standard errors. It is rather 
the drop of their sizes that causes their insignificance. So it is the genuine lack of 
correlation rather than weaker instrumentation that makes the unweighted contagion 
proxies irrelevant. Bilateral trade is then a relevant channel of shocks propagation: 
weighting foreign output fluctuations for its intensity increases the size and 
significance of the contagion coefficients.  
Assuming di and de exogenous does not alter substantially the results of the 
analysis: the coefficients’ signs and size are similar to those in the baseline model. 
The feedback from output fluctuations to economic policies does not seem to work 
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within the lapse of a quarter. Moreover, saving degrees of freedom by instrumenting 
two variables less has a beneficial impact on the precision of the estimation. The 
standard errors of most coefficients decrease. 
Finally, S8 shows that assuming no intercept effects of the dummies is 
reasonable: the controls for such effects introduced in S8 are completely non-
significant. Furthermore, the effect of currency mismatches on the propagation 
mechanism found in the main analysis are confirmed fully, as the tests below will 
prove. 
 
The main analysis supported the hypotheses tested, and in particular it gave 
strong evidence in favour of the higher sensitivity hypothesis. To assess the 
robustness of these results, the four hypotheses are re-tested for all the sensitivity 
models. The results are presented in Table 4.13.  
The higher sensitivity hypothesis is confirmed in all models but S2 and S3, the 
models using older lags as instruments. Leaving aside the distinction between 
negative and positive shocks and introducing one dummy interaction only for OS 
countries (COS2), one finds that the effect of a unit change of the contagion index in 
both direction causes a 1.1% movement in the output of an FC and a 2.3% movement 
in an OS. The difference between the two, identified by COS2, is significant at the 1% 
level (see Table 4.12, first column). Keeping the difference between positive and 
negative shocks, the higher sensitivity is confirmed with a different de-trending 
method (S4), trade weights (S5), different exogeneity assumptions for the policy 
variables (S7) and about intercept effects (S8).  S2 do not confirm the higher 
sensitivity hypothesis, while S3 does so only at the 7% significance level. However, 
this is likely to depend on the weaker instrumentation implemented in these models. 
Indeed, S2 and S3 show first-stage statistics much worse than those of both the other 
sensitivity models and of the baseline ones. The partial R-squared of C and its 
interactions falls markedly: they hover around 17% in the main regressions and in the 
other sensitivity models while they are close to 2% in the S2 and S3 specifications. In 
the same line, the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood-ratio test statistic gives a 
P-value of around 16% for the baseline models and 66% for S2 and S3. Recalling that 
the LR test’s null hypothesis is the underidentification of the reduced form 
coefficients (i.e. the non-relevance of all instruments), the Anderson statistics 
suggests that the instruments used in S2 and S3 are much more likely to be scarcely 
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correlated with the instrumented variables. Since S2 and S3 use older lags than all 
other models, this makes intuitive sense.  
The negative hypothesis is also confirmed by the sensitivity test, albeit more 
weakly. Out of the seven specifications where it is tested (S2 to S8), the hypothesis is 
not confirmed only in the models assuming different AR (S2 and S3) and unweighted 
contagion proxy S6. The former are however suffering of poor instrumentation, so 
that all results loose significance, while the latter is meant to give non-significant 
contagion coefficients since the proxy is unweighted. In S4 (different trade weight), 
the hypothesis is confirmed marginally, since the null of no additional effect of 
negative shocks is rejected with an 8.85% P-value. In all other specifications, the null 
is rejected with a P-value of zero. 
The sensitivity analysis provides evidence of asymmetry in the propagation 
mechanism to OSs but not to FCs. The third row in each model of Table 4.13 gives 
the statistic and P-value associated with the Asymmetry to FC test. As one can see, 
the null of no asymmetries in FCs is never rejected at standard levels of significance. 
The mild support given by the main analysis to the Asymmetry to FC hypothesis does 
not stand the sensitivity check. On the other side, evidence of asymmetries in OS 
countries is more robust: statistically significant asymmetries are found for OS 
countries in all models but the one with different de-trending (S4) (and S6, where one 
expects the test results to be non-significant since unweighted contagion proxies are 
used). 
 
The main result of this analysis, that currency mismatches magnify the effects of 
trade shocks, is then robust to a vast array of assumptions regarding the regressors’ 
endogeneity, intercept effects, the de-trending techniques and trade intensity 
measures used. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis in model S5 proves that it is trade-
related contagion and not common shocks that causes the output co-movements 
isolated by the contagion proxy C and its interactions.  Negative trade shocks seem to 
interact in a particularly damaging way, as proven by the evidence of magnification 
of negative trade shocks and asymmetry caused by the presence of currency 
mismatches. 
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4.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Several reasons why currency mismatches might magnify the effect of foreign 
disturbances have been identified by the literature. These feature: balance sheet 
effects, increasing costs of funding for dollar-borrowing firms, higher capital flows 
sensitivity to real shocks and limited scope and effectiveness of central banks’ 
counterbalancing intervention. Notwithstanding this, a formal test of currency 
mismatches’ magnification effect have not been performed before. Using GMM to 
overcome endogeneity and heteroskedasticity issues, I tested the effects of trade 
partners’ output fluctuations on the domestic output of a sample of 23 countries 
spanning from the first quarter of 1995 to the last of 2005. Some of these countries 
showed widespread currency mismatches while others did not. In such a setting, it 
was possible to assess the role of currency mismatches on various aspects of the 
propagation mechanism. Four hypotheses were tested, namely that currency 
mismatches: a) magnify the real effects of negative trade shocks, b) magnify the real 
effects of trade shocks irrespective of their sign (i.e. magnify trade-related output 
volatility), c) generate asymmetric trade shock propagation (i.e. make negative trade 
shocks more effective on domestic output than positive ones). It was also tested 
whether negative shocks are more effective than positive ones in countries where 
currency mismatches are not widespread (d). 
The analysis gives strong support for the first three hypotheses: currency 
mismatches do magnify the effects of trade shocks, both positive and negative, on 
domestic output levels. The reaction of an average OS country to an external trade 
shock (i.e. the output fluctuation caused by the shock) is roughly double than the 
reaction of an FC country, whatever the sign of the shock. Currency mismatches also 
generate asymmetry in the propagation mechanism, with negative trade shocks being 
felt more strongly than positive ones. Some evidence of asymmetry is found in 
countries without currency mismatches as well, thus lending some support to the 
fourth hypothesis tested. This appears however weak. Sensitivity checks suggest that 
the asymmetry is not robust to different assumptions regarding the regressors’ 
endogeneity, the de-trending method and trade intensity measures used.  
 
The analysis’ findings relate with the existing literature in various ways. 
Eichengreen, Hausmann, Turner and Goldstein’s empirical works quoted above 
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showed that currency mismatches increase the likelihood and severity of financial 
crises. This chapter complements those results by showing that currency mismatches 
also magnify the propagation of trade shocks, in particular negative ones. Their result 
is also generalized by showing that currency mismatches magnify the detrimental 
effects of negative output shocks of all sizes, not only of major ones. In other words, 
currency mismatches increase the output losses caused by trade slumps in normal 
times as well as during crises. By reducing its degree of liabilities dollarization, a 
country might reduce its vulnerability not only to full-blown financial crises but also 
to minor recessions caused by ordinary negative trade shocks. 
In line with the theoretical findings of the DSGE literature quoted above, the 
results confirm that currency mismatches increase domestic output’s volatility caused 
by trade shocks. This point is interesting in relationship with the recent literature on 
volatility and growth. Ramey and Ramey (1995) find a strong negative relationship 
between the standard deviation and the mean of the rate of output growth on a cross-
section of countries. Since output volatility appear to be detrimental to growth, not 
only do currency mismatches exacerbate output fluctuations, they might also reduce 
its growth. More recently, Aghion et al. (2004) showed that the negative correlation 
between output volatility and growth is stronger, the lower the degree of development 
of financial markets. Countries with less developed financial markets suffer the 
negative effects of output volatility more than countries where financial markets are 
more advanced. Since financial underdevelopment and liability dollarization tend to 
go together, the negative effect of currency mismatches on growth might work via 
this channel too. This chapter’s findings are then consistent with those of Aghion et 
al.   
Finally, the results show that the negative shocks’ real effects are more magnified 
than positive ones, so that there is a substantial asymmetry of propagation of shocks 
to countries with currency mismatches, but not towards financial centres. 
 
These results suggest an obvious goal for policymakers in Emerging Markets: 
reducing their countries’ degree of currency mismatches. How to pursue this goal 
depends on the opinion on the origin of the currency mismatches problem one has.  
Following the Eichengreen et al. approach, currency mismatches is an “original 
sin”, a phenomenon common to all EMEs and beyond their control. It is an history of 
defaults and scarce commitment to price and exchange rate stability that makes 
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foreign investors unwilling to buy debt denominated in local currency. In order to 
change this, EMEs government should start “behaving well” and then wait for their 
reputation among international investors to improve. However, the wait might be too 
long, especially if in the meantime their countries are exposed to devastating 
contagion episodes like the ones seen in the ‘90s. For this reason Eichengreen et al. 
suggest drastic measures: countries where currency mismatches are extreme should 
dollarize their economies, even if this means giving up any independence in the 
monetary and exchange rate policy management. In the meantime, a composite 
currency including major EMEs’ currencies should be created and the G8 
governments should issue debt in this composite currency, in order to give EMEs an 
hedging opportunity. 
Goldstein and Turner argue that the Eichengreen et al. approach is misled and 
oversees crucial differences running between EMEs. They argue that good domestic 
policies can instead make a difference and reduce the degree of currency mismatches. 
They put forward four areas of macroeconomic policies that EMEs governments 
should implement:  
a) a better inflation performance that would reassure international investors 
that the government will not inflate its debt away,  
b) a more flexible exchange rate regime that will make agent less complacent 
about currency risk,  
c) stronger government’s fiscal accounts that will reduce its incentive to 
devalue or inflate its debt away and  
d) a better management (i.e. lower exposure to currency risk) of public debt, 
which represents the most part of outstanding debt in EMEs. 
Also, they point three microeconomic policies that introduce incentive for agents 
to reduce their exposure to currency risk:  
a) developing more liquid domestic bond markets that will give agents the 
opportunity to trade domestic-currency-denominated debt,  
b) prudential oversight of financial institutions ensuring that regulatory 
capital requirements reflect the risk the bank is exposed to, that banks 
have appropriate systems in place to monitor and control such exposures 
and transparent reporting exposes reckless risk-taking, 
c) regulation of banks in major lending centres, aimed at reducing large-scale 
short-term dollar-denominated lending. 
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Further research on the ultimate causes of the arising of currency mismatches in 
EMEs are needed to settle this dispute and understand what are the best policy 
options to reduce the negative effect currency mismatches have on macroeconomic 
stability. 
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Table 4.3 
Summary Statistics: levels 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Index of Industrial Production overall 98.43145 12.01942 52.78083 140.314 
 between  3.500087 94.1727 107.4462 
 within  11.52109 51.78006 139.8014 
       
Contagion Index * overall 0.0024031 0.0043115 -0.0154399 0.0303775 
 between  0.0012021 0.0008052 0.005094 
 within  0.004148 -0.0165222 0.0283187 
       
Average price of crude oil overall 27.03983 11.4556 11.64333 59.96333 
 between  0 27.03983 27.03983 
 within  11.4556 11.64333 59.96333 
       
US discount rate overall 3.820684 1.521618 0.9433333 6 
 between  0 3.820684 3.820684 
 within  1.521618 0.9433333 6 
       
domestic discount rate** overall 9.165423 11.83732 0.1 67 
 between  11.27718 0.3081197 53.88889 
 within  4.282645 -18.39013 29.37368 
       
Domestic exchange rate overall 100.3885 297.0761 0.0764986 1792.263 
vis-à-vis the US dollar between  252.1935 0.6196773 1147.113 
 within  165.3784 -370.1997 1421.303 
Observations: 897; Countries: 23; 
Periods (quarters) 39.         
* sum of IIP in trade partners, weighted 
for relative importance      
** Money market rate for Mexico, 
Nederland and the UK     
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Table 4.4 
Summary Statistics: percentage changes 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Index of Industrial Production overall 0.0085937 0.0214923 -0.0809721 0.1186505 
 between  0.0066125 -0.0000381 0.0246829 
 within  0.0204951 -0.0914282 0.1069855 
       
Contagion Index * overall 0.0024031 0.0043115 -0.0154399 0.0303775 
 between  0.0012021 0.0008052 0.005094 
 within  0.004148 -0.0165222 0.0283187 
       
Average price of crude oil overall 0.037124 0.1260378 -0.2482307 0.3767536 
 between  0 0.037124 0.037124 
 within  0.1260378 -0.2482307 0.3767536 
       
US discount rate overall -0.0028205 0.4864304 -1.416667 1.306667 
 between  0 -0.0028205 -0.0028205
 within  0.4864304 -1.416667 1.306667 
       
domestic discount rate** overall -0.1945659 1.503434 -10.76667 17 
 between  0.2262142 -0.8428206 0.0021368 
 within  1.487047 -10.78768 17.41227 
       
Domestic exchange rate overall 0.0000921 0.1033776 -0.9994587 0.4849018 
vis-à-vis the US dollar between  0.0235572 -0.0251111 0.0865369 
 within  0.1007746 -0.9784078 0.4543013 
Observations: 897; Countries: 23; 
Periods (quarters) 39.         
* sum of IIP in trade partners, weighted 
for relative importance      
** Money market rate for Mexico, 
Nederland and the UK     
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Table 4.5 
OSIN indexes 
 
  OSIN1 OSIN1 OSIN2 OSIN2 OSIN3 OSIN3 
 1993-1998 1999-2001 1993-1998 1999-2001 1993-1998 1999-2001
Austria  0.95 0.7 0.9 0.69 0.9 0.69 
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0.78 0.85 0.76 0.83 0.55 0.76 
Czech Republic 1 1 0.88 0.84 0 0 
Finland 0.98 0.65 0.96 0.62 0.96 0.62 
France 0.59 0.35 0.52 0.42 0.23 0.12 
Germany 0.69 0.37 0.67 0.48 0 0 
Greece 0.99 0.78 0.93 0.6 0.93 0.6 
Hungary 1 1 1 0.98 1 0.98 
Ireland 0.98 0.6 0.94 0.59 0.94 0.59 
Israel 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy 0.86 0.37 0.65 0.51 0 0 
Japan 0.64 0.53 0.25 0.35 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 0.76 0.51 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.47 
Norway 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.89 0.98 0.89 
Poland 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.82 0 
Portugal 0.97 0.44 0.42 0.59 0.42 0.24 
Slovak Republic 1 1 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.85 
Spain 0.96 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.42 
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United Kingdom 0.56 0.64 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.31 
United States 0.3 0.17 0.65 0.44 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110
Table 4.6 
OSIN and AECM indexes 
 
 OSIN1 OSIN1 OSIN2 OSIN2 OSIN3 OSIN3 AECM AECM AECM2 AECM2 
 1993-1998 1999-2001 1993-1998 1999-2001 1993-1998 1999-2001 1994-1998 1999-2001 1994-1998 1999-2001
Austria  0.95 0.7 0.9 0.69 0.9 0.69     
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 -2.964 -16.300 -4.636 -23.547 
Canada 0.78 0.85 0.76 0.83 0.55 0.76     
Czech Republic 1 1 0.88 0.84 0 0 3.364 5.730 6.784 10.063 
Finland 0.98 0.65 0.96 0.62 0.96 0.62     
France 0.59 0.35 0.52 0.42 0.23 0.12     
Germany 0.69 0.37 0.67 0.48 0 0     
Greece 0.99 0.78 0.93 0.6 0.93 0.6     
Hungary 1 1 1 0.98 1 0.98 -11.960 -4.260 -18.120 -5.767 
Ireland 0.98 0.6 0.94 0.59 0.94 0.59     
Israel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.130 2.377 3.838 5.963 
Italy 0.86 0.37 0.65 0.51 0 0     
Japan 0.64 0.53 0.25 0.35 0 0     
Korea, Rep. 1 1 1 1 1 1 -4.208 3.043 -4.836 4.003 
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 -21.036 -7.537 -27.694 -9.267 
Netherlands 0.76 0.51 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.47     
Norway 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.89 0.98 0.89     
Poland 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.82 0 4.502 5.260 9.350 9.617 
Portugal 0.97 0.44 0.42 0.59 0.42 0.24     
Slovak Republic 1 1 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.85     
Spain 0.96 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.42     
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 -12.268 -19.460 -19.768 -34.820 
United Kingdom 0.56 0.64 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.31     
United States 0.3 0.17 0.65 0.44 0 0         
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Table 4.7 
OS dummies specifications 
 
  OS OS OS1 OS1 OS2 OS2 
 1993-1998 1999-2005 1993-1998 1999-2005 1993-1998 1999-2005
Austria  X  X  X X 
Brazil X X X X X X 
Canada  X X X X X 
Czech Republic X X X X X X 
Finland X  X  X X 
France       
Germany       
Greece X  X  X  
Hungary X X X X X X 
Ireland X  X  X  
Israel X X X X X X 
Italy     X  
Japan       
Korea, Rep. X X X X X X 
Mexico X X X X X X 
Netherlands     X  
Norway X X X X X X 
Poland X X X X X X 
Portugal       
Slovak Republic X X X X X X 
Spain      X 
Turkey X X X X X X 
United Kingdom       
United States       
       
N. of OS countries 14 11 15 11 17 13 
Threshold 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% 
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Table 4.8 
Estimation results 
Baseline model 
    OLS     GMM   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OS OS1 OS2 OS OS1 OS2 
        
C 1.753*** 1.802*** 1.748** 0.759** 0.927** 0.799** 
 (0.587) (0.628) (0.782) (0.370) (0.416) (0.382) 
CpOS 0.308 0.237 0.280 1.490*** 1.249*** 1.340*** 
 (0.512) (0.546) (0.659) (0.372) (0.391) (0.407) 
Cm 0.0132 -0.0455 -0.281 1.321* 1.363* 1.342*** 
 (1.099) (1.118) (1.201) (0.747) (0.743) (0.514) 
CmOS -0.502 -0.501 -0.0665 3.073*** 2.770*** 2.902*** 
 (0.793) (0.790) (0.719) (0.819) (0.886) (0.691) 
dius 0.00220 0.00220 0.00232 -0.00814*** -0.00833*** -0.00918*** 
 (0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00162) (0.00153) (0.00166) (0.00177) 
di -0.00130** -0.00131** -0.00131** 0.00115 0.00113 0.00156 
 (0.000576) (0.000575) (0.000569) (0.00230) (0.00237) (0.00249) 
de -0.000786 -0.000809 -0.000603 0.0456* 0.0424 0.0492*** 
 (0.00683) (0.00682) (0.00673) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0180) 
doil 0.00242 0.00242 0.00245 0.0118*** 0.0130*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.00894) (0.00910) (0.00932) (0.00322) (0.00357) (0.00322) 
L.dy 0.0467 0.0473 0.0468 0.378*** 0.397*** 0.410*** 
 (0.0653) (0.0652) (0.0652) (0.0634) (0.0632) (0.0599) 
Constant 0.00295** 0.00290** 0.00287** 0.00244** 0.00202* 0.00240*** 
 (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00121) (0.000988) (0.00104) (0.000809) 
Observations 897 897 897 897 897 897 
R-squared 0.176 0.176 0.175 -0.094 -0.095 -0.128 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
Standard errors are robust, clusterized by country       
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Table 4.9 
Estimated responses 
  Regime Linear Combination Coefficient P-value  95% C.I. 
       
(4) +VE to FC C 0.759 0.040 0.034 1.484 
 +VE to OS C+CpOS 2.249 0.000 1.781 2.718 
 -VE to FC C+Cm 2.080 0.005 0.629 3.531 
 -VE to OS C+Cm+CmOS 5.152 0.000 3.863 6.442 
       
(5) +VE to FC C 0.927 0.026 0.113 1.742 
 +VE to OS C+CpOS1 2.176 0.000 1.692 2.660 
 -VE to FC C+Cm 2.290 0.003 0.786 3.794 
 -VE to OS C+Cm+CmOS1 5.060 0.000 3.726 6.394 
       
(6) +VE to FC C 0.799 0.036 0.050 1.548 
 +VE to OS C+CpOS2 2.139 0.000 1.638 2.641 
 -VE to FC C+Cm 2.141 0.000 0.963 3.320 
 -VE to OS C+Cm+CmOS2 5.043 0.000 3.661 6.425 
Ho: coefficient/sum of coefficients=0         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10 
Hypotheses tests 
  Hypothesis Ho Statistic P-value 
     
(4) Negative CmOS=0 14.08 0.0002 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS=0 & CpOS=0 17.87 0.0001 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 3.13 0.0769 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS-CpOS=0 19.79 0.0000 
     
(5) Negative CmOS1=0 9.76 0.0018 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS1=0 & CpOS1=0 11.50 0.0032 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 3.36 0.0667 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS1-CpOS1=0 18.38 0.0000 
     
(6) Negative CmOS2=0 17.64 0.0000 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS2=0 & CpOS2=0 17.64 0.0001 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 6.82 0.0090 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS2-CpOS2=0 20.32 0.0000 
Notes: All tests but high sensitivity distributed as a Chi-squared with 1 d.o.f. .    
  Higher sensitivity tests distributed as a Chi-squared with 2 d.o.f. 
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Table 4.11 
First Stage Results: 
Selected statistics 
    (4) (5) (6) 
    OS OS1 OS2 
C F-stat 1241.49 295.01 1240.98 
 F-stat p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 partial R-squared 0.223 0.2315 0.2295 
CpOS F-stat 4371.05   
 F-stat p-value 0.0000   
 partial R-squared 0.4041   
CpOS1 F-stat  6263.54  
 F-stat p-value  0.0000  
 partial R-squared  0.4098  
CpOS2 F-stat   2621.46 
 F-stat p-value   0.0000 
 partial R-squared   0.3746 
Cm F-stat 1200.63 1223.23 839.62 
 F-stat p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 partial R-squared 0.2153 0.2181 0.2195 
CmOS F-stat 5426.11   
 F-stat p-value 0.0000   
 partial R-squared 0.2624   
CmOS1 F-stat  1674.17  
 F-stat p-value  0.0000  
 partial R-squared  0.2681  
CmOS2 F-stat   1050.42 
 F-stat p-value   0.0000 
 partial R-squared   0.2522 
dius F-stat 1241.63 1093.28 1416.43 
 F-stat p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 partial R-squared 0.2156 0.2164 0.2157 
di F-stat 210.46 107.85 111.59 
 F-stat p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 partial R-squared 0.0488 0.0483 0.0458 
de F-stat 126.3 147.09 487.03 
 F-stat p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 partial R-squared 0.03 0.0315 0.0287 
l.dy F-stat 25.28 24.99 23.05 
 F-stat p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 partial R-squared 0.1114 0.1114 0.1109 
J-statistic* 15.918 16.544 13.341 
J-stat p-value** 0.195 0.1676 0.3448 
* Hansen overidentification test of all instruments     
**H0: exogeneity of all instruments       
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Table 4.12 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Regressions results 
 
                  
 (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) (S7) (S8) 
                  
C 1.123** -1.405 -4.099 -1.681* -0.305  1.534*** 2.669*** 
 (0.533) (2.860) (3.616) (1.012) (0.342)  (0.325) (0.826) 
CpOS2  3.016 5.604** 4.991*** 1.044**  0.738*** -1.015 
  (2.404) (2.843) (0.691) (0.419)  (0.242) (1.180) 
Cm  2.360 2.439 0.113 0.319  0.988 -0.580 
  (1.931) (2.334) (1.471) (1.579)  (0.773) (1.031) 
CmOS2  6.306 10.10* 6.369*** 3.212*  2.073*** 3.824** 
  (4.352) (5.667) (1.312) (1.886)  (0.503) (1.651) 
dius -0.00284 -0.0219*** -0.0207** 0.00360 -0.0101** -0.00710 -0.00703*** -0.00664** 
 (0.00251) (0.00821) (0.00888) (0.00641) (0.00510) (0.00689) (0.00205) (0.00296) 
di 0.000499 0.000302 -0.000485 -0.00115 -0.00107 0.000108 -0.00145***  
 (0.00257) (0.00286) (0.00434) (0.00107) (0.00166) (0.00380) (0.000481)  
de 0.0196 -0.0995*** -0.0861 0.0215 0.0711*** 0.0959 -2.06e-05 -0.0291 
 (0.0246) (0.0354) (0.0609) (0.0362) (0.0183) (0.106) (0.00351) (0.0350) 
L.dy 0.322*** 0.749*** 0.610* 0.165* 0.506** 0.892*** 0.433*** 0.406*** 
 (0.0599) (0.273) (0.339) (0.0930) (0.225) (0.203) (0.0513) (0.0481) 
doil 0.00885** 0.0289* 0.0313 0.00445 0.00686 0.0257 0.00350 0.00726** 
 (0.00370) (0.0156) (0.0216) (0.00692) (0.00439) (0.0181) (0.00306) (0.00362) 
COS2 1.189**        
 (0.508)        
Cnw      0.0876   
      (0.169)   
CnwpOS2      0.0621   
      (0.0886)   
Cnwm      -1.535   
      (1.192)   
CnwmOS2      1.156   
      (0.936)   
OS2        0.00688 
        (0.00488) 
neg        -0.000667 
        (0.00365) 
negOS2        0.00723 
        (0.00859) 
Constant 0.000558 0.00221 0.00529 0.00471*** 0.00429** -0.00379 0.000433 -0.00338 
 (0.00154) (0.00334) (0.00422) (0.00167) (0.00185) (0.00429) (0.000961) (0.00279) 
Observations 897 874 851 897 897 897 897 897 
R-squared 0.055 -0.864 -0.918 -0.057 -0.348 -0.726 -0.031 -0.038 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
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Table 4.13 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Hypotheses tests 
          
 Hypothesis Ho Statistic P-value 
          
     
(S1) Higher sensitivity  C + CmOS2 = 0 18.25 0.0000 
     
(S2) Negative CmOS2=0 2.10 0.1473 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS2=0 & CpOS2=0 2.12 0.3464 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 1.49 0.2218 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS2-CpOS2=0 3.22 0.0728 
     
(S3) Negative CmOS2=0 3.18 0.0746 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS2=0 & CpOS2=0 3.90 0.1422 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 1.09 0.2960 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS2-CpOS2=0 3.87 0.0491 
     
(S4) Negative CmOS2=0 23.57 0.0000 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS2=0 & CpOS2=0 52.91 0.0000 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 0.01 0.9388 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS2-CpOS2=0 0.83 0.3613 
     
(S5) Negative CmOS2=0 2.90 0.0885 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS2=0 & CpOS2=0 8.56 0.0138 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 0.04 0.8397 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS2-CpOS2=0 4.73 0.0297 
     
(S6) Negative CnwmOS2=0 1.52 0.2170 
 Higher sensitivity  CnwmOS2=0 & CnwpOS2=0 1.79 0.4091 
 Asymmetry in FC Cnwm=0 1.66 0.1979 
 Asymmetry in OS Cnwm+CnwmOS2-CnwpOS2=0 0.61 0.4340 
     
(S7) Negative CmOS2=0 16.97 0.0000 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS2=0 & CpOS2=0 18.72 0.0001 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 1.63 0.2014 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS2-CpOS2=0 9.68 0.0019 
     
(S8) Negative CmOS2=0 5.36 0.0206 
 Higher sensitivity  CmOS2=0 & CpOS2=0 27.82 0.0000 
 Asymmetry in FC Cm=0 0.32 0.5735 
 Asymmetry in OS Cm+CmOS2-CpOS2=0 7.07 0.0078 
     
Notes: All tests but high sensitivity distributed as a Chi-squared with 1 d.o.f. 
 All higher sensitivity tests but the one in (1) distributed as a Chi-squared with 2 d.o.f. 
  Higher sensitivity test in (1) distributed as a Chi-squared with 1 d.o.f. 
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Appendix A 
 
The model as a standard three-dummies specification 
 
Focusing on C and its interactions only, the estimated model is: 
 
tiititititiitititit uOSNegCNegCOSPosCCy +++++=Δ ***** 3210 ββββα
 (A1) 
 
or, rearranging it: 
 
tiititiitititititit uOSPosCOSNegCNegCCy +++++=Δ ***** 1320 ββββα
 (A2) 
 
Defining: 
it
i
it
it
Posx
OSx
Negx
Cx
≡
≡
≡
≡
4
3
2
1
 
      
(A2) can be rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) tit uxxxxxxxxxy +++++=Δ 3411321321210 ***** ββββα   (A3) 
 
The standard specification of such a structural model is suggested by Wooldridge 
(2002) as a one-continuous-variable-two-dummy-structure: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) tit uxxxxxxxxy +++++=Δ 321131321210 **** ββββα   (A4) 
 
with: 
 
i
it
it
OSx
Negx
Cx
≡
≡
≡
3
2
1
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In other words, the standard specification includes the continuous variable and its 
interactions with all dummies. In this way, the specification controls for all possible 
effects of the dummies on  the slopes (i.e. the effects of the dummies on 
1x
y
∂
∂ )6. 
Comparing the standard specification (A4) with (A3), we can see that there is only 
one difference: in my specification ( )3411 ** xxxβ  substitutes ( )313 * xxβ . The latter 
is a control for the interaction between the continuous variable and the dummy 3x . 
This control is however present in my specification as well. Recall that itNegx ≡2  
and itPosx ≡4 , so that the last two terms of my specification ( )3411 ** xxxβ  and 
( )3211 ** xxxβ  are equivalent to ( )313 * xxβ  split between positive and negative 
observations of 1x . In other words, ( )3411 ** xxxβ  and ( )3211 ** xxxβ  control for the 
effect of ( )313 * xxβ  and any asymmetries in its effect. It follows that my 
specification controls for all potential interactions of 1x  and the dummies just as the 
standard specification does7. 
My specification has however a desirable feature over the standard specification: 
its betas identify the different effects of trade shocks we want to test. The estimated 
effect of each of the four types of trade shock on the domestic output is indeed given 
by the linear combinations listed in Table 4.1 reproduced here: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Wooldridge is actually proposing a structure such as :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) tit uxxxxxxxxxxxxy ++++++++=Δ 3211313212326352410 ***** βββββββα
 which is (A4) plus three controls for the effects on the intercept of the dummies 2x  and 3x  and their 
interaction. This specification includes the continuous variable, the two dummies and all the possible 
interactions between the three. (A4) and my specification assume instead no intercept effects of the 
two dummmies (i.e. they assume: 0654 === βββ ). This hypothesis is tested in the sensitivity 
analysis (model S8) where the three controls for intercept effects of the dummies are introduced (see 
the sensitivity analysis section for details). 
7 As noticed in the chapter, the interactions ( )3211 ** xxxβ  and ( )3411 ** xxxβ  would generate 
perfect multicollinearity with ( )311 * xxβ . The latter is however not included, so that the two 
interactions can coexist in the estimated model. 
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Table 4.1 
The four regimes 
Regime 
Estimated 
effect 
positive shock to FC 0β  
positive shock to OS 10 ββ +  
negative shock to FC 20 ββ +  
negative shock to OS  320 βββ ++
   
The difference in the real effect of a positive trade shock in an OS with respect of 
an FC is identified by 1β  (second row minus first), the difference in the real effect of 
a negative trade shock in an OS with respect of an FC is identified by 3β  (last row 
minus third), the asymmetry of shocks propagation in FC is identified by 2β  (third 
row minus first) and, finally, the asymmetry of shocks propagation in OS is identified 
by 132 βββ −+  (last row minus second). Apart from the latter, all effects are 
identified by single parameters so that they are more evidently shown in regression 
outputs. This contrasts with the standard specification where linear combinations are 
always needed to identify the differences. For this reason, the specification in (A3) is 
preferred. 
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CHAPTER 5 - TESTING THE STABILITY OF THE PROPAGATION 
MECHANISM 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: Contagion tests 
 
In this chapter we focus on the second main question addressed in the contagion 
literature: whether or not the strength of the contagion channels is stable across time. 
The following literature review sets the background for the instability test presented 
below. 
 
 The speed, intensity and pervasiveness of the turbulence caused by the major 
crises in the 1990s led researchers to ask whether the linkages between financial 
markets in different countries grew stronger during these turbulent times or were 
instead already as strong before. As pointed out by Forbes and Rigobon (2001), this is 
an important question because it sheds light on at least three key aspects of financial 
and international economics: 
a) The effectiveness of international portfolio diversification in reducing 
risk. If cross-country correlations of assets returns shift during crises, 
portfolios designed based on correlations during tranquil times would 
exhibit different properties in crises, which could lead to larger than 
expected losses 
b) The effectiveness of microprudential bank regulation as standardized by 
the Basel II accord. The latter sets the levels of banks’ capital adequacy 
ratios on the basis of their risk weighted assets portfolio. The portfolio 
risk is typically estimated using Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures. These in 
turn are based on historical measures of assets correlations. If the 
correlations increase during crises, the risk is underestimated and thus the 
capital adequacy ratios are insufficient. 
c) The empirical relevance of crisis-contingent versus non-crisis-contingent 
contagion models. Models based on a shift in investor behaviour during 
crises imply a break in the shocks’ propagation mechanism. Therefore, a 
necessary condition for such models to be relevant is the observation of a 
break in the propagation mechanism during crises.  
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For these reasons, the issue of instability of the propagation mechanism or shift 
contagion (see the introduction of the thesis) has been studied in depth. To present it 
formally, I follow the approach of Dungey et al. (2004) and specify a model of 
interdependence of asset markets during non-crisis periods as a latent factor model of 
asset returns. The model has its origins in the arbitrage pricing theory, where asset 
returns are determined by a set of common factors and a set of idiosyncratic factors 
(Sharpe 1964, Ross 1976). This framework is useful to show how instability can be 
and has been empirically tested in the literature. 
The model is here presented in a two-country fashion, but its generalization to N 
countries is straightforward. Assume there are two countries whose stock returns are 
given by: 
 
{ }tt xx 21 ,           (5.1) 
 
where both returns are assumed to have zero means. During non-crisis times, the 
returns are assumed to be determined by the following factor model: 
 
tttt uuwx 112111 δγλ ++=         (5.2) 
tttt uuwx 221222 δγλ ++=  
 
where tw  represents the common factor affecting all stock markets with loadings 
λ . This can be thought of as changes in investor risk aversion or risk perception, or 
changes in world endowment. tw  is often referred to as the world factor. It is 
assumed to be a latent stochastic process with zero mean and unit variance. itu  
represents the idiosyncratic factor that is unique to market i, with loading δ . itu  is 
also assumed to be a latent stochastic process with zero mean and unit variance. 
Correlation among stock returns in country 1 and 2 can arise from two sources: the 
world factor and the direct effect of country 1’s stock market on country 2 (and vice-
versa). This second source of correlation, called “market interdependence” is 
represented by the elements jtiuγ . The strength of the interdependence is measured 
by the loadings γ . These identify the interdependence of markets in normal times. 
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Why should stock markets be interdependent? The most obvious cause is trade 
linkages. If companies listed in country 1’s stock exchange export a relevant part of 
their output to country 2, shocks affecting country 2’s aggregate demand will affect 
the expected profits of companies in both countries, therefore affecting both stock 
indexes. Financial linkages such as common lenders operating in both financial 
markets are another potential source of interdependence.  
 
Notice that (5.2) is the reduced form of: 
 
tttt uxwx 1
2
2121
2
2
1
2
2121
1 


 −
++


 −
= δ
γγδδ
δ
γ
δ
λγδλ    (5.3) 
tttt uxwx 2
1
2121
1
1
2
1
1212
2 


 −
++


 −
= δ
γγδδ
δ
γ
δ
λγδλ
 
 
or: 
 
tttt xwx εβα ++= 2111        (5.4) 
tttt xwx ηβα ++= 1222  
 
where: 
 



 −
≡
2
2121
1 δ
λγδλ
α      
2
1
1 δ
γβ ≡  
tt u1
2
2121 


 −
≡ δ
γγδδ
ε  



 −
≡
1
1212
2 δ
λγδλ
α  
1
2
2 δ
γβ ≡  
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tt u2
1
2121 


 −
≡ δ
γγδδη  
 
Equation (5.4) gives an intuitive model of market interdependence in which the 
stock returns are determined by a common factor, an idiosyncratic factor and the 
effect of the foreign shocks.  
Assuming all factors to be independent so that: 
 
[ ] 021 =ttuuE  ji ≠∀       (5.5) 
[ ] 01 =tt wuE  i∀        (5.6) 
 
we have that the covariance between the two stock markets during tranquil times 
is given by: 
 
[ ] 12212121 δγδγλλ ++=tt xxE        (5.7) 
 
The first term on the right hand side represents the world-factor-induced 
covariance while the other two the effect of direct stock markets interdependence. 
 
Now assume that during crisis times the returns are instead determined by the 
following factor model: 
 
tttt uuwx 1
'
12
'
1
'
11 δγλ ++=        (5.8) 
tttt uuwx 2
'
21
'
2
'
22 δγλ ++=  
 
and the markets’ covariance is given by: 
 
[ ] '1'2'2'1'2'121 δγδγλλ ++=tt xxE       (5.9) 
 
Comparing (5.9) with (5.7) we find the change in covariance from tranquil to 
crisis period. If the world and the own idiosyncratic factors retain the same influence 
on the markets we have that their loadings are unchanged. In other words we have 
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that 1
'
1 λλ = , 2'2 λλ = , 1'1 δδ = , 2'2 δδ = . In this case, the change in covariance from 
tranquil to crisis times is given by: 
 
[ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) 12'221'12121 δγγδγγ −+−=− tranquilttcrisistt xxExxE   (5.10) 
 
If 0' >− ii γγ , i=1,2, there is a positive break in the interdependence structure of 
the two markets. These are more interdependent during crises: foreign shocks have 
stronger repercussions on the domestic market. Notice that, since 0>iδ  by 
assumption, the increase in the γ ’s causes an increase in the returns’ covariance. 
Therefore, increased interdependence translates into higher covariance.  
 
Shifts in the parameters γ  are thus identifying the instability of the propagation 
mechanism or shift contagion. The test for shift contagion is then a test of the 
hypothesis: 
 
ii γγ ='  i∀         (5.11) 
 
A rejection of hypothesis (5.11) means that a crisis alters the effect of foreign 
stock returns’ fluctuations on domestic indexes. Therefore, a rejection of (5.11) is 
considered as a proof of shift contagion, the instability of the propagation mechanism. 
As we will see now, all common shift contagion tests can be shown to have reference 
to the test of hypothesis (5.11) in the context of the latent factor model presented 
above. 
 
Recall that the variances of all factors are fixed at 1. Assuming the loadings λ  
and δ  fixed as we did, we are implicitly assuming homoskedastic factors. In other 
words, the variance of the world and the idiosyncratic factors are not allowed to vary 
during crises. The model is however easily augmented, allowing for increases in the 
factors’ variances (structural breaks henceforth). Autoregressive dynamics can be 
introduced as well, both in the form of autocorrelation and GARCH processes of the 
factors. The nature of the shift contagion test (5.11) would not be altered by the 
introduction of these features in the latent factor model. 
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5.1.1  Early tests 
 
The first application of the ideas presented above was that of King and Wadhwani 
(1990). In this paper the authors examined the correlation coefficient of London and 
New York’s stock exchange indexes before and after the 1987 crash, in order to see 
whether the coefficient increased during the latter. The link with the shift contagion 
test summarized in (5.11) is immediate. The correlation coefficient is the covariance 
scaled by the standard errors of the two variables. If the correlation coefficient 
increases in presence of increasing standard errors, the covariance must increase even 
more. Since the variance of both stock markets increased after the crash, an increase 
of the correlation coefficient in the period following the crash would be a proof of 
increase of the covariance as well. It would therefore represent a rejection of the 
hypothesis (5.11). The sharp increase in the coefficient documented by King and 
Wadhwani seems then to suggest the presence of shift contagion in the New York and 
London stock exchanges following the 1987 crash. The same finding was 
subsequently documented by similar correlation studies on emerging markets (Calvo 
and Reinhardt (1996), Bordo and Mushid (2000) and Bajg and Goldfajn (1998)). The 
third of this studies found that correlation coefficients of markets situated in different 
continents increased too.  
Early tests therefore suggested the presence of shift contagion. However, Forbes 
and Rigobon (1999) showed how these results are flawed by the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Their argument is that the correlation coefficient is a biased 
measure of the actual correlation between two variables when these two are related in 
the way described in (5.4) and heteroskedastic. This is because an increase in the 
variance of the one variable will cause an increase in the correlation coefficient even 
if the propagation mechanism is unaltered (i.e. even if the β ’s in the system (5.4) are 
unchanged). Therefore, an increase in the correlation coefficient is not necessarily a 
proof of shift contagion.  
To see their point formally, recall the system (5.4) and for simplicity assume there 
are no common shocks. { }tt xx 21 ,  are thus given by: 
 
ttt xx εβ += 211         (5.12) 
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ttt xx ηβ += 122         
 
Assume also that we have two periods: one of high volatility and one of low. In 
the period of high volatility there is a structural break, i.e. the variance of 2x  
increases so that: 
 
( )
( ) φσ
σ
+= 1
2
2
2
2
x
x
L
H            (5.13) 
 
where ( )22 xHσ  and ( )22 xLσ  represent the variance of 2x  in the high and low 
volatility periods respectively. If [ ] 0,2 =ttxE ε , from (5.12) one can see that the 
variance of 1x  in the high volatility period is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) 2222112 εσσβσ += xx HH          (5.14) 
 
Substituting (5.13) in (5.14) and rearranging one can show that: 
 
( ) ( )( ) 



+=
1
2
2
2
2
11
2 1
x
xx
L
L
H
σ
σφβσ         (5.15) 
 
From the standard formula of the correlation coefficient we have that: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )1
2
1
21
21
x
x
xx
xx
σ
σβ
σσ
σρ ==         (5.16) 
 
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between 1x  and 2x . 
Substituting (5.16) in (5.15) we have that: 
 
( ) ( )( )21212 1 LLH xx φρσσ +=  
 
or: 
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( )
( )
2
1
2
1
2
1 L
L
H
x
x φρ
σ
σ
+=           (5.17) 
 
where Lρ  is the correlation coefficient in the low volatility period. (5.17) gives 
the increase in the variance of 1x  between the two periods. Expectedly, this is a 
function of the increase in 2x ’s variance and the correlation between the two 
variables. Comparing the increase in the variances of 1x  and 2x  as given by (5.17) 
and (5.13) we have that: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )22
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
11
x
x
x
x
L
H
L
L
H
σ
σφφρ
σ
σ
=+<+=        (5.18) 
 
  Unless 1=Lρ , the variance of 2x  increases more than the variance of 1x . Thus, 
unless there is perfect correlation between the two variables in the low volatility 
period, the variance of 2x  increases more than the variance of 1x .   
Rearranging (5.18) one can show that the ratio of the variance of 1x  over that of 
2x  increases in the high volatility period: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )12
2
2
1
2
2
2
x
x
x
x
L
L
H
H
σ
σ
σ
σ
>           (5.19) 
 
from which follows that: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) LL
L
H
H
H x
x
x
x ρ
σ
σβ
σ
σβρ =>=
1
2
1
1
2
1        (5.20) 
 
The correlation coefficient between 1x  and 2x  has increased in the high volatility 
period even if the actual correlation between the two variables (measured by 1β ) has 
not. It is the increase in the variance of 2x  that caused such increase. This makes 
intuitive sense: the variance of 1x  is given by the variance of an idiosyncratic element 
(ε ) and the variance of 2x . If 2x  becomes more volatile while ε  does not, 2x  will 
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generate relatively more of the variation of 1x  than before, even if the two variables’ 
correlation has not increased. The idiosyncratic element ε  looses importance in 
favour of 2x  as a determinant of 1x ’s variance and the correlation coefficient picks 
this up increasing.  
Since in periods of turbulence the variance of stock markets indexes tend to 
increase, Forbes and Rigobon argue that the increased correlation among stock 
markets found by previous studies is likely to be generated by the phenomenon just 
described rather than by a genuine increase in the correlation among stock markets. 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999) thus propose a corrected correlation coefficient ν :  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )HL
LH
H
x
xx ρ
σ
σσ
ρ
ν
−


 −
+
=
11
2
2
2
2
2
2
      (5.21) 
 
which is the standard correlation coefficient between the two stock markets 
during crisis times ( Hρ ) discounted for the effect of the increase in ( )22 xσ . The 
comparison between the adjusted crisis-time coefficient ν  and the tranquil-times 
unadjusted correlation coefficient Lρ  is then the basis of their shift contagion test. If 
Lρν > , the increase in the correlation coefficient is not completely attributable to the 
structural break in country 2 and thus it must be interpreted as a proof of shift 
contagion. If instead Lρν =  there is no shift contagion. Computing the corrected 
coefficient (called FR test henceforth), Forbes and Rigobon conclude for the second 
case: according to their test, no correlation increase has taken place in recent crises 
apart from East Asian one. They conclude that the quick spreading of crises across 
border is the effect of the high degree of interdependence that characterises financial 
markets in both tranquil and turbulent times (i.e. the high value of the β ’s), rather 
than shift contagion (i.e. a shift in the β ’s).  
 
The corrected coefficient is however based on the assumption that: 
 
[ ] 0,2 =ttxE ε           (5.22) 
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in (5.12). This is true only if 02 =β  in both periods. Thus, during tranquil and 
crisis times country 2 stock returns affect country 1’s ones but not the reverse. Forbes 
and Rigobon assume that shocks originating in country 2 propagate towards country 
1, “with negligible feedback from 1 to 2”. This is equivalent to rule out by 
assumption the intrinsic endogeneity in the equations system (5.12). It is however 
hard to justify. It is not clear why, for example, swings in the Argentinean stock 
exchange should affect the Brazilian stock exchange but not vice-versa. Forbes and 
Rigobon are well aware of these limitations, but they rule them out a priori. The 
coefficient correction is thus based on a very unpleasant assumption.  
 
5.1.2  The DCC test 
 
Rigobon (2003) acknowledges the limitations of the FR test and affirms that its 
results are unreliable. He thus proposes a technique that should instead be able to test 
for parameter stability in presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. Borrowing 
his words, the essence of the procedure can be described as “identification through 
heteroskedasticity”. A graph might help intuition on the subject.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 
The simultaneous determination of stock returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2x  
*
2x
(2) 
(1) 
 *1x  1x  
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The two lines (1) and (2) in the figure represent the relationships between country 
1 and 2 stock returns as given by the two equations in the non-reduced form system 
(5.4). If (1) represents the first equation in the system and (2) the second, we have 
that their slope is respectively 
1
2
1
1
γ
δ
β =  and 1
2
2 δ
γβ = . Clearly, we do not observe the 
lines themselves, but only the equilibrium stock returns *1x  and 
*
2x . If we have a 
dataset of stock returns, what we observe is therefore a cloud of points, each one 
representing an observed pair of equilibrium returns ( *1x ;
*
2x ). We cannot identify (1) 
and (2), to do so an instrument is needed. Rigobon argues that a structural break (i.e. 
the increase in the variance of one idiosyncratic element) provides such an instrument 
and gives a way of identifying the two schedules.  
An example might help, Figure 5.2 below, taken from Rigobon (2000) describes 
graphically the “identification through heteroskedasticity” argument for a standard 
demand, supply and prices representation.  
The top panel represents the pre-structural break set of observed equilibrium 
prices generated by the underlying demand and supply relationships. The cloud of 
points is evenly distributed around the lines’ crossing. The bottom panel represents 
the post-break set. The break is an increase in the supply’s variance. This causes the 
set of observed equilibrium points to align along the demand. It is this alignment that 
allows identification. 
This example is useful in explaining the use of a structural break as an 
instrument. However, to apply this line of thought to the stock markets correlation 
issue one more step is needed. In fact, contrary to the demand and supply in the 
example, the two stock markets whose correlation is studied are interdependent. 
Therefore the increase in the variance of one stock’s idiosyncratic factor will 
necessarily cause an increase in the other stock market’s variance. Therefore, a 
structural break in one stock market will make both lines in figure 5.1 more volatile. 
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Figure 5.2 
Identification through heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Source: Rigobon (2000), page 30. 
 
 
Rather than align the cloud of equilibrium points along one line, the break will 
then spread the cloud in both directions. Identification is however still possible: the 
key is that, under some assumptions, the increase in the variances of the two stock 
markets will be equal to a certain ratio. In other words, if the only shock to the system 
(5.4) is the increase in the variance of ε , the ratio of the increases in the variance of 
tx1  and tx2  is known. Therefore, one can estimate the increases in the variance of tx1  
and tx2 , calculate their ratio and compare it to that known value. If the ratio is equal 
to that value, the increase in the variance of ε  has been the only change in the system 
parameters. Otherwise, some other parameter, (the β  ‘s) must have changed: there 
has been shift contagion.  
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The argument is formally expressed starting again from the system (5.4). 
Assuming ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,, === ηεηε CovwCovwCov , the Variance-Covariance matrix of 
tx1  and tx2  is given by: 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) 

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+++•
+++++++
−
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,
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221
2
,2
2
,1
2
,221121
2
,
2
,
2
1
2
,
2
121
2
211
1
tttw
tttwtttw
t
εη
εηεη
σβσσαβα
σβσβσαβαβαασσβσβαα
ββ
 
              (5.23) 
 
where 2,
2
,
2
, ,, tttw εη σσσ  are the variance of, respectively, w, η  and ε at time t.  A 
crisis is modelled as a one-shot increase in 2,tησ , the variance of the country 2’s 
idiosyncratic element. In particular, it is assumed that:  
 
2
,
2
,
2
1,
2
, tttt k ηηηη σσσσ =−≡Δ +          (5.24) 
 
It is also assumed that: 
 
02,
2
, =Δ=Δ twt σσ ε            (5.25) 
 
Conditions (5.24) and (5.25) state that only one idiosyncratic shock experiences a 
variance increase, the other idiosyncratic and the world factors do not. These crucial 
assumptions can be summarized by the assumed matrix of changes in the variance-
covariance matrix of the errors ε  and η : 
 



=ΔΩ 2
,0
00
t
t k η
ε
σ          
(5.26) 
 
From (5.24) follows that the post-shock level of η ‘s variance is 
( ) 2,2 1, 1 tt k ηη σσ +=+ . Substituting this in (5.23) one finds the post-break variance-
covariance matrix of tx1  and tx2 . Subtracting the pre-shock matrix (5.23) from the 
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post-shock one, one obtains the changes in the variance-covariance matrix of tx1  and 
tx2  generated by the structural break: 
 
( ) 


−
=Ω−Ω≡ΔΩ + 11 1
1
2
1
2
21
2
,
1 β
ββ
ββ
ση t
ttt
k
       (5.27) 
  
Notice that the covariance and the variances of both stock markets have increased 
after the break. However, they did so in known proportions. This is the key point, 
highlighted earlier: the ratios of the changes in the variance-covariance matrix are 
known. In particular, they are so that the determinant of  the matrix tΔΩ  is equal to 
zero, irrespective of the value of all parameters. This can be easily seen looking at the 
squared parenthesis’ elements, whose determinant is clearly zero. This result is the 
core of the Rigobon’s test, which is indeed called the Determinant of the Change in 
the Covariance matrix (DCC) test. If only one idiosyncratic element increases its 
variance and the interdependence parameters (i.e the β ‘s) are stable, the determinant 
of the changes’ matrix will be zero. Rigobon affirms that in order to test the stability 
of the parameters β   it is then sufficient to estimate tΔΩ  and test whether this is 
different from zero. Formally, the DCC test states that if two markets are related in a 
manner reducible to eqs. (5.4), and one idiosyncratic structural break only hits the 
system, then 0≠ΔΩ t  if and only if 0≠Δ iβ  for some i. It follows that 0=ΔΩ t  
implies the stability of the β ‘s and thus the stability of the propagation mechanism. 
In other words, 0=ΔΩ t  implies ii γγ =' , i∀  in the latent factor model (5.2); It 
means no shift contagion (see hypothesis 5.11). 
Rigobon (2003) applies the DCC test to a multivariate version of eq. (5.4), 
expanded to include constant terms, lagged values of the  x’s and the Fed discount 
rate as a proxy for the unobservable common factors tw . He tests the change in the 
var-cov matrix during three recent crises: the Mexican, Asian and Russian-Brazilian 
one. The sample is of 36 countries, both OECD and not, for a period ranging from 
January 1993 to December 1998. The procedure is implemented as follows: first, the 
multivariate expanded system (5.4) is estimated for each crisis episode separately and 
tε  is obtained. Second, “low” and “high” variance windows are defined for each 
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crisis. Third, the tε  are split in two according to the defined windows. Once obtained 
the low and high variance tε , their variance-covariance matrix is estimated and the 
determinant of the change εtΔΩ  computed. Finally, to test the shift contagion 
hypothesis, εtΔΩ ’s distribution is estimated by bootstrap. If the actual value of 
ε
tΔΩ  lies outside the 5-95% range of its bootstrapped distribution with zero mean, 
the null hypothesis of 0=ΔΩεt  is rejected and one concludes for parameter 
instability. Note that this procedure is testing 0=ΔΩεt . However, this is equivalent 
to test 0=ΔΩ t , as shown by Rigobon (2003) in its Appendix B. 
In order to take into account the role of various events on the path of the 
unfolding of each crisis (e.g.: the Russian default and the LTCM near-collapse in the 
Russian-Brazilian episode), different windows definitions are implemented for each 
crisis. The test is performed separately on four different regions: OECD, East Asia, 
Latin America and others (India, Russia and South Africa) In other words, excluding 
the “other countries” group, it is a test for within-region parameter stability. 
The results are notable: regarding Latin America, parameters stability is rejected 
only in 2 out of 5 windows definitions during the East Asian crisis and in 1 out of 4 
during the Russian one. The same happens in the Other Countries group. Parameter 
stability is instead never rejected for the OECD and the East Asian group. These 
results suggest that a shift in the mechanism of financial shocks propagation never 
took place in the two latter groups. However, statistically significant shifts took place 
within Latin America and within India, Russia and South Africa during the East 
Asian and Russian Crises. These results are interpreted by Rigobon as a proof of 
substantial stability of the propagation mechanism, especially in more developed 
financial markets such as the OECD and East Asian ones, where parameter stability is 
never rejected.  
 
A closer look to the DCC’s assumptions 
 
 The DCC seemed to provide a way of testing parameters stability in models with 
simultaneous heteroskedasticity and endogeneity problems such as those describing 
financial markets’ returns. However, a closer look to the set of assumptions on which 
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the test is based reveals some unappealing features. The crucial assumption is the 
diagonality and non-full-rankness of the matrix of changes in the variance covariance 
matrix of the idiosyncratic elements ε  and η : 
 



=ΔΩ 2
,0
00
t
t k η
ε
σ          (5.26’)
 
 
 It is the diagonality assumption that is most uncomfortable. To see why, recall 
the model depicted in eqs. (5.4): ε  and η  represent all the domestic factors 
influencing stock returns. They can be thought as a mix of country-specific 
macroeconomic (fundamentals such as the amount of money in circulation, easiness 
of credit, GDP growth, prevailing interest rates) and microeconomic factors, 
idiosyncratic to the companies listed in the indexes (think, for example, at the quality 
of the firm’s management). Crucially, in the relationship between the macro and 
micro fundamentals and the stock returns a key element is the interpretation of such 
elements by the investors (i.e. the way investors determine the expected value of the 
asset from the analysis of the fundamentals). Therefore, investor behaviour is also 
part of ε  and η . It is another determinant of the stock returns that is not foreign stock 
returns or common factors.  
By assuming tεΩ  and 
t
εΔΩ  diagonal, the DCC test assumes ε  and η  to be 
uncorrelated and stably so (i.e. they are assumed uncorrelated during tranquil and 
crisis times). This means that all domestic elements affecting country 1 stock index 
(ε ), investor behaviour included, cannot be affected by shocks originating in country 
2’s market (η ). Therefore, an extraordinary value of η  (e.g. a stock market crash in 
country 2) cannot affect the behaviour of country 1’s investors (i.e. the way investors 
establish their ask and bid prices starting from country 1’s  fundamentals). Any shift 
in the way investors assess, analyse and interpret the fundamentals caused by foreign 
shocks would indeed affect domestic stock returns without implying a change in the 
linear correlation between the levels of tx1  and tx2  (i.e. without implying a change in 
the β ’s). Any such shift would then imply a movement of ε  caused by a movement 
in η . In this case the shift in investor behaviour caused by foreign shocks would 
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generate correlation among the idiosyncratic factors ε  and η . The change in the 
variance-covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic errors would be: 
 



=ΔΩ 2
,t
t kc
cm
η
ε
σ        (5.28)
 
 
where 0≠c  represents the shift from zero of the covariance between ε  and η  
caused by investors behaviour shift. The assumed diagonality of tεΔΩ  (eq. 5.26) is 
necessarily violated. In this case the elements of tΔΩ  are unknown and so is its 
determinant. Indeed, dropping the ( ) 0, =ηεCov  assumption expands the variance-
covariance matrix of stock returns tΩ  to include all terms related to it. Unless one is 
willing to assume all these term to remain stable after a structural break, tΔΩ  
includes also the changes in the covariance terms and therefore does not have the 
simple form of (5.27). Since there is no apparent reason why the covariance among 
factors should be stable while their variances increase, it is hard to see how that 
assumption could be justified. To this end it is worth recalling that if 2ησ  increases 
while 2εσ  and the correlation coefficient between ε  and η  remain constant, 
( )ηε ,Cov  increases. Therefore, in order to have a stable covariance after a structural 
break in η , the correlation coefficient must increase of the amount exactly offsetting 
the increase in 2ησ . There is no reason why this should be the case. In presence of 
investor behaviour shifts (5.27) is therefore unknown. The DCC test is not able to 
identify the parameters’ instability since tΔΩ  is unidentified even with stable 
parameters (i.e. it is not bound to zero by parameter stability)8.  
 
The DCC test rules out any role of investor behaviour shifts (i.e. of changes in 
the way investors assess the equilibrium stock prices starting from the fundamentals) 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, one could assume investor behaviour to be included in the common factor w. In this 
case, investor behaviour shifts caused by crises would violate the assumption ( )η,wCov  instead of 
that of ( )ηε ,Cov . (5.27) and thus tΔΩ  would be unknown for the same reason just explained. In 
general, any event affecting the variance of more than one factor causes the breakdown of Rigobon’s 
identification strategy. 
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in the propagation of financial shocks across borders. This is at odds with the current 
consensus on financial contagion, which admits a relevant role played by investors’ 
sentiments in recent episodes such as the East Asian crisis. As shown in the literature 
review in chapter 2, various theoretical models of investor-behaviour-driven 
contagion have been developed in recent years while empirical studies proved the 
existence of risk-appetite shifts or flight-to-quality phenomena as well as some 
evidence of jumps between multiple equilibria. The DCC assumptions appear then to 
be unjustifiable from a theoretical point of view and proved false by ample empirical 
evidence. 
 
In fact, the DCC test has the same limit of the FR test: in order to achieve 
identification, it restricts a crisis to be a very specific structural break in the variance-
covariance structure of the stock indexes. Namely, a crisis can only cause the increase 
of a subset of idiosyncratic elements’ variance. This point is highlighted by Billio and 
Pelizzon (2003) as well. They argue that in the light of the quick spread of volatility 
across markets it is hard to believe that a crisis will cause heteroskedasticity in a 
subset of idiosyncratic elements only. In terms of our bivariate model, Billio and 
Pellizon argue that a crisis is likely to cause an increase in the variance of both ε  and 
η . They show that in such a situation the DCC test is biased.  
 
5.1.3 Extreme events-based tests 
 
Other researchers try to deliver tests based on a less stringent set of 
assumptions. Favero and Giavazzi (2002) propose a two-step procedure to test for 
instability in foreign exchange expectations in the pre-euro ERM area. To do so, they 
estimate the interdependence of the interest rate differentials between 7 ERM 
countries and Germany, considered the centre of the ERM system, and then test 
whether such interdependence becomes stronger during turbulent times. 
The two-step procedure is as follows: first a VAR including all 7 interest rate 
differentials in the sample is estimated and the residuals tiu ,  are obtained. The latter 
are intended to isolate the part of the differentials’ variation caused by either 
idiosyncratic elements, simultaneous (t to t) interdependence or common shocks 
taking place in time t (the VAR is indeed controlling for shocks taking place in the 
past only). The residuals therefore represent the variation caused by the elements 
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included in our latent factor model (5.4). “Extreme” values of the residuals are then 
defined as those observations further than 3 estimated standard deviations from the 
mean. These extreme values are intended to identify extraordinary shocks. Then a set 
of K unique dummies Kvv ...1 , each one identifying an extreme event, is defined as: 
 

 >
=
otherwise
uv iutiti 0
31 ,,
,
σ        (5.29) 
 
where tiu ,  is the error from the ith equation of the VAR at time t. 
The second stage of the test involves the estimation of the structural model of 
interest rate differential interdependence with Kvv ...1 , the set of K unique dummies, 
each one identifying K extreme events as defined above. In a two-country setting, the 
model estimated in the second stage is: 
 
tKKttt evvvxxcx 122112111111 .. +++++++= − γγγβα    (5.30) 
tKKKKttt evvvxxcx 2222111212222 .. +++++++= ++− γγγβα     
 
where tx1  and tx2  are the interest rate differentials for country 1 and 2 with 
respect to the German rate at time t. These are assumed to be a function of the interest 
rate differential in the other country, one-lagged own differential, and the extreme 
events dummies.  
The presence of shift contagion is assessed by estimating (5.30) and testing the 
statistical significance of the extreme-event dummies (i.e. testing the 2K hypotheses 
0=iγ , for i=1,…,2K). The idea is that if the propagation mechanism is stable during 
normal and “extreme” times, the set of dummies should not have any explanatory 
power as the β ’s should already explain all the interdependence between the markets. 
Indeed, the β ’s estimate the “normal” interdependence structure (i.e. the average 
interdependence in both tranquil and crisis times). If that is the interdependence 
structure in both tranquil and crisis times, the dummies are superfluous. A rejection of 
any of the null hypotheses 0=iγ , for i=1,…,2K  is therefore considered as a proof of 
unstable propagation mechanism or shift contagion.  
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Notice that if two markets register an “extreme” event simultaneously (i.e. if 
1,1 3 utu σ>  and 2,2 3 utu σ>  in the two-country setting), the dummy assigned to that 
extreme event will represent a common shock rather than an idiosyncratic shock. 
Common shocks are then controlled for, although only “extreme” ones (i.e. those 
common shocks generating errors more than 3 standard deviations away from the 
mean). 
The simultaneous interdependence of interest rate differentials (i.e. the fact that 
tx1  and tx2  appear as regressors in the other country’s equation) raises the issue of 
endogeneity. This is dealt with by estimating the model with a Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator using three own lags and as instruments for 
the endogenous variables. The dummy variables are considered exogenous and 
therefore not instrumented but used as included instruments themselves. This feature 
of the test is contested by Pesaran and Pick (2004). They repeat the Favero and 
Giavazzi test instrumenting the dummies as well, to find very similar results anyhow. 
Notice also that the simultaneous interdependence raises the issue of the 
identification of the system. Since each equation has one outcome variable with 
unrestricted parameter, one regressor must be excluded from each equation in order to 
achieve identification. To obtain this, Favero and Giavazzi restrict the lag structure in 
the system. The only lag assumed to influence the interest rate differentials is the one-
period own lag. The restriction requires markets to react instantly, so that all the 
effect of foreign shocks must be internalised in the domestic outcome variable within 
the same period. The one-period lags of all others differentials are then excluded 
regressors that guarantee identification. In the two country setting, we have one 
unrestricted outcome variable and one excluded regressor (the other country’s one-
period own lag) per equation. The system is then just identified. The authors then 
move to an overidentified model by restricting to zero all the dummies coefficients 
that are found to be statistically insignificant.  
 
FG test vs. DCC 
 
The Favero and Giavazzi test (FG henceforth) is superior to the DCC in two 
aspects: first, with the use of dummies, it uses a full information estimation technique 
by estimating the interdependence equations on the full sample. The DCC implements 
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instead a limited information technique: it splits the data into two tranquil and crisis 
sub-samples and estimates the difference in the var-cov matrix of the two periods. As 
Favero and Giavazzi point out, the sample splitting can reduce greatly the 
unbiasedness and efficiency of the estimation, especially if one of the two samples 
has few observations. This is indeed the case of the DCC application in Rigobon 
(2002), where the crisis period is often comprising less than 15 observations. Favero 
and Giavazzi argue that their full information approach provides a test with higher 
power than the DCC.  
The second aspect in which the FG test is superior is that it relies on less 
restrictive assumptions about the variance-covariance matrix of the errors. To see 
this, rewrite the FG second stage interdependence equations (5.30) as: 
 
tttt xxcx εβα +++= − 2111111       (5.31) 
tttt xxcx ηβα +++= − 1212222           
 
 with: 
 
tKKt evvv 12211 .. ++++= γγγε       (5.32) 
tKKKKt evvv 222211 .. ++++= ++ γγγη         
 
Notice the similarity of (5.31) with the non-reduced factor model (5.4). The 
former is identical to the latter with one lagged dependent variable added and with 
common shocks w restricted in the errors. ε  and η  represent the errors during both 
tranquil and crisis times, while 1e  and 2e  represent the error during tranquil times 
only (see 5.32). 
As we have seen above, the DCC test is based on the structural model (5.4). Thus 
comparing ε  and η  in (5.31) with ε  and η  in (5.4) one can see the different 
assumptions regarding the variance-covariance matrix change during crises upon 
which the two tests hinge. The comparison can be made in the two-country setting 
without loss of generality and so we will do. First notice that to compare ε  and η  in 
(5.31) with ε  and η  in (5.4), one must take into account that the latter do not include 
common shocks while the former include extreme common shocks. Defining ε  and 
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η  in (5.31) and in (5.4) (and thus in the FG and DCC setting) respectively FGε , FGη  
and DCCε , DCCη  we can thus write: 
 
*
1wDCCFG λεε +=           (5.33) 
*
2wDCCFG ληη +=             
 
The idiosyncratic errors in the FG structural equations are equal to the 
idiosyncratic errors in the structural equations of the DCC plus the extreme common 
shocks *w . The DCC test assumes ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,, === ηεηε CovwCovwCov . Therefore, 
under the DCC assumptions, the variance-covariance matrix of FGFG ηε ,  is: 
 




+•
+
=Ω 22
2
2
21
22
1
2
w
w
DCC
DCC
σλσ
λλσλσ
η
εε        (5.34) 
 
In the DCC setting a crisis is an increase in one idiosyncratic element only, 
namely η . The matrix of changes in the variance-covariance matrix (5.34) brought by 
the crisis is then: 
 



Δ=ΔΩ 20
00
DCCη
ε
σ
         (5.35) 
 
(5.34) tells us that under the DCC test’s assumption the only correlation between 
FGε  and FGη  is caused by the common factor and measured by the loadings 21λλ . 
(5.35) states that the correlation cannot be altered by a crisis. Furthermore, it states 
that a crisis can only increase the variance on one error, FGη . 
From this, one can see that the FG test imposes a less restrictive set of 
assumptions on the variance–covariance matrix of the errors tt ηε , . The only 
assumption made in the FG setting is that 1e  and 2e  are jointly normally-distributed 
and homoskedastic. In other words, the crisis dummies are assumed to filter any 
alteration to the normal and homoskedastic nature of the non-crisis errors 1e  and 2e . 
The dummies can however generate any heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and non-
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normal structure, so that the variance-covariance matrix of ε  and η  is totally 
unrestricted (see 5.32). If then the var-cov matrix of ε  and η  must be equal to (5.34) 
under the DCC assumptions, it is instead totally unrestricted under the FG 
assumptions. Furthermore, the changes caused to the var-cov matrix by a crisis are 
also unrestricted in the FG while are restricted to (5.35) under the DCC assumptions.   
The FG test is then more robust than the DCC. In particular, we have seen that the 
DCC effectively rules out investor behaviour changes because it restricts a crisis to be 
a shock that does not alter the covariance between idiosyncratic shocks, while 
investor behaviour alters the covariance among idiosyncratic shocks. On the contrary, 
in the FG test a crisis can alter the covariance among idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore 
the FG test is robust to investor behaviour shifts and can detect breaks in the 
propagation mechanism under those circumstances as well.  
 
The FG test results suggest the presence of shift contagion. Several dummies are 
found extremely significant, rejecting the hypothesis of a stable propagation 
mechanism even for advanced financial markets such as the ERM area ones. This is in 
contrast with the DCC results that found no breaks in the propagation mechanism of 
advanced markets such as the EU and the US. Furthermore, various dummies related 
to negative events have opposite signs in different equations, implying that the 
negative event had opposite effects on different exchange rates. Favero and Giavazzi 
give an interesting interpretation of such facts. They notice that the sign tends to be 
negative for the country with worse records in inflation targeting and commitment to 
euro parity and positive for the country with better records. It seems then that 
investors move towards the safer currencies when negative shocks of extraordinary 
size hit the ERM area. In other words, investors fly towards quality9.  
 
Variations on the FG test are provided by the Pesaran and Pick 2002 (PP 
henceforth) and the Bae, Karolyi and Stulz 2000 (BKS henceforth) tests. The PP test 
differs from the FG in two aspects only: 
- instead of defining one dummy for each extreme event as FG, it defines a 
dummy for each currency market. This dummy will take value 1 every time an 
extreme event occurs anywhere. Therefore, all v dummies defined by FG are 
                                                 
9 Notice also that in this case the shift contagion generate a decrease in the cross-market correlation. 
Flight to quality phenomena can thus cause shifts of correlations in both directions. 
 143
condensed in one only dummy per market. In practice the PP test forces all extreme 
events to have the same effect (if any) on the exchange rate under investigation.  
-  The dummies are considered endogenous and therefore instrumented. 
The results of the PP test are very similar to those of FG, several breaks to the 
propagation mechanism are found. 
 
Bae, Karolyi and Stulz also identify extreme events as outliers in the errors of a 
VAR. Their first-stage is identical to the FG’s one. However, the outliers are then 
used to define the second stage’s dependent variable. The latter is defined as the 
number of simultaneous extreme events occurring in the region. An example might 
help. The BKS test for Latin America is run as follows: 
1) A VAR of all Latin American stock returns is estimated 
2) Errors are extracted and extreme events (“exceedances” in BKS words) are 
defined as those observations standing more than three standard deviations 
away from the mean (just as in the FG setting) 
3) The number of exceedances occurring in the same day in Latin America are 
defined “co-exceedances” 
4) A multicothomous dummy is specified: 
 



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


−
−
−
−
−
+
=
sexceedanceco
sexceedanceco
sexceedanceco
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sexceedancecono
c
4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1
0
      (5.36) 
 
so if 1=c  two Latin American countries showed an error more than three 
standard deviations from the mean in the same day. 
 
5) Points 1) to 4) are repeated for other areas (East Asia, EU, US) 
 
6) A probit model is estimated to investigate whether the probability of c being 
equal to 1,2,3 or 4 is increased by the occurrence of co-exceedances outside 
Latin America. In other words, the probit model estimates the effect of co-
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exceedances outside Latin America on the conditional distribution of c, the 
number of co-exceedances in Latin America. 
 
The test is applied to four regions: Latin America, East Asia, Europe and the US. 
The results are unambiguously against the stability of the propagation mechanism in 
Latin America and East Asia. Co-exceedances in other regions increase significantly 
the probability of co-exceedances in both regions. Europe and the US appear less 
sensitive to events in other regions, showing only marginal increases in the 
probability of domestic co-exceedances caused by extra-regional ones.  
 
Filtering and the tests’ power 
 
A key feature of the FG, PP and BKS  tests is the filtering of data: the residuals 
from the VAR are filtered in the sense that only extreme observations are given a 
dummy and then inserted in the second stage (or are considered “exceedances” in the 
BKS test). Therefore, only extreme events are assumed to cause breaks in the 
interdependence structure. If events smaller than those defined as extreme cause a 
break in the propagation mechanism, limiting the investigation of the existence of 
breaks to those caused by extreme events causes a loss of information contained in 
the data that could affect seriously the power of the test. The practical consequences 
of such filtering on the power of extreme-events based tests are investigated by 
Dungey et al. (2005) with a Monte Carlo experiment. They assume a three- countries 
model of shift contagion: 
 
ttt uwy ,1,1 24 +=  
tttt uuwy ,1,2,2 2102 δ++=       (5.37) 
tttt uuwy ,1,3,3 243 δ++=  
 
where w is a common factor affecting all three countries, and iu  is country i's 
idiosyncratic factor. They set 0=δ  in tranquil times and 0≠δ  during crises. 
Country 2 and 3 are therefore affected by country’s 1 idiosyncratic shocks only 
during crises, and it is precisely this propagation channel arising during crises that 
constitutes shift contagion. δ  measures the strength of the contagion.   
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Notice that (5.37) is effectively a latent factor model just like (5.2) with no 
interdependence during tranquil times. Indeed, taking a three-country version of (5.2) 
and imposing 0=iγ  for i=1,2,3 and δγ ='i  for i=2,3. gives the system (5.37). As all 
the tests presented above were reducible to a test of the shift contagion hypothesis 
(5.11), they are reducible to a test of the hypothesis 0=δ  in the system (5.37). The 
power of the tests presented above can thus be assessed by applying them to data 
generated by (5.41) and computing how often they detect shift contagion. 
Dungey et al. generate 10000 replications of a dataset containing 100 “tranquil 
times” observations (where 0=δ )  and 50 “crises” observations (where 0≠δ ) from 
the model (5.37). They assess the power of the five tests described above (FR, DCC, 
FG, PP1, PP2, BKS) by applying them on each replication and computing the 
percentage of times the tests detect shift contagion from country 1 to 2 and from 1 to 
3. PP1 and PP2 represent two versions of the Pesaran and Pick test, with, 
respectively, instrumented and non-instrumented dummies.  
Since shift contagion takes place in each replication of the experiment, the 
percentage of times the tests detect contagion should be as close as possible to 1. This 
is unlikely to occur, so that a less stringent request is that the power function of the 
test be monotonic in δ  (i.e. that its power increases as δ  does). Six different 
experiments are performed, to assess the power of the tests in different scenarios:  
 
1) High autocorrelation of the common factor w 
2) Medium autocorrelation of the common factor w 
3) No autocorrelation of the common factor w 
4) Increase in the variance of 1u  during crises 
5) Increase in the variance of w  during crises 
6) Increase in the variance of w  during crises with  ARCH dynamics 
 
Each experiment is repeated four times with, respectively, 10,5,2,1=δ . In this 
way, the Monte Carlo exercise assesses each test’s power function (i.e. the 
relationship between the strength of shift contagion and the percentage of times this is 
detected) as well.  
In general, all tests exhibit very low power, especially when structural breaks are 
taking place (experiments 4 to 6). Even with the highest strength of contagion 
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( 10=δ ) all tests exhibit power close to zero in at least one scenario. The 
performance of the three tests based on filtering (FG, PP, BKS) is particularly poor: 
in all six experiments they detect shift contagion in roughly 10% of times while in the 
some of the same scenarios the power of the FR and DCC tests is close to 1. 
Furthermore, all three tests have a very flat power function, meaning that their ability 
to detect shift contagion does not increase as its strength increases. In some cases the 
opposite is true, the probability of them detecting contagion falls as δ  increases. 
Comparing the DCC and the non-instrumented PP test, one finds that the former has 
a significantly higher power in all experiments, sometimes four times bigger than the 
latter. Since both tests do not instrument to control for simultaneity bias, Dungey et 
al. argue that the reduction in power of the PP test represents “the information loss of 
using a filter that excludes important sample information”. The fact that all tests 
based on filtering exhibit significantly lower powers than the others gives support to 
this statement. 
So, while the FG, PP and BKS tests are preferable on the basis of their less 
stringent assumptions on the variance-covariance structure of the system and no 
sample splitting, their filtering process causes a severe loss in information. A trade-
off between robustness and power of tests seems to be there. The FR/DCC approach 
has more power but can give wrong answers if the crisis does not take the specific 
form it assumes; the FG/PP/BKS approach deals with all forms of crises but detects 
shift contagion only when this is extremely strong (and not even then sometimes). In 
light of these considerations, a test that leaves the var-cov structure unrestricted, 
estimates the structural equation on the full sample and avoids the filtering process 
would retain the appealing features of both approaches: robustness and power. 
Providing such a test is the aim of the next section.   
 
 
5.2 A Quantile Regression-based test for the instability of stock markets’ 
interdependence 
 
In this section I will provide a shift contagion test that, as the FG, PP and BKS, 
does not assume a particular form for tεΔΩ  and does not split the dataset into tranquil 
and crisis samples while retaining the desirable features of the DCC (i.e. it avoids the 
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filtering of data). This aim is pursued with the use of Quantile Regressions (QR 
henceforth). To illustrate the underlying idea, recall the latent factor model in eqs. 
(5.4): 
 
tttt xwx εβα ++= 2111        (5.38) 
tttt xwx ηβα ++= 1222  
 
The interdependence of stock markets tx1  and tx2  during tranquil times is 
measured by the β s. I call these “interdependence coefficients”. Now assume that 
country 2’s stock exchange is hit by a major negative shock such as a currency and/or 
banking crisis. If shift contagion takes place so that there is a break in the 
interdependence structure of the stock markets, the model becomes: 
 
( ) tttt xwx εδβα +++= 21111       (5.39) 
( ) tttt xwx ηδβα +++= 12222     
 
When tx2  is large and negative for idiosyncratic reasons (i.e. when tη  is large and 
negative), the effect of tx1  on tx2  increases by the amount 2δ  and the effect of tx2  on 
tx1  increases by 1δ . If the idiosyncratic elements are correlated via investor 
behaviour (or in general if returns are related in any way other than market 
interdependence or common factors), we will have that ( ) 0, >ηεCov  and thus both 
tη  and tε  will tend to be negative. Both stock markets will tend to show below-
average returns for idiosyncratic reasons. In other words, both returns will be in the 
bottom tail of their distribution conditional on the regressors. It follows that, if the 
interdependence structure of the two markets is unstable, below-the-conditional-
median observations of both tx2  and tx1  should be associated with different 
interdependence coefficients than those associated with median observations of tx2  
and tx1 . If market interdependence increases during crises, the coefficients associated 
with below-the-conditional-median observations should be bigger than those 
associated with median observations. The presence of shift contagion can then be 
assessed by estimating the interdependence coefficients at the median and at the 
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bottom of tx2 ’s and tx1 ’s distributions and then testing their equality. This is the 
procedure implemented in the following. 
 
In the above discussion I have assumed ε  and η  to be correlated so that when a 
crisis hits country 2 both ε  and η  will tend to be negative. In this setting, an increase 
in the interdependence coefficients at the bottom of tx2 ’s and tx1 ’s conditional 
distributions represents increased market interdependence during crises.  
If instead ε  and η  are uncorrelated, bigger interdependence coefficients at the 
bottom of tx2 ’s and tx1 ’s conditional distributions represents increased sensitiveness 
to foreign shocks when the domestic market is underperforming for idiosyncratic 
reasons, whatever those reasons are.  
ε  and η  are likely to contain both genuinely idiosyncratic elements (e.g. 
productivity growth) and elements generating correlation among the two (e.g. 
investor behaviour). In other words, η  can be negative for low productivity growth or 
investors behaviour shifts caused by a crisis in country 1. Aim of this test is however 
to detect the eventual instability of the shock propagation mechanism, for the reasons 
highlighted at the very beginning of the chapter. Therefore, distinguishing whether 
shift contagion takes place during crises or more generally when the domestic market 
is underperforming for idiosyncratic reasons is beyond the scope of this application. 
 
This test is again nested in the latent factor model presented at the beginning of 
the chapter. Take (5.2) as the model describing the interdependence structure at the 
median and (5.8) as the model describing the interdependence at the, say, 1% quantile 
of the dependent variable’s conditional distribution (i.e. the extremely negative 
conditional stock returns). Testing the equivalence of the interdependence coefficients 
at the median and 1% quantile is identical to test the hypothesis (5.11), the standard 
shift contagion test nested in the latent factor model approach. 
 
However, the QR approach implies some differences with respect to the shift 
contagion tests presented above. By estimating the market interdependence at 
different quantiles of the dependent variable’s conditional distribution, the QR test 
investigates whether foreign shocks have different repercussions on the domestic 
market depending on the latter’s idiosyncratic performance. On the other side, 
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traditional shift contagion tests investigate whether foreign shocks have different 
repercussions on the domestic market depending on the size of those shocks or the 
degree of volatility in the global markets (i.e. depending on foreign markets’ 
performance). This implies a difference between what shift contagion means in 
standard tests and in the QR test. In standard ones, shift contagion means that “big” 
negative foreign shocks (or extraordinary volatility) have stronger domestic 
repercussions than “small” ones, whatever the domestic market’s idiosyncratic 
performance. The break in the propagation mechanism is then caused by an 
extraordinary negative event abroad. Differently, in the QR test shift contagion means 
that negative foreign shocks have stronger domestic repercussions when the 
idiosyncratic performance is poor, whatever the size of the foreign shock. Here the 
break in the propagation mechanism is caused by an extraordinary negative 
idiosyncratic performance. However, both types of instability generate shifts in 
markets’ interdependence. Investigating them sheds light on the key aspects discussed 
at the very beginning of this chapter.   
Another difference is the definition of a crisis. In all correlation-based tests such 
as the FR and the DCC the test is made operational by splitting the sample into a high 
and a low volatility sub-samples. There is a great deal of arbitrariety in this 
procedure. To give an example, consider the DCC test applied on the East Asian 
crisis. Here Rigobon defines the tranquil sample as the one running from 2-Jan-1997 
to 2-Jun-1997 (the day the Thai central bank abandoned the dollar peg and let the 
Baht float). Three alternative crisis periods are then defined, starting respectively 
from: 10-Jun-1997, 27-Oct-1997, 1-Dec-1997. These dates correspond to 
respectively: the immediate aftermath of the Thai devaluation, the explosion of Hong-
Kong short-term interest rates (widely considered as the moment in which the crisis 
went international) and the devaluation of the Korean Wong. Using the first crisis 
sub-sample, the DCC test detects shift contagion in Latin America, using the other 
two windows it does not. What result should be trusted? The problem is that one 
cannot compare the results since they are based on different datasets: the different 
results could be due to sampling variance only. It follows that one cannot say that, 
since the window containing the Thai devaluation is the only rejecting parameters 
stability, the Thai devaluation was the only event causing shift contagion. Billio and 
Pellizzon (2003) show that this problem is systematically affecting the DCC test. 
Performing the DCC test on rolling windows, they find that even a 3-days shift in the 
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latter changes the test result from clear-cut rejection to acceptance of the null of no 
shift contagion. This is in fact what happens in Rigobon’s application as well. In the 
Latin American and East Asian zones one finds rejections and acceptances of the null 
hypothesis by shifting the border between crisis and tranquil times by a week.  
A similar problem plagues extreme-event-based tests such as the FG. Recall that 
the latter defines an “extreme event” as a VAR residual lying 3 or more estimated 
standard deviations from the mean. This definition is clearly arbitrary (why not 4 nor 
2 standard deviations?) and it makes the size of a shock defined as “extreme” 
positively related to the volatility in the sample. The higher the volatility in the 
sample, the bigger the absolute size of an observation lying more than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean. Also, changing the definition of a crisis (shifting the 
number of standard deviations necessary to be categorized as an extreme event) alters 
the structural model estimated. Indeed, the higher the standard deviations determining 
the threshold, the lower the number of dummies included in the model. Therefore, as 
in the DCC setting, one cannot compare the results from tests based on different crisis 
definitions. Different results can be generated by different covariances among 
estimated parameters. 
In this aspect the QR test is preferable because it allows the comparison of results 
arising from different definitions of crisis. In the QR setting a “crisis” is a quantile on 
which the structural model is estimated and the interdependence parameter compared 
with the median one. Clearly, the definition of crisis as the 1% rather than the 2% 
quantile is arbitrary as the other tests’ definitions were. Potentially, one could limit 
the arbitrariness by estimating the interdependence parameter at all quantiles and then 
compare it with the median one. Therefore, a complete mapping of the 
interdependence across the whole conditional distribution of the domestic stock 
returns could be carried out, in search for breaks. The instability of the propagation 
mechanism could then be tested without relying on an arbitrary definition of crisis. In 
practice, estimating a model with 100 simultaneous equations is unfeasible. First, one 
would need a huge dataset to guarantee enough degrees of freedom and, second, a 
standard computer would probably be unable to carry the burden of calculations 
involved. Since the model’s variance-covariance matrix is bootstrapped, even a much 
more parsimonious model such as the one estimated in the present chapter proved 
challenging for a standard computer. Therefore, one is likely to have to choose a 
limited number of quantiles on which to base the test. The definition of a crisis is then 
 151
arbitrary in the QR setting as well. The latter is however still preferable because, 
contrary to the other tests, it allows comparisons among tests based on different 
definitions of crises. Let us say, for example, that one tests for the difference between 
the interdependence coefficient at the median and at the 1% and 5% quantiles. If the 
second test does not reject parameters equality but the first does, this is due only to 
the different weight assigned to the observations in the sample in the two different 
quantile regressions. The structural model and the data on which the latter is 
estimated are identical in the two tests, and therefore the eventual difference in the 
results cannot be generated by sampling variance or different correlation among 
different regressors. It must arise from the different interdependence at different 
quantiles of the dependent variable’s conditional distribution only. Therefore, the QR 
tests allows for a direct comparison of results arising from different definitions of 
crisis. This is indeed done in the robustness analysis below, where the QR test is 
applied on different extreme quantiles. 
 
The QR setting avoids filtering the data, therefore extracting more information 
that extreme-event-based tests from the same dataset. We have seen above that the 
filtering causes important informational losses, so that avoiding filtering should make 
the QR a more powerful test than the extreme-event-based ones. Also, the QR 
estimates the structural model on the full sample while the DCC estimates the model 
on two sub-samples in order to compare the results from the two. As seen, this causes 
a relevant loss of information, reason for which the QR should be a more powerful 
test than the DCC as well. 
 
Finally, the QR test leaves the variance-covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic 
factors and its change during crisis unrestricted. This makes it a more robust test than 
the DCC and, in particular, a test robust to investor behaviour shifts. Since these have 
been widely recognized as at least an important source of contagion, this seems a 
relevant advantage. In order to treat this issue in some detail, a formal discussion of 
the test methodology is needed. For this reason, this discussion is postponed to the 
methodology section below. 
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5.3 Methodology and Econometric Issues 
 
5.3.1 The estimated model 
 
The estimated model is a multivariate equivalent of (5.38) with two common 
shocks proxies NY and CPS: 
 
tttitit uCPSNYCy ++++= 10 γγβα                 (5.40) 
 
where: 
 
ity  is the percentage change in country i's stock market index in month t  
itC  is the contagion index for country i in month t .This is defined as: 
 
( )
≠
=
ij
jtijtit yMC *        (5.41) 
 
it is the sum of the returns of all stock markets but i, weighted by the relative 
importance of market j for market i. The weights are normalized so that they add up 
to one. This allows for a clear interpretation of the coefficient associated with 
contagion index. The relative importance is measured by the degree of bilateral trade 
over country’s i's GDP: 
 
it
ijt
ijt GDP
EX
M =          (5.42) 
 
The definition of the contagion index and the weighting scheme follow the same 
line of thought exposed in the fourth chapter. For a justification of the index and a 
detailed description see equation 4.3 and related discussion. 
tNY  is the percentage change of the New York Stock Exchange Composite index 
in month t. This variable is intended as a proxy for common shocks affecting 
financial markets such as shocks on oil prices or the US monetary policy for example. 
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iCPS  is the monthly change in the average US spread between 90-Day AA and 
A2/P2 Non-financial Commercial Paper. This is intended as a measure of investors’ 
risk perception and tolerance. As one can see in Figure 5.3, the spread’s hikes 
coincide with all major crises in the sample: the Russian-LTCM crisis, the dotcom 
crash, the Argentinean devaluation and finally the current global credit crunch are 
spotted at first sight. The huge spike at the end of the 2008 summer is particularly 
interesting. It is on September the 15th , the day Lehmann Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy. 
  
Figure 5.3 
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The figure shows how the commercial paper spread follows closely the events on 
global markets, and how the premium required by investors to buy riskier commercial 
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paper increases markedly every time a negative shock hits the markets. The spread 
provides therefore a good measure of the shifts in investors’ risk assessment and/or 
tolerance. During tranquil times, low risk is perceived (and tolerance is relatively 
high), and as a consequence investors require a small premium to buy riskier paper. 
When a crisis shakes the markets investors re-assess the risk of default upwards and 
therefore increase that premium. Also, investors might become more risk-averse after 
a major negative giving rise to fight-to-quality phenomena. As discussed earlier in 
this thesis, there is broad consensus that shifts in investors’ behaviour played a role in 
the transmission of turbulence across financial markets in the ‘90s. By affecting more 
market simultaneously, investors’ behaviour shift would bias the interdependence 
coefficients upwards just as another common shock. CPS is then included in the 
estimated model in order to avoid this possibility.    
 
Equation (5.40) is estimated at the median and 6 different quantiles (.01 .05 .1 .9 
.95 .99). The shift contagion tests are a test of the null hypothesis: 
 
Mq ββ =   q=0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99   (5.43) 
  
where Mβ  is the interdependence coefficient in the median equation while qβ  is 
the one in the quantile q equation. A rejection of the null is interpreted as the 
detection of shift contagion. 
 
System estimation 
 
In order to perform the test (5.43) it is necessary to estimate a system of 7 
equations (one per quantile) and obtain the systemic variance-covariance matrix. This 
procedure is implemented by the Stata command sqreg. Following the method 
suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1982), the sqreg command estimates all the 
equations in the system simultaneously and then obtains the inter-quantile var-cov 
matrix of the estimators by bootstrapping. The estimated system is then formed of 7 
equations identical to (5.40), each one fitted on one of the 7 quantiles listed above: 
 
tttitit uCPSNYCy
9999
1
99
0
9999 ++++= γγβα  
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… 
t
M
t
M
t
MM
it
MM
it uCPSNYCy ++++= 10 γγβα     (5.44) 
… 
tttitit uCPSNYCy
11
1
1
0
11 ++++= γγβα  
 
Pooling 
 
One could estimate the system (5.44) for each of the N countries in the sample. 
This procedure would however require the estimation of N systems of Q equations 
(one per quantile) with K parameters each. We want to estimate the difference among 
the median and 6 quantiles coefficients, with 4 regressors per equation on a sample of 
57 countries. The procedure would then require the estimation of 7*4*57=1596 
parameters. Furthermore, since we want to test the difference between coefficients in 
different quantile equations, the systemic var-cov matrix has to be estimated. 
Therefore, we would have to estimate 57 var-cov matrices, one for each country. 
Although we have a relatively big sample consisting of almost 7000 observations, the 
need for instrumentation (discussed further down) imposes to keep the number of 
estimated parameter at the lowest possible level. Pooling the data reduces the number 
of parameters to be estimated to 4*7=28 plus one systemic var-cov matrix. This is 
therefore the procedure pursued. One only system is estimated on the pooled sample: 
 
9999
1
99
0
9999 uCPSNYCy ++++= γγβα  
… 
MMMMMM uCPSNYCy ++++= 10 γγβα     (5.45) 
… 
11
1
1
0
11 uCPSNYCy ++++= γγβα  
 
where y is an NTx1 vector with T observations for each of the N countries in the 
sample, C is the NTx1 vector containing the contagion index C while both NY and 
CPS are Tx1 vectors stacked N times. 
 
By pooling data, (5.45) estimates the cross-country average effect of foreign stock 
returns on the conditional distribution of domestic stock returns at quantile q. The QR 
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setting tests the stability of the cross-country average interdependence. Clearly, it 
would be more informative to estimate (5.44) country by country and then testing the 
stability of the interdependence differences across quantiles. This is however 
unfeasible because of the above considerations.  
Another potential problem is that, by pooling data from all countries, these are 
unified in one only dependent variable y with probability distribution f(y). If stock 
returns are more volatile in EMEs than in financial centres (FCs henceforth), the tails 
of f(y) will include more observations from EMEs than from FCs. Since quantile 
regressions fitted at the extreme quantiles assign more weight on extreme 
observations, the estimated coefficient from those extreme quantile regressions will 
represent the coefficient of EMEs more than that of financial centres. The difference 
between the extreme and median coefficient could then be generated by different 
interdependence of different countries, rather than a change in the interdependence 
structure brought by the negative idiosyncratic performance. By looking at the 
country composition of observations at the median and at the tails of the dependent 
variable distribution, one can indeed notice a very different country composition. 
Table (5.1) provides the percentage of observations from FCs (Euro-area, US, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) and EMEs in the 
two quantiles range centred on the quantile of interest. For example, the first row 
gives the percentage of FCs and EMEs observations in the 0-2 quantiles range of the 
stock returns’ distribution. The second row gives the same percentages for the 4-6 
quantiles range and so on. FCs account for 31.6% of the overall observations in the 
sample (see MEAN row). However, they are disproportionally represented in the in 
the median range, where they account for 44.1% of the observations. In the bottom 
quantile they represent only 19.9% of the observations and even less (6.6%) in the top 
quantile. There are notable differences in country composition across different 
quantiles of y’s distribution. EMEs are far more present in the extreme quantiles, 
proving the higher volatility of their stock markets. Even if Table 5.1 disaggregates 
data of y’s unconditional distribution while the relevant distribution for the QR test is 
conditional on the regressors, these results call for prudence in interpreting eventual 
differences in the interdependence coefficients. The relevance of this issue for the test 
results is investigated with robustness tests below.  
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Unrestricted variance-covariance matrix 
 
Earlier I have affirmed that the QR test is more robust than the DCC because, 
contrary to the latter, it leaves the variance-covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic 
errors unrestricted. Now we can see this formally. For simplicity, assume for now that 
the QR test is performed on one quantile only, say 0.01, against the median with a 
sample of two countries. The estimated system is then: 
  
t
M
t
M
t
MM
it
MM
it uCPSNYCy ++++= 10 γγβα     (5.46) 
tttitit uCPSNYCy
11
1
1
0
111 ++++= γγβα  
 
and the variance-covariance matrix of the system errors 1u  and Mu  is: 
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Since the data is pooled, we have that the errors in (5.46) are: 
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and: 
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 where MMT
M
11 ,, ηεε  and MTη  are respectively country 1’s error in time 1 and T and 
country 2’s error in time 1 and T in the median equation. 11
11
1 ,, ηεε T  and 1Tη  are the 
equivalent errors in the first quantile equation. In other words, the errors in (5.46) are 
the stacked country error vectors. It follows that 2Muσ  is the cross-country average 
variance of the error in the median equation. In other words: 
 
2
22
2 MM
Mu
ηε σσσ
+
=           (5.49) 
 
where 2Mεσ  and 
2
Mησ  are the sample variance of 
Mε  and Mη . Since the cross-
country average 2Muσ  is unrestricted, so are the two elements that make up the 
average, the single country error’s variances. More importantly, Mε  and Mη  can be 
correlated so that ( )MMCov ηε ,  is also unrestricted. Summing up, the var-cov matrix 
of the country idiosyncratic errors in the median equation Mε  and Mη  is totally 
unrestricted. 
Furthermore, since 21uσ , the average error variance in the 1% quantile equation, is 
unrestricted, the difference 22 1uuM σσ −   is also unrestricted. Being the difference 
among averages unrestricted, so is the difference among its elements:  
222
1εεε
σσσ −≡Δ M  , 222 1ηηη σσσ −≡Δ M  and ( ) ( )11 ,, ηεηε CovCovCov MM −≡Δ .  
We therefore have that the variance and covariance of the country idiosyncratic 
shocks ε  and η  can take any value and can change in any way from the median to 
the 1% quantile. In other words, the cross-quantile changes in the Variance-
Covariance matrix of the country idiosyncratic shocks ε  and η : 
 




Δ•
ΔΔ
=ΔΩ 2
2
η
εε
σ
σ Cov
t          (5.50) 
 
is totally unrestricted. The QR test is then robust to any form of variance shock 
caused by a crisis. Comparing this with the changes in the Variance-Covariance 
matrix of the country idiosyncratic shocks assumed by the bivariate DCC: 
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


Δ
=ΔΩ 20
00
η
ε
σt        
(5.51) 
 
one can see why the QR is more robust. Furthermore, we have seen how this 
implies that the QR test is robust to shift contagion driven by investors behaviour 
shifts while the DCC is not. 
 
5.3.2  Simultaneity bias and instrumentation 
 
If stocks returns are interdependent (i.e. if the true β ’s are positive), C 
determines y as well as the reverse. Movements in u affect other countries’ 
fluctuations and therefore C. It follows that the error term is not independent from the 
latter. If the true β ’s are positive, simple QR  regressions will then give biased and 
inconsistent estimators, and the bias will be directly proportional to the 
interdependence of stock returns. The econometric procedure needs to take into 
consideration the likely endogeneity present in the model. As usual, the tool used to 
overcome these problems is instrumentation. This poses another question: what 
instruments are likely to be relevant and valid? Relevance (i.e. the partial correlation 
of excluded instruments with the instrumented variables) can be achieved in this 
model exploiting the mild autocorrelation exhibited by stock markets indexes at a 
monthly level. This is the reason why the analysis is carried out on monthly data. 
Daily and weekly data on stock markets fluctuations resemble random walks, making 
own lags irrelevant instruments. This point is made by both Walti (2003) and Pick 
(2007). Monthly data exhibits instead a certain degree of autocorrelation, high enough 
to make the lags relevant instruments. The relevance of the lags as instruments in this 
setting is tested via Bound’s partial-Rsquared, which will be provided and discussed 
in the results section below. Of course one could look for other variables to use as 
instruments. However, stock markets movements are notoriously hard to predict. 
Own lags are then the variable most likely to provide relevant instruments. 
Since the choice of how many and how old lags to use as instruments is 
somewhat arbitrary, I performed the first stage with a series of lags combinations. I 
have tried instrumenting C using its own lags from the first up to the twelfth, in 
several different combinations. The lag structure that provided the highest correlation 
 160
is the one including the second lag only. This is therefore the lag structure used to 
instrument C in the QR test.  
 
 
5.3.3  Quantile regression  and instrumentation 
 
Amemiya (1982) proposed a class of two-stage estimators for QR models with 
endogenous variables and called it “two-stage least absolute deviation” estimators 
(2SLAD). This is the equivalent of a 2SLS procedure where the second stage is a 
quantile regression. In fact, Amemyia showed how 2SLAD contains 2SLS as a special 
case. Powell (1986) derived the large-sample properties of such estimators, which 
have since become well established in the literature. The underlying idea is indeed 
simple enough. The regressors suspected to be endogenous are regressed on the 
whole set of exogenous variables. The fitted values of these first-stage regressions are 
then introduced in the second-stage (quantile) regression. The variance-covariance 
matrix of the coefficients is then obtained via bootstrapping. There is a long literature 
on bootstrap methods for quantile regression estimators, so that a bootstrap with a 
valid resampling scheme is a well established way of obtaining a consistent estimator 
for the variance of the estimator (see Buchinsky (1995) and Koenker (2005) and 
references therein). The valid resampling scheme is implemented by bootstrapping 
both stages of the procedure. In other words, each bootstrap replication generates a 
subset of observations on which the first and second stage equations are estimated. 
The estimate for the coefficient is the one estimated on the full sample, while the var-
cov matrix of coefficients is obtained by calculating the variance of each second-stage 
coefficient around the coefficient estimated on the full sample. We thus have the 
following procedure: 
 
 
First Stage: estimation of  
 
210 −+= itit CC δδ         (5.52) 
 
Second Stage: estimation of the system 
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9999
1
99
0
9999 ˆ uCPSNYCy ++++= γγβα  
… 
MMMMM uCPSNYCy ++++= 10ˆ γγβα      (5.53) 
… 
11
1
1
0
11 ˆ uCPSNYCy ++++= γγβα  
 
where the coefficients’ superscripts denote the quantile the regression is fitted 
upon. Cˆ  is the vector of fitted values from equation (5.52). The system contains 7 
equations, one for each of the 6 extreme quantiles (0.99 0.95 0.9 0.1 0.05 0.01) and 
the median. Both stages are bootstrapped and the β ’s, their standard errors, t-statistics 
and 95% confidence interval saved.  
The joint estimation of the 7 equations allows the bootstrapping of the systemic 
variance-covariance matrix containing the variance of all coefficients of all equations 
and their intra- and cross-equation covariances. In this way, one can obtain estimates 
for the six differences Mββ −99 , … , Mββ −1  and their standard errors, t-statistics 
and 95% confidence intervals. These constitute the core of the shift contagion test. 
The rejection of their t-tests’ null is interpreted as evidence of shift contagion. I have 
written a Stata program (ado file) that performs the two-stage QR procedure just 
described. A copy of the ado file is provided in Appendix 1.  
The 2SLAD estimator has been recently criticized by Hansen and Chernozhukov 
(2006). The authors affirm that, even if 2SLAD have an established history, the 
estimator is not very general. As a consequence, they not only recommend a more 
general method, but in their footnote 1 on page 493 they clarify that the older two-
stage method will produce inconsistent estimates when the effects of the endogenous 
variables vary across quantiles. This could pose a problem for our test, since in 
presence of shift contagion the effect of the endogenous variable (the contagion index 
itself) would indeed vary, potentially giving biased estimates. However, no 
assessment of the size of the bias is carried out by the authors. The empirical 
relevance of the theoretical result in Hansen and Chernozhukov (2006) is thus unclear 
still. Given its established position in econometrics, I will apply the 2SLAD estimator. 
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5.3.4  Heterogeneity and Autocorrelation 
 
The system (5.53) is estimated on the pooled sample. However, we are dealing 
with a panel dataset constituted by countries. In presence of a country-specific 
idiosyncratic unobservable, a pooled estimation might generate serial correlation in 
the error. The existence of country-effect is likely: some countries’ stock exchanges 
may have maintained higher growth rates than others for idiosyncratic reasons, 
independent of markets’ interdependence or common shocks. Since the contagion 
index C is instrumented using own lags, the presence of autocorrelation could render 
the instruments themselves endogenous, as discussed at length in the previous chapter 
(see section 4.3.2). This does not however seem to be an issue here since a standard 
autocorrelation test such as the one suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.177) cannot 
reject the null of no autocorrelation of the residuals of the structural equations. 
 
5.3.5  Stationarity 
 
The dataset includes 121 observations per country. From the time-series nature of 
the dataset arises the issue of stationarity. Since we are estimating the mutual effect of 
stock indexes’ growth on each other, we need to ensure the stationarity of the series. 
Otherwise, spurious relationship could be found and mistaken for interdependence. 
However, since all variables enter the model as percentage changes, this should not 
be a problem. It is unlikely that, for example, stock indexes grow or fall at an ever 
faster rate. This is indeed confirmed by Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, which reject 
the unit-root null for each stock market without any doubt. 
 
5.3.6  Identification 
 
The systemic nature of the estimated model raises the issue of identification. This is 
however easily solved. Recalling the estimated system (5.53) one can see the 
equations do not contain any outcome variable with unrestricted parameter (i.e. any 
dependent variable form other equations). The equations are therefore not 
simultaneous and the identification of the system depends on the identification of 
each equation singularly. This in turn is guaranteed by the standard assumption of 
instruments exogeneity. 
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5.3.7  Data 
 
The test exploits data from four sources: the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) and the Directorate of Trade Statistics (DOTS) complied by the IMF , the WDI 
database compiled by the World Bank and the FRED dataset compiled by the Federal 
Reserve Board.  
The IFS database has been introduced and described in the previous chapter. It 
provides monthly, quarterly and yearly data on stock market indexes. Given the speed 
at which stock markets fluctuations are transmitted across borders, monthly data are 
preferred as quarterly and yearly data would probably lose most of the dynamics by 
averaging out higher frequency oscillations. In fact, monthly data themselves are 
likely to lose a good deal of the stock markets dynamics. However, for the sake of 
instrumentation higher frequency data are not a viable option. Walti (2003) and Pick 
(2007) both showed how shift contagion tests in which the simultaneity bias is dealt 
with via the use of the financial variable’s lags as instruments is likely to give results 
as biased as a standard OLS if the autocorrelation of the financial variable is 
sufficiently weak. They notice how this is often the case in contagion tests performed 
on high-frequency (daily) financial data that are typically resembling a random walk. 
For this reason, I have applied the test to monthly data that instead showed some 
autocorrelation, at least of first and second order. In such a setting, problems 
associated with a weak instrumentation should be less pressing. The estimation of a 
standard 2SLS interdependence equation supports this view. The model gives good 
results: relevant and exogenous instruments, correct signs and extremely significant 
second-stage coefficients (see below). This clearly does not need to hold for quantile 
regressions  but, as we will see shortly, it does. 
 All data used in the analysis apart from those on exports and commercial paper 
spreads are taken by the IFS database. Data on exports disaggregated for country of 
destination is taken from the DOTS database, while data on exports’ share of GDP is 
provided by the WDI database. The latter are provided at yearly frequency and they 
are therefore transformed in monthly data by assigning the same value to all months 
of the same year. Data on commercial paper spreads are taken from the FRED 
dataset. All data apart from the latter have been downloaded using the ESDS access 
system based at the University of Manchester. 
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The sample covers 57 countries from January 1998 to December 2007, giving 121 
monthly observations for each country, for a total of 6897 observations. Also, exports 
data from the 1996-98 period are used in calculating the weightings. The countries 
included in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Hong Kong, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Venezuela and the United States.  
Summary statistics are given in table 5.2 while table 5.3 provides selected 
quantiles of the dependent variable’s unconditional distribution. 
 
 
5.4 Results and interpretation  
 
5.4.1 Preliminary estimations 
 
Before delving into the QR test results, a standard 2SLS estimation of (5.40) with 
C instrumented with its own 2nd lag is carried out. This gives an idea of the overall 
relationship existing between domestic stock markets fluctuations and the regressors 
at the basis of the QR test. It seems informative to look at the average relationship 
between domestic and foreign stock markets fluctuations before analysing it at 
different quantiles. The results are presented in Table 5.4. The column (1) gives the 
results for the standard 2SLS mean regression. All coefficients are correctly signed 
and extremely significant. A 1% increase in the contagion index causes a 0.41% 
increase in the domestic stock index value. Therefore, a 1% increase in all foreign 
other stock markets raises the domestic market by 0.41% on average and ceteris 
paribus. Looking at the common shock proxies, the model estimates that a 1% 
increase in the spread between AA and A2 US commercial paper is associated with an 
average 0.0034% decrease in domestic stock markets. This number is surprisingly 
small. To give an idea, between July and December 2008 the spread rose from 0.11 to 
1.08, representing an 818% increase in 5-months, by far the biggest since the Federal 
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Reserve started keeping this statistics. According to the estimated coefficient this 
huge rise in risk perception/aversion should have caused a mere 0.00291% decrease 
on average stock market returns. The coefficient is however correctly signed and 
significant, which is enough for a control variable. Finally, a 1% increase in the NYSE 
index causes an average 0.36% increase in world markets.  
The 2SLS exercise gives information about the instrumentation that will be used 
in the QR test as well. It represents indeed the first stage of the test. Although the 
2SLS procedure is here applied on the full sample while the QR test performs it on the 
random subsets generated by the bootstrap procedure, it gives an idea of the quality of 
the instrumentation. The second lag of C appears to be a relevant instrument: its 
partial R-squared is quite low (0.0477), but the F-stat is 1168.18, associated with a P-
value of zero. More importantly, as we will see below the coefficients associated with 
C are very significant in the second stage, a fact that hardly happen if C’s 
instrumentation is weak.  
Regarding the orthogonality of the instrument, this cannot be directly tested in the 
QR framework. Moreover, as the model is just identified, there are no overidentifying 
restrictions to be tested so that the orthogonality cannot be tested in the 2SLS 
regression either. However, re-running the first stage with one more instrument 
allows testing the exogeneity of the 2nd and the other lag used. I have gone along this 
way using the instrumentation including the 2nd lag and the other lag with highest 
partial correlation with C. Since the latter is the sum of foreign stock markets 
fluctuations, the instruments with the highest correlation with C are the ones most 
likely to be also correlated with the domestic market’s fluctuations (i.e. the dependent 
variable). They are the most likely to be endogenous. If then the combination with the 
highest correlation with C is exogenous, we can have some confidence in the 2nd lag’s 
exogeneity. The most highly correlated combination is the one with the 2nd and the 6th 
lag. Applying the Hansen-Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions on the latter 
gives a statistic of 0.008 associated with a P-value of 93.08. The null of instruments 
exogeneity cannot be rejected, and the high P-value allows to trust the exogeneity of 
these instruments. Clearly, the likely exogeneity of the two lags as instrument in the 
2SLS regression does not need to hold for the 2nd lag only and also cannot be 
generalized to the quantile regressions. The above result must then be interpreted as a 
hint of the instrument exogeneity. However, the fact that no error autocorrelation is 
detected in the structural equations makes it hard to conceive why a lagged variable 
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should be endogenous (see Sections 5.3.4 and 4.3.2 for a detailed discussion of the 
issue). 
 
If foreign markets’ fluctuations have stronger repercussions on the domestic 
market when the latter is faring badly for idiosyncratic reasons, the coefficients of the 
mean regression just presented may average out very different coefficients associated 
with extreme negative quantiles and thus be scarcely informative. In this light, it is 
interesting to compare the results just discussed with those of the same model 
estimated at the median. The latter is less sensitive than the mean to outliers and 
should therefore give a fairer idea of the model’s relationship during “normal” times. 
These are presented in column (2) of Table 5.4. This is a special case of the model 
described in (5.52)-(5.53) with the median equation only and 200 bootstrap 
replications.   
We can see that there are relevant differences between the median and mean 
coefficients indeed. The coefficient associated with the contagion index is 0.239 in 
the median regression. Compared with the 0.414 mean estimate, it represents a 42% 
drop in the estimated interdependence. The commercial paper spread coefficient also 
becomes smaller in the median regression (-24%), while the median NY coefficient is 
21% bigger than its mean counterpart. Given the differences between median and 
mean coefficients, investigating the relationship among stock markets returns at the 
extremes of their distribution seems an informative exercise. To this we now turn.  
 
5.4.2 The QR test 
 
Table 5.5 provides the results for the full 7-equations model estimation. Only the 
parameters of interest and the related statistics are presented. For each parameter the 
table provides the estimated coefficient, its bootstrapped standard error, t statistic 
with associate P-value and 95% confidence interval. The first seven rows give the 
statistics for the contagion index C for the seven quantiles, starting from 1% up to 
99%. The following six rows provide the statistics for the estimated differences 
between the extreme and the median coefficients. 
Focusing on the contagion coefficients b1 to b99, we can see that they show 
substantial instability and that this takes the form expected. The coefficients at the 
bottom tail of the distribution (b1 to b10) are notably bigger than at the median, while 
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b90-b95 are roughly the same size or smaller than the median coefficient. These 
results suggest a clear pattern: when the domestic market is performing worse than its 
median (conditional on the regressors’ value) it becomes more sensitive to foreign 
shocks, when it performs better, its behaviour is more idiosyncratic. An exception is 
when the market is doing extremely well (b99). In this case, the domestic market 
seems very sensitive to foreign shocks, somewhat challenging the previous statement. 
The 99th quantile coefficient and, as we will see shortly, its difference from the 
median are however not statistically significant.  
The size of the coefficients’ difference is notable: the coefficients on the 5% and 
10% quantiles b5 and b10 are respectively 0.72 and 0.78, roughly three times bigger 
than the median coefficient (0.24), while the 1% quantile coefficient is 1.47, six times 
bigger than the median one. To interpret these numbers, consider that the 
unconditional median market performance is 1.3% while its 5% and 10% quantiles 
are respectively -6.4% and -10% (see table 5.3). This means that when the domestic 
stock market is growing at 1.3% and all regressors are zero, a 1% fall in all foreign 
markets will push it down by 0.24%, while when the domestic market is falling by 
6.4% to 10% the same fall in foreign markets will push the domestic market down by 
roughly 0.7%. When the domestic market is falling by 18% (1% quantile of the 
dependent variable), a 1% fall will push it down by 1.47%. The results suggest that 
the mechanism of shocks propagation across stock markets is extremely unstable. 
When the domestic market is underperforming for idiosyncratic reasons it seems 
much more sensitive to foreign shocks than when it is performing averagely (or better 
medianly). Moreover, the worse the domestic market’s idiosyncratic performance, the 
stronger the domestic effects of foreign shocks. 
The top tail of the distribution paints a very different picture: the effects of foreign 
shocks are either the same or smaller than at the median. The contagion coefficient at 
the 90% quantile is 0.07, compared to 0.24 at the median. Thus, the same change in 
foreign stock indexes is estimated to be more than three times more contagious at the 
median. Considering that y’s unconditional 90% quantile is 0.09, this means that 
when the domestic market is growing by 1.3% and all regressors are zero, foreign 
shocks have roughly three times as big effects than when the domestic market is 
growing by 9%. When the domestic market is growing by 12.9% (the 95% quantile) 
the coefficient is 0.27, roughly the same as the median one. Therefore, when the 
market is doing very well for idiosyncratic reasons foreign shocks are affecting it as 
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or less than when it is at its median performance. When the domestic market is doing 
exceptionally well (+24%, the 99% quantile) the coefficient is however estimated 
around 1.2, notably bigger than the median estimate. It seems therefore that there is a 
break here as well and that foreign shocks are felt more strongly also when the 
domestic market idiosyncratic performance is exceptionally good, not only 
exceptionally bad.  
The higher coefficients at both extremes of the distribution are somewhat 
surprising, and may question the validity of the analysis. It could be that, rather than a 
break in the propagation mechanism, it is common shocks not controlled for by the 
common shocks proxies that cause stock markets to appear highly correlated in 
periods of high volatility (if the latter is caused by those uncontrolled common 
shocks). This is however at odds with two strong findings of the analysis: firstly, only 
the 99th quantile coefficient is markedly bigger than the median, while if white 
common shocks are the driving forces behind those differences, we should have all 
top tail coefficients bigger than the median, just as for the bottom tail ones. Secondly, 
all top tail coefficients are not statistically significant while all negative ones are. 
Again, if common shocks are the driving forces behind the results, these should be 
more symmetric, we should have significant coefficients at both extremes of the 
distribution. Instead the analysis identifies a statistically significant increasing effect 
of foreign shocks on the domestic market at the bottom tail of the distribution only. 
This is a key finding: bottom tail estimated coefficients are consistently bigger than 
the median and significant, while top tail ones follow unclear patterns and are non 
significant. 
 
This is reflected in the estimated differences among extreme and median 
coefficients, which is the key point of this study. So far, we have indeed described 
how different the estimated coefficients are across quantiles. However, to substantiate 
the apparent instability of the propagation mechanism we need to assess the statistical 
significance of the highlighted differences. This is done by estimating the difference 
between the coefficients at the extreme quantiles and at the median and then applying 
a standard t test. A rejection of the t tests is interpreted as a proof of propagation 
mechanism instability, a proof of shift contagion.  
The estimated differences, their bootstrapped standard errors and all other 
relevant statistics are provided in the bottom six rows of table 5.5. The difference 
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between b10, b5, b1 and b50 is significant at the 0.5%, 5% and 12% significance 
level, respectively. There is unequivocal evidence of breaks in the propagation 
mechanism: when the domestic stock market is underperforming (conditional on the 
independent variables) it is more sensitive to foreign shocks than when it is doing 
normally (the evidence is however weaker when the market is doing exceptionally 
bad). Moreover, the more below the median the domestic performance, the stronger 
the estimated foreign shocks effect becomes. On the other side, there is no evidence 
of breaks in the top tail of the distribution. The differences between the three top 
coefficients and the median one are all insignificant at any reasonable level. Stock 
markets do not appear to be more sensitive to foreign shocks when they are 
performing above the median (again, conditional on the independent variables). 
 
As noticed earlier, EMEs are more represented at the extreme of the dependent 
variable unconditional distribution while FCs are more represented at the median. If 
that is true for y’s conditional distribution as well, it could be that the cross-quantile 
differences in the estimated coefficient are simply due to the fact that EMEs are more 
sensitive than FCs to external shocks. In this case, the difference in the estimated 
coefficients would not be proof of shift contagion. Rather, it would be proof of higher 
sensitivity of EMEs than FCs to foreign shocks. However, if this would be the case 
we should find that the interdependence coefficients are bigger than the median at 
both extremes of y’s distribution. If anything, the top quantiles should show the 
biggest and most significant coefficients since EMEs are even more dominant there 
than at the bottom quantiles (see Table 5.1). What we find is instead that the 
estimated coefficients at the top half of the distribution are smaller than their bottom 
tail equivalent and not statistically different from the median one, while the bottom 
ones are. Therefore, the country composition does not seem to be the force behind the 
results. To substantiate this claim we will however split the dataset in two samples, 
one including EMEs only and another including FCs only, and re-run the QR test on 
the two country-homogenous samples. If the sceptic is right and the differences in 
coefficients are only caused by the higher sensitivity of EMEs we should see no 
cross-quantile differences in the coefficients of the country-homogenous samples. 
This and other robustness tests are presented in the next section. 
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5.5 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section I examine whether the evidence of shift contagion provided by the 
baseline model is robust to the following alterations: 
 
a) Homogenous country composition sample. As just discussed, the higher 
presence of EMEs observations at the extremes of the dependent variable’s 
distribution could be behind the higher coefficients found in the extreme 
quantiles equations. In this case the test would not give evidence of 
contagion, rather of the higher sensitivity of EMEs to foreign shocks. To 
test this hypothesis, the sample is split between EMEs and FCs. The results 
of the QR test on the two samples are given by models S1 and S2 
respectively. 
b) Different extreme quantiles. The choice of what quantiles are considered 
extreme and thus compared with the median is arbitrary. To limit the 
arbitrariness of such choice, the analysis is re-run on different quantiles. In 
model S3, the extreme quantiles are (0.02 0.07 0.15 0.85 0.93 0.98) while 
in model S4 they are (0.03 0.09 0.20 0.80 0.91 0.97). By shifting the 
investigated quantiles one is effectively changing the definition of 
“exceptional” times (i.e. the definition of “crisis” in the bottom quantiles 
case). Notice that, with respect to the baseline model, S3’s and S4’s 
extreme quantiles are closer to the median, so that the test for contagion 
becomes more stringent under these specifications. In order to find 
significant differences among the extreme quantiles coefficients and the 
median one in S3 and S4, we must have that the break happens in less 
exceptional cases than the ones identified in the baseline model. 
c) Different time span. Six observations are excluded from the beginning and 
the end of the sample in models S5 and S6 respectively. S5’s sample 
excludes most of the aftermaths of the East Asian crises since it starts in 
July 1998, while S5’s excludes the current global credit crunch since its 
ends in June 2007. These two events are arguably the biggest global shocks 
to financial markets occurred in the baseline sample period 1998-2007, 
both in terms of the macroeconomic volatility they generated and the real 
global GDP drop they caused. It is then sensible to test whether such 
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extraordinary events caused the break found in the baseline model or 
whether the instability is independent from them. 
d) Unweighted contagion index. Stock markets of countries with no relevant 
trade or financial linkages are often moving together, especially during 
turbulent times. It was this phenomenon during the crises in the ‘90s that 
gave rise to the concept of unexplained-by-fundamentals contagion. By 
weighting the contagion index C for trade intensity, the baseline analysis 
focuses on the propagation of stock market fluctuations among trade 
partners. If however other channels of propagation uncorrelated to trade 
connect stock markets, the analysis would give excessive weight to trade 
partners as source of shocks. For this reason model S7 re-estimates the 
baseline model with an unweighted contagion index.  
e) NY substituted by iUS. NY proxies common shocks affecting all stock 
markets simultaneously. Wall Street could however be affected by events 
in other markets, in which case NY could be endogenous. A variable 
commonly used as a proxy for common shocks is the Fed discount rate. 
The latter is less likely to be influenced by the performance of foreign 
stock market than the NYSE. For this reason, I substitute NY with the 
monthly change in the Fed discount rate (iUS) as a proxy for common 
shocks. In this way, common shocks should still be controlled for, and by a 
variable less likely to be endogenous. The results of this exercise are 
presented in the model S8. 
 
Tables 5.6 to 5.13 provide the results for the eight variations of the baseline model 
just described.  
The disaggregation of the sample into EMEs and FCs gives many interesting 
insights. It proves that country composition cannot be the driving force behind the 
results. Were this the case, we should see the coefficients in the two country-
homogeneous samples more or less constant across quantiles. Instead there are 
marked differences in their coefficients (see Tables 5.6-5.7). The EMEs-only 
regressions produce a pattern very similar to that of the baseline model: higher 
coefficients in the bottom tail, stable coefficients in the top tail except for the 99th 
quantile. FCs show the same pattern in the bottom tail of the distribution (higher 
coefficients at the extremes) but a very different pattern in the top tail. Somewhat 
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surprisingly, the contagion coefficients turn negative: when FCs are overperforming, 
foreign shocks have opposite-sign effects on the domestic market. To our analysis, 
the key finding is however that both types of countries show breaks in the bottom tail 
coefficients. Furthermore, these are bigger and more significant in the FCs sample 
than in the EMEs one. If the higher presence of EMEs at the extremes is what causes 
the bigger bottom tail coefficients found in the baseline model, the contrary should be 
seen: EMEs should be more sensitive than FCs to foreign shocks and should therefore 
show bigger and more significant coefficients. Therefore, the results seem driven 
more by FCs than by EMEs, since the former show bigger bottom tail coefficients 
than the latter and more statistically significant differences. 
The contagion identified in the baseline model is therefore hardly explainable by 
the different country composition. However, the pooling of EMEs and FCs increases 
markedly the precision of the estimation: the baseline estimates show smaller 
standard errors than both S1 and S2 at all quantiles. The difference between EMEs 
and FCs stock markets’ performances seems to help to providing the variance 
necessary to identify the estimated parameters. 
Finally, the very different pattern of top tail coefficients between the two types of 
countries is noteworthy. It could explain the scarce significance of those coefficients 
in the baseline model. In fact, the latter pools together countries showing opposite 
reactions to foreign shocks when overperforming. As a consequence, the estimated 
pooled contagion coefficient may be biased towards zero. Comparing the top tail 
coefficients b90, b95 and b99 in the baseline, EMEs and FCs only regressions gives 
support to this conjecture: the EMEs coefficients are always the biggest, the FCs the 
smallest and the baseline ones lay in between, as if they average out the two 
extremes. In the bottom tail of the distribution, EMEs and FCs coefficients are much 
closer and the baseline coefficients are also close to the latter and significant. 
 
Shifting the definition of exceptional times (i.e. of the extreme quantiles) does not 
alter the results substantially: bottom tail coefficients are still positively signed, 
notably bigger than the median one, increasing as one moves towards the extreme and 
significant, while top tail coefficients are also bigger than the median but less so and 
always non-significant (see Tables 5.8-5.9). Similarly the differences with the median 
are positive and significant in the bottom tail while close to zero and non-significant 
in the top tail. It is further reassuring that the differences becomes smaller and loose 
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significance as one moves the extreme quantiles closer to the median: as the 
exceptional times becomes less exceptional, their difference with respect to normal 
times is less pronounced. 
 
The East Asian and the current financial crisis did not have a fundamental effect 
on the results either: the pattern found in models S5 and S6 tracks closely the one 
found in the baseline estimation (see Tables 5.10-5.11). The same is true when the 
contagion index is left unweighted (see Table 5.12). Using the Fed discount rate 
instead of the NYSE performance as a proxy for common shocks has instead notable 
effects on the estimates. Focusing on the bottom tail coefficients, the contagion 
pattern is even stronger here than in the baseline model: the b10, b5 and b1 
coefficients increase markedly in size and significance while the opposite is true for 
the median coefficient, which falls to 0.12 (from 0.23 in the baseline model) and 
looses significance. As a consequence, the differences between extreme and median 
coefficients are even bigger and more significant (see Table 5.13). One could think 
this to be generated by the inability of iUS to proxy for common shocks. If iUS does 
not identify common shocks, these move stock markets together therefore generating 
a positive bias in the estimated contagion coefficients. However, the positive bias 
should push all coefficients up, since it should increase cross-markets correlations at 
all quantiles. The median and the top tail coefficients are instead smaller in S8 than in 
the baseline model and non-significant, with b95 and b99 turning even negative. 
Common shocks cannot be behind the increased contagion found in S8. 
 
The same pattern emerged in the baseline estimation is then found in all 
variations: the coefficients at the bottom quantiles are positively signed, notably 
bigger than the median one, increasing as one moves towards the extreme and 
significant, while those at the top quantiles are similar to the median coefficient (or 
even negative) and non-significant. Furthermore, the differences between the 
coefficients at negative extreme quantiles and at the median are positive and 
significant while at the top tail of the distribution no significant difference is found. 
We can thus say that different country composition, definitions of crises, time spans, 
trade weights and control variables used do not alter the key finding of the analysis: 
the higher sensitivity of stock markets to foreign shocks when the former are 
underperforming for idiosyncratic reasons.  
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
Correlation-based contagion tests such as the Forbes and Rigobon (2000) and the 
DDC test introduced by Rigobon (2003) are not very general. They are able to 
detected contagion only if a crisis generates a very specific structural break. I have 
argued that this is at odds with the presence of investors’ behaviour shifts. These have 
been widely documented in the recent literature on contagion, and various theoretical 
models of contagion driven by sentiment shifts have been developed. Correlation-
based tests seem then both unappealing theoretically and based on assumptions 
proven wrong in the major crises that took place in the 1990s.  
Extreme-value-based tests such as the Favero and Giavazzi (2002), the Pesaran 
and Pick (2004) and the Bae et al. (2000) provide more robust alternatives. Contrary 
to the two tests above, these leave the changes in the idiosyncratic factors’ var-cov 
matrix caused by a crisis unrestricted. However, by limiting the investigation of the 
existence of breaks in the propagation mechanism only to those caused by “extreme” 
events, they do not use all the information available in the dataset. As shown by 
Dungey et al (2005), this reduces seriously the power of those tests in detecting 
contagion.  
The aim of this chapter was to provide a contagion test that retained the appealing 
unrestricted heteroskedasticity form assumed by the second class of tests while use 
the full information contained in the dataset as the first class of tests. In this way, the 
test would provide robustness and power together. This was pursued with an 
application on stock markets’ returns of the two-stage quantile regression technique 
first suggested by Amemyia (1982). The test was based on the idea that if the 
propagation mechanism is stable (i.e. if there is no shift contagion), then the effect of 
shocks coming from foreign stock markets on the domestic one should be similar 
across the whole distribution of the dependent variable. Thus, a structural equation 
estimating the interdependence of stock markets should give similar coefficients at 
the extremes of the dependent variable’s conditional distribution as well as at the 
median. This was tested by estimating a system of seven equations, a median one and 
three extreme quantiles per part (0.01 0.05 0.1 0.9 0.95 0.99), and then testing the null 
of no difference between the interdependence coefficient across all quantiles and the 
median. The working hypothesis was that contagion would cause the interdependence 
coefficients to be bigger at the bottom of the dependent variable’s distribution (i.e. 
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that markets’ interdependence would increase during crises or exceptionally bad 
idiosyncratic performances). 
Applying this procedure on a sample of 57 stock market indexes in the 1998-2007 
period sizable differences between coefficients at the extreme quantiles and the 
median were found. These differences are in line with the working hypothesis: at the 
bottom quantiles the coefficients are bigger than at the median, while they are smaller 
or similar at the top quantiles. Therefore, while the interdependence coefficient is 
more or less stable when the domestic market is performing at or above its 
conditional median, it becomes bigger and bigger as its performance worsens. The 
differences in the bottom quantiles coefficients are both statistically significant and 
economically relevant. According to the estimates, with all regressors equal to zero, 
while a roughly stable market (i.e. a market rising by 1.3%, its unconditional median 
performance) will react to a percentage point drop in all foreign markets with a 0.24% 
fall, a plummeting market (falling by 18%, the 1% quantile) will be six times more 
reactive to foreign shocks, dropping by 1.5% after the same foreign shock. The 
analysis gives then clear evidence of increased stock markets’ interdependence during 
crises or in general when the latter are underperforming for idiosyncratic reasons.  
As pointed out in the opening of this paper, the issue of instability has been 
studied because it sheds light on three important aspects of financial and international 
economics: the effectiveness of international portfolio diversification in reducing risk, 
the effectiveness of microprudential bank regulation and the empirical relevance of 
crisis-contingent versus non-crisis-contingent contagion models. Regarding the latter, 
this chapter’s findings are consistent with crisis-contingent models such as multiple 
equilibria models and in general models based on a shift in investor behaviour during 
crises. In this light it is interesting that tests able to detect contagion in presence of 
investors behaviour shifts (FG, PP, BKS and QR) do detect it in the late ‘90s period, 
while the others (FR/DCC) do not. The empirical findings of the four models give 
support to the interpretation of those contagion episodes as a negative shift in 
investors’ behaviour triggered by a crisis onto other countries. Regarding the other 
aspects, the substantial shift in the propagation of shocks identified by this analysis 
calls into question the effectiveness of international portfolio diversification based on 
historical asset returns correlation in reducing risk as well as the effectiveness of the 
Basel II accord. Being based on Value-at-Risk measures, the latter’s capital adequacy 
requirements are likely to be lower than needed as stock markets correlation increases 
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in turbulent times. Calls for different measures of assets risk to be included in the 
Basel III accord under development are indeed common. 
It is worth highlighting that the instability identified by the QR test is caused by 
the domestic situation rather than the size of the foreign shocks hitting the domestic 
market. This analysis shows indeed that foreign negative shocks have stronger effects 
on the domestic market when this is performing below its conditional median, 
irrespective of the size of the foreign shock. Extreme-event based tests showed 
instead that extraordinary negative foreign shocks have stronger proportional effects 
than normal negative ones, irrespective of the domestic market’s performance. Thus, 
this analysis highlights a new type of contagion, one that depends on the domestic 
performance of the market rather than on the size of the foreign shock. The general 
policy implication of this research is thus that, by acting on domestic factors affecting 
the performance of stock markets, not only would policymakers boost their stock 
market performance, but they would also render the stock market more resilient to 
foreign, uncontrollable shocks. 
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Table 5.1 
Country composition 
of stock returns at 
different quantiles 
 
Quantile FCs EMEs 
1% 0.199 0.801 
5% 0.252 0.748 
10% 0.267 0.733 
   
50% 0.441 0.559 
   
90% 0.212 0.788 
95% 0.142 0.858 
99% 0.066 0.934 
   
MEAN 0.316 0.684 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Domestic stock market return overall 0.014 0.086 -0.625 2.129 
 between  0.008 0.003 0.05 
 within  0.085 -0.625 2.094 
      
Contagion index overall 0.015 0.053 -0.316 0.428 
 between  0.005 0.008 0.0289 
 within  0.053 -0.33 0.413 
      
NYSE composite index return overall 0.005 0.036 -0.123 0.103 
 between  0 0.0052 0.005 
 within  0.036 -0.123 0.103 
      
Commercial paper spread overall 0.085 0.549 -0.622 4.973 
 between  0 0.0849 0.085 
 within  0.549 -0.622 4.973 
Observations: 6783; Countries: 57; Periods 
(months) 121.         
All variables in monthly percentage changes     
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Table 5.3 
Stock market returns 
quantiles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 
Mean (2SLS) versus median (2SLAD) 
estimation of the contagion model 
  (1) (2) 
  mean median 
C 0.414*** 0.239*** 
 (0.109) (0.0746) 
dcps -0.00344* -0.00259* 
 (0.00190) (0.00142) 
NY 0.366*** 0.444*** 
 (0.106) (0.0622) 
Constant 0.00655*** 0.00584***
  (0.00149) (0.00113) 
R-squared 0.128 0.066 
Observations 6669  
Countries  57  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Quantile Value Difference 
1% -0.18054 -0.19366 
5% -0.10078 -0.11389 
10% -0.06481 -0.07793 
25% -0.02321 -0.03633 
   
50% 0.013117  
   
75% 0.047707 0.034589 
90% 0.090962 0.077844 
95% 0.128781 0.115664 
99% 0.242296 0.229179 
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Table 5.5 
QR test results 
Baseline model 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b1 1.472 0.799 1.84 0.065 -0.093 3.038 
b5 0.788 0.290 2.72 0.007 0.220 1.356 
b10 0.726 0.177 4.10 0.000 0.379 1.073 
b50 0.239 0.109 2.19 0.029 0.025 0.453 
b90 0.068 0.265 0.26 0.798 -0.452 0.588 
b95 0.274 0.393 0.70 0.486 -0.496 1.043 
b99 1.199 1.228 0.98 0.329 -1.209 3.606 
b1 - b50 1.233 0.795 1.55 0.121 -0.325 2.791 
b5 - b50 0.549 0.278 1.97 0.049 0.003 1.094 
b10 - b50 0.487 0.173 2.82 0.005 0.148 0.825 
b90 - b50 -0.171 0.246 -0.70 0.485 -0.653 0.310 
b95 - b50 0.035 0.382 0.09 0.928 -0.714 0.783 
b99 - b50 0.960 1.218 0.79 0.431 -1.429 3.348 
Observations 6669      
Countries  57      
Replications 200      
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 
QR test results 
Model S1: EMEs sample 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b1 1.387 1.039 1.34 0.182 -0.648 3.423 
b5 0.561 0.420 1.34 0.182 -0.262 1.385 
b10 0.595 0.311 1.91 0.056 -0.015 1.204 
b50 0.243 0.166 1.47 0.142 -0.082 0.568 
b90 0.238 0.394 0.60 0.546 -0.534 1.010 
b95 0.343 0.470 0.73 0.466 -0.578 1.264 
b99 1.397 1.552 0.90 0.368 -1.645 4.439 
diff01 1.144 1.048 1.09 0.275 -0.910 3.198 
diff05 0.318 0.417 0.76 0.445 -0.499 1.135 
diff10 0.352 0.294 1.20 0.231 -0.224 0.928 
diff90 -0.005 0.363 -0.01 0.989 -0.716 0.706 
diff95 0.100 0.463 0.22 0.829 -0.807 1.007 
diff99 1.154 1.569 0.74 0.462 -1.921 4.230 
Observations 4563      
Countries  39      
Replications 200      
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Table 5.7 
QR test results 
Model S2: FCs sample 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b1 1.062 0.970 1.09 0.274 -0.839 2.963 
b5 1.200 0.484 2.48 0.013 0.252 2.148 
b10 0.921 0.423 2.18 0.029 0.093 1.749 
b50 0.279 0.193 1.44 0.149 -0.100 0.658 
b90 -0.066 0.403 -0.16 0.869 -0.857 0.724 
b95 -0.322 0.503 -0.64 0.522 -1.308 0.664 
b99 -0.351 1.528 -0.23 0.818 -3.346 2.643 
diff01 0.783 0.937 0.83 0.404 -1.055 2.620 
diff05 0.921 0.444 2.08 0.038 0.051 1.790 
diff10 0.642 0.354 1.81 0.070 -0.052 1.335 
diff90 -0.346 0.401 -0.86 0.389 -1.131 0.440 
diff95 -0.601 0.513 -1.17 0.241 -1.607 0.404 
diff99 -0.631 1.515 -0.42 0.677 -3.600 2.338 
Observations 2106      
Countries  18      
Replications 200      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.8 
QR test results 
Model S3: different quantiles 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b2 0.794 0.483 1.64 0.100 -0.152 1.741 
b7 0.777 0.249 3.12 0.002 0.289 1.265 
b15 0.522 0.163 3.20 0.001 0.202 0.841 
b50 0.239 0.109 2.19 0.029 0.025 0.453 
b85 0.109 0.213 0.51 0.607 -0.307 0.526 
b93 0.218 0.332 0.66 0.511 -0.432 0.868 
b98 0.851 0.601 1.42 0.157 -0.328 2.030 
b2 - b50 0.555 0.481 1.15 0.248 -0.387 1.498 
b7 - b50 0.537 0.234 2.30 0.021 0.080 0.995 
b15 - b50 0.282 0.157 1.79 0.073 -0.026 0.591 
b85 - b50 -0.130 0.192 -0.68 0.499 -0.506 0.247 
b93 - b50 -0.021 0.316 -0.07 0.947 -0.640 0.598 
b98 - b50 0.612 0.601 1.02 0.309 -0.566 1.790 
Observations 6669      
Countries  57      
Replications 200      
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Table 5.9 
QR test results 
Model S4: different quantiles 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b3 0.743 0.381 1.95 0.051 -0.004 1.491 
b9 0.755 0.197 3.84 0.000 0.369 1.141 
b20 0.426 0.124 3.45 0.001 0.184 0.669 
b50 0.239 0.109 2.19 0.029 0.025 0.453 
b80 0.089 0.158 0.56 0.574 -0.221 0.399 
b91 0.201 0.285 0.70 0.481 -0.358 0.759 
b97 0.437 0.462 0.95 0.343 -0.467 1.342 
b3 - b50 0.504 0.375 1.34 0.179 -0.231 1.240 
b9 - b50 0.516 0.189 2.74 0.006 0.147 0.886 
b20 - b50 0.187 0.123 1.52 0.128 -0.054 0.429 
b80 - b50 -0.150 0.148 -1.01 0.311 -0.441 0.140 
b91 - b50 -0.038 0.266 -0.14 0.886 -0.560 0.483 
b97 - b50 0.198 0.458 0.43 0.665 -0.699 1.095 
Observations 6669      
Countries  57      
Replications 200      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.10 
QR test results 
Model S5: different time span 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b1 1.225 0.863 1.42 0.156 -0.467 2.916 
b5 0.837 0.318 2.63 0.009 0.213 1.461 
b10 0.707 0.204 3.47 0.001 0.308 1.107 
b50 0.244 0.132 1.85 0.064 -0.014 0.501 
b90 0.080 0.320 0.25 0.803 -0.547 0.707 
b95 0.264 0.503 0.53 0.599 -0.721 1.249 
b99 1.088 1.383 0.79 0.431 -1.623 3.800 
b1 - b50 0.981 0.872 1.13 0.260 -0.727 2.689 
b5 - b50 0.593 0.321 1.85 0.064 -0.035 1.222 
b10 - b50 0.464 0.197 2.36 0.018 0.078 0.849 
b90 - b50 -0.164 0.290 -0.56 0.573 -0.732 0.405 
b95 - b50 0.021 0.467 0.04 0.965 -0.894 0.935 
b99 - b50 0.845 1.375 0.61 0.539 -1.851 3.540 
Observations 6669      
Countries  57      
Replications 200      
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Table 5.11 
QR test results 
Model S6: different time span 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b1 1.406 0.734 1.91 0.055 -0.033 2.845 
b5 0.735 0.311 2.36 0.018 0.125 1.344 
b10 0.688 0.201 3.42 0.001 0.293 1.082 
b50 0.304 0.116 2.61 0.009 0.076 0.532 
b90 0.200 0.278 0.72 0.472 -0.345 0.744 
b95 0.267 0.412 0.65 0.517 -0.540 1.074 
b99 1.099 1.130 0.97 0.331 -1.116 3.314 
b1 - b50 1.102 0.727 1.52 0.130 -0.323 2.527 
b5 - b50 0.431 0.312 1.38 0.167 -0.181 1.042 
b10 - b50 0.384 0.195 1.97 0.049 0.002 0.766 
b90 - b50 -0.104 0.258 -0.40 0.686 -0.610 0.401 
b95 - b50 -0.037 0.406 -0.09 0.927 -0.832 0.758 
b99 - b50 0.795 1.111 0.72 0.474 -1.382 2.972 
Observations 6669      
Countries  57      
Replications 200      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.12 
QR test results 
Model S7: unweighted contagion index 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b1 2.622 1.651 1.59 0.112 -0.614 5.859 
b5 1.997 0.683 2.93 0.003 0.659 3.335 
b10 2.104 0.342 6.15 0.000 1.434 2.775 
b50 0.589 0.183 3.22 0.001 0.230 0.947 
b90 0.022 0.465 0.05 0.962 -0.889 0.934 
b95 0.449 0.626 0.72 0.473 -0.778 1.676 
b99 2.359 2.013 1.17 0.241 -1.587 6.305 
b1 - b50 2.034 1.644 1.24 0.216 -1.188 5.255 
b5 - b50 1.408 0.667 2.11 0.035 0.100 2.716 
b10 - b50 1.516 0.338 4.48 0.000 0.853 2.179 
b90 - b50 -0.567 0.449 -1.26 0.207 -1.446 0.313 
b95 - b50 -0.140 0.634 -0.22 0.825 -1.382 1.103 
b99 - b50 1.770 2.022 0.88 0.381 -2.193 5.733 
Observations 6669      
Countries  57      
Replications 200      
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Table 5.13 
QR test results 
Model S8: iUS substituting NY 
  Observed Bootstrap     Normal Based 
  Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
b1 2.396 1.052 2.28 0.023 0.334 4.459 
b5 1.728 0.640 2.70 0.007 0.474 2.983 
b10 0.948 0.443 2.14 0.032 0.079 1.818 
b50 0.121 0.163 0.74 0.457 -0.198 0.441 
b90 -0.565 0.370 -1.53 0.126 -1.290 0.159 
b95 -0.688 0.573 -1.20 0.230 -1.811 0.435 
b99 -1.963 1.762 -1.11 0.265 -5.415 1.490 
b1 - b50 2.275 1.071 2.13 0.034 0.177 4.374 
b5 - b50 1.607 0.645 2.49 0.013 0.342 2.872 
b10 - b50 0.827 0.431 1.92 0.055 -0.018 1.673 
b90 - b50 -0.687 0.343 -2.00 0.045 -1.358 -0.015 
b95 - b50 -0.810 0.552 -1.47 0.143 -1.892 0.273 
b99 - b50 -2.084 1.740 -1.20 0.231 -5.493 1.326 
Observations 6669      
Countries  57      
Replications 200      
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Appendix 1: STATA ado file performing the QRtest 
 
use C:\…\Dset.dta 
log using  C:\…\QRtest4.log, replace 
 
drop v1-NYSE 
drop w1-dw57 
drop cps Cnw 
drop if y==. 
rename dNYSE NY 
  
program QRtest, rclass 
 sort country time 
 quietly { 
  tempvar xb 
  reg C L2.C L6.C dcps NY  
  predict `xb' 
  } 
 
 sqreg y `xb' dcps NY, quantile (1 5 10 50 90 95 99) reps(2) 
  return scalar b1 = [q1]`xb' 
  return scalar b5 = [q5]`xb' 
  return scalar b10 = [q10]`xb' 
  return scalar b50 = [q50]`xb' 
  return scalar b90 = [q90]`xb' 
  return scalar b95 = [q95]`xb' 
  return scalar b99 = [q99]`xb' 
  return scalar diff01 = [q1]`xb'- [q50]`xb' 
  return scalar diff05 = [q5]`xb'- [q50]`xb' 
  return scalar diff10 = [q10]`xb'- [q50]`xb' 
  return scalar diff90 = [q90]`xb'- [q50]`xb' 
  return scalar diff95 = [q95]`xb'- [q50]`xb' 
  return scalar diff99 = [q99]`xb'- [q50]`xb' 
  end 
 
bootstrap b1 = r(b1) b5 = r(b5) b10 = r(b10) b50 = r(b50) b90 = 
r(b90) b95 = r(b95) b99 = r(b99) diff01 = r(diff01) diff05 = 
r(diff05) diff10 = r(diff10) diff90 = r(diff90) diff95 = r(diff95) 
diff99 = r(diff99) , reps (1000) seed(1): QRtest 
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CHAPTER 6 - FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study of financial contagion has developed into the study of which channels 
render financial markets of different countries interdependent, and how stable the 
interdependency is across time. This thesis investigated both aspects, integrating the 
currency mismatches phenomenon in the picture. 
The theoretical model presented in chapter 3 showed how currency mismatches 
render exchange rate volatility detrimental to the aggregate supply via its effect on 
firms’ costs of funding. External disturbances such as trade shocks or flight to quality 
phenomena can translate into higher exchange rate volatility and thus affect the 
domestic supply. This channel does not need direct trade or financial linkages to 
work, so that volatility can theoretically be transmitted to any country with substantial 
liability dollarization. This is a situation in which several EMEs have found 
themselves. Notably, some of the worst affected countries in the ‘90s crises fell in this 
category: Argentina affected by the Mexican crisis in 1995, Indonesia and Korea 
affected by the Thai crisis in 1997, Brazil affected by Russia in 1998. Also, the same 
countries shared at most weak trade or financial linkages with the crisis countries. It 
is indeed this fact that led researchers to blame investor behaviour for the spread and 
virulence of the contagion. Notably, the shift in investor behaviour documented in 
those episodes was considered mostly irrational, detached from fundamentals. The 
model presented in Chapter 3 provides a different interpretation of contagion. The 
latter is still viewed as potentially caused by a shift in investor behaviour, but this is a 
consequence of the objective deterioration of the economy’s fundamentals (i.e. of the 
increased perceived volatility of the exchange rate and therefore the risk associated 
with loans to the country). Contagion is thus related to fundamentals, although to a 
previously neglected one: exchange rate volatility in a dollarized financial system.  
 
Where trade links between countries are present, theoretical models suggested 
that currency mismatches might magnify the effects of trade level shocks (i.e. shocks 
to the level of net exports). This is an important issue in the theory of contagion as 
trade has been identified as the major source of output co-movements across countries 
from both the literature on optimal currency area and financial contagion. Currency 
mismatches’ magnifying effect of trade shocks’ real effects could then explain at least 
partly the higher observed output volatility in EMEs. To assess the empirical 
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relevance of this argument, chapter 4 tested three related hypotheses: a) that currency 
mismatches magnify the real effects of negative trade shocks, b) that currency 
mismatches magnify trade-related output volatility (i.e. that they magnify the real 
effects of trade shocks of either sign) and c) that currency mismatches generate 
asymmetric trade shocks propagation (i.e. that negative trade shocks propagate more 
strongly than positive in presence of currency mismatches).  
The results give strong support for all first three hypotheses: currency mismatches 
magnify the real effects of trade shocks, both positive and negative. They also 
generate asymmetry in the propagation mechanism, with negative trade shocks being 
felt more strongly than positive ones.  
 
These findings show that foreign disturbances such as output fluctuations can 
propagate in very different strength, depending on various factors such as the sign of 
the shock and the presence of currency mismatches. In other words, the propagation 
mechanism of output fluctuations seems unstable. If this is true for output 
fluctuations, what about financial variables fluctuations? This issue has been given 
much attention in the literature, for the reasons explained in the opening of chapter 5.  
This thesis contributed to the debate proposing a new instability test, based on 
Quantile Regressions. This was applied to monthly stock market data, giving strong 
support to the instability hypothesis. When stock markets are doing badly for 
idiosyncratic reasons (i.e. when their aggregate index is dragged down by domestic 
factors), swings in foreign stock indexes are felt more strongly than when the 
domestic market is rallying for idiosyncratic reasons. The estimated differences in the 
effects of foreign disturbances are both statistically significant and economically 
relevant: while a roughly stable market (i.e. a market rising by 1.3%, its unconditional 
median performance) will react to a percentage point drop in all foreign markets with 
a 0.24% fall, a plummeting market (falling by 18%, the 1% quantile) will be six times 
more reactive, dropping by 1.5% after the same foreign shock. The analysis gives 
then clear evidence of increased stock markets’ interdependence when the latter are 
underperforming for idiosyncratic reasons.  
 
The thesis’ main findings can be summarized in three points:  
a) currency mismatches are a key factor determining the direction 
and strength of the transmission of disturbances across financial markets 
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b) among these disturbances increases in macroeconomic 
volatility can be theoretically as damaging as deterioration in the levels of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, so that increases in uncertainty about the 
macroeconomic environment is as damaging as its certain deterioration in 
presence of currency mismatches. The empirical relevance of this point has 
to be however tested. 
c) the propagation of shocks across stock markets is unstable, with 
cross-market correlations increasing markedly during turbulent times. 
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